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During the Second British Empire, Britons actively sup- 
ported the idealized conception that one lone British officer 
or civil administrator could accomplish strenuous and often 
dangerous tasks, through sheer determination and a charis- 
matic personality.  Charles George Gordon, during his ill- 
fated expedition to Khartoum, was portrayed by the majority 
of Britons as the epitome of this highly romantic image.  The 
purpose of this research is to examine critically the growth 
and development of the so-called Gordon legend.  In doing so, 
one must attempt to discover the individuals responsible for 
its creation, while simultaneously examining the social, po- 
litical and economic environments of Great Britain and certain 
Oriental countries, which had a direct bearing on the legend 
itself.  Contrary to popular and some scholastic opinion, 
Gordon was scarcely recognized by the British public during 
and after his exploits in China (1863-1864) and his early ad- 
ventures in the Sudan (1874-1879) .  He only obtained enduring 
fame from an empire-minded public when he was sent to evacuate 
Egyptian troops during his second Sudanese mission in 1884. 
It was necessary to examine letters, newspapers (both 
Liberal and Conservative) and diaries written during Gordon's 
life time, in order to trace the changing attitudes toward a 
British Empire and the officers and civil administrators who 
strengthened British prestige overseas.  It was also essential 
to examine these materials to ascertain the reasons for the 
fluctuation in Gordon's popularity between the 1860's and 
1880's. 
Gordon's name, reputation and numerous exploits obtained 
permanent glorification during the 1880's because they had been 
so closely interwoven with the "sacred" prestige of the Second 
British Empire.  Even though attitudes toward empire greatly 
changed from the 1860's to the 1880's, the ethnocentric opinions 
of Britons with respect to the Oriental races remained the same. 
This underestimation of the Oriental's ability to change his 
seemingly stagnant environment cost Gordon his life.  His 
death necessitated the continual glorification of his achieve- 
ments in order to bolster a damaged imperial prestige among 
Orientals and Europeans alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 26   January  1885  Charles  George  Gordon,   according 
to  a popular  account,   was  speared  to  death   in  the  Governor's 
palace  in  the  Sudanese capital of Khartoum,   "while he  stood 
in  silence  surveying  his lArad antagonists.H1    During  the 
past  year,   he  had been portrayed by numerous pamphlets,  books 
and  the  imperialist  press  as   the heroic British officer  and 
administrator  abandoned by an  indifferent  Gladstone ministry. 
The  British public,   however,   regardless of  political  affilia- 
tion,   glorified Gordon  as  the  Christian knight-errant who 
through his personal   influence had quelled   thousands  of un- 
civilized  savages.     In  the minds  of British  merchants  and 
shopkeepers,   Gordon was worshipped  among  the Arab nations 
almost as   a demigod.     More  importantly,   however,   he  symbolized 
to  these Britons  their  imperial  prestige  throughout the Arab 
world;   his  death  struck  a  serious blow  to  the  standard  theory 
of British  superiority,   not only  in  the  Middle East but  through- 
out Europe. 
The  British public  came  to  accept  Gordon as   the  epitome 
of  British heroism as   a  result of  an extended period  of"indoc- 
trination"  which   stressed  the  characteristics   of  the   "ideal"Brit- 
ish hero.     An early  and   important contributor  to British  thought 
concerning heroism was  Thomas  Carlyle.     In a   series  of  lectures 
given  in  the   1840's,   Mr.   Carlyle  expressed the  belief  that 
"Universal  History,   the history of what man  has  accomplished  in 
this  world,   is  at bottom the  History of  the  Great Men.    .   .   ."2 
The hero was   God's  servant upon earth,  but he  had  to depend 
upon his  own  resources  to perform and accomplish his  appointed 
task.     This   individual had  to possess  the   important virtues 
of  "originality,   intellect,   genius,   inspiration,   and  insight," 
but  above  all   "sincerity"   in his  sacred mission.       The ultimate 
form  in  Carlyle's  evolutionary  development of heroism was   the 
"King".     In his  relationship with  his  subjects,   the will   of  the 
people   "fwasj   to be  subordinated  and  loyalty  surrendered,   .   .   . 
{while  he was}   to command over    {the  peoplej,   to  furnish   ^he 
peoplej  with constant  practical  teaching,   to  tell   \the peoplej 
for  the  day and hour what   fthey]   are   to do." 
These  influential  concepts were  seriously  challenged 
by  an  increasing number  of economists,   sociologists     and 
biologists who  found no validity   in  this   "Great Man"   theory. 
What Mr.   Carlyle  envisioned  as  the eventual  Utopia  for  Great 
Britain,   Mr.   Herbert Spencer  looked  upon as  only  a  temporary 
stage   in  man's  evolutionary  development.     This   "military" 
form of society,   according  to Mr.   Spencer,   would  eventually 
be  replaced by  a pure  industrial state  in which   the welfare 
of  the masses would  take  precedence  over the   luxury  of  a privi- 
leged  few.       He  lambasted  the  supposed virtues  of  Carlyle's 
"King".     These worshipped  individuals believed   that  "success 
in war  Was]   the  highest glory   .   .    . (and identified] good- 
ness with bravery  and  strength.     Revenge n>ecamej   a sacred 
duty with  them,"   and  they were willing to disregard  their 
country's welfare   for  personal gain.      "They must have   a patriot- 
ism, "  continued  Spencer,   "which   [regarded]    the  triumph of  their 
society  as  the  supreme  end  of  action;   they possess  the   loyalty 
whence   flows  obedience   to authority;   and  that  they may  be 
obedient;   they must have  abundant  faith   (in human  authority]."** 
Mr.   Thomas  Huxley   (in  a  letter  to Mr.   Charles  Kingsley)    "lookfed"] 
upon hero-worship  as no better  than  any  other  idolatry,   and 
H/iewedJ   the  attitude  of  the mind  of  the hero-worshipper as 
essentially immoral;    [he  believed]   that  it   fwasy   better  for  a 
man  to go wrong  in  freedom than  to  go  right  in chains.   .   .   ."' 
With the  establishment of William Ewart Gladstone's 
first ministry,   these hopeful  expectations  appeared  to bear 
fruit.     The philosophy of  "free   trade"  no  longer  required  the 
employment of Carlyle's   "King"   to man the  military outpost or 
suppress  rebellious   tribes.     Britain's  industrialists would 
cooperate  with  other  countries   to manufacture  abundant pro- 
ducts  to satisfy everyone's  needs.     Some   statesmen,   however, 
believed  Gladstone's  neglect of  foreign affairs  would  seriously 
affect  Great Britain's  prestige  and position as   a  colonial 
power.     Spurred  on by Germany's   increased  influence  in 
European  affairs,   Benjamin  Disraeli  and  the Conservative  party 
commenced an  active  campaign to make  the British  public  aware 
a 
of  their  responsibility overseas. 
The  essence of  Disraeli's   foreign  aspirations  was 
expressed  in his  Crystal Palace  speech  of  1872.     Accusing  the 
Gladstone  government of willful  abandonment of Britain's 
overseas   interests,   Disraeli  gave his countrymen   two  choices: 
either  to  stay  bottled  up  in  their  small  island kingdom,   or 
to become   "a  great  country where your sons when  they  rise, 
rise  to paramount positions,   and  obtain,   not merely  the 
esteem of your  countrymen but command  the  respect  of  the 
world."9 
While  Disraeli  called  for  the   appearance of the British 
imperial  hero,   Mr.   Charles  Kingsley  reminded  the  British 
public of  the  essential  characteristics  of  this  special  in- 
dividual.     Writing  in  1873   just before Disraeli's   government 
took  office,  Kingsley described Britons   "as  so many  sheep; 
and,   like  so many  sheep,    Rhey havel   no will  or  character 
of  their own.   ..." Complaining of  the   "pettiness  and 
dullness  of  our modern  life",   Kingsley believed  that this 
placid  existence  increased  the demand   for  "sensational novels", 
in which people  were   anxious   "to hear  of people  utterly  un- 
like  themselves,   more  noble,   and  able^ and   just,   and  sweet, 
and pure.    ..." The hero struck  out against the   injustice 
which plagued mankind  and had  the moral  and physical  courage 
to  carry  out his   convictions.     This  unusual   individual not 
only  accomplished his   appointed  task,   but did  "something be- 
yond duty;   something which  is not in  the bond,   some   spon- 
12 
taneous   and  unexpected  act of  self-devotion."   "      Furthermore, 
one must have   "a perfectly   simple,   frank,  unconscious  char- 
13 
acter"   in order  to  accomplish  something  of heroic  value. 
It  is  interesting  to note   that Sir Garnet Wolseley, 
Commanding  General of British  forces,   expressed  similar  thoughts 
fifteen years  later.     The  true hero must have   an utter dis- 
regard  for  death,   and  the   "courage"   to  tackle  any obstacle. 
He  cited  a   few examples  of British officers  who  calmly  faced 
enemy  fire   in order  to  inspire  their men.      (Sir William Peel 
at Sebastopol would  "walk  about behind  his  battery on  the 
natural  plateau of  the  ground where he  had little or no pro- 
tection  from  the enemy's   fire."14)     Wolseley  believed,   as 
did Mr.   Kingsley,   that heroic deeds were not  accomplished 
by  "simply doing their duty,   and  restricting  themselves  ex- 
clusively  to  its  simple  performance."     Someone  must be will- 
ing to risk his  life   to perform a  noteworthy  accomplishment. 
He  expressed more  respect  for  the   "dead  lion"    (i.e.   the   fallen 
hero)   than  for  the   "living donkey"    (i.e.   the  soldier who 
accomplishes   only what  is  expected  from him)." 
In  1874,   with  the  election of  the  Conservative party, 
Britons were  able  to perform,   and  if not able  to participate 
in,   read  about  the heroic  adventures of British  soldiers  and 
administrators  in numerous   travel  journals  and detailed news- 
paper accounts.     Disraeli's   "spirited  foreign policy"  became 
a reality with   the purchase of controlling  interest in  the 
Suez  Canal.   6     But public dissatisfaction over British  in- 
volvement  in  the  Balkans,   Afghanistan  and  South Africa pro- 
vided  Gladstone  with enough  ammunition  to  agitate  public 
opinion against  the Conservatives'   imperial program.     In  1880, 
Gladstone,   preaching  a policy of  domestic  reform with minimal 
foreign  involvement,   gained control over Britain's  politics. 
Even  though  dissatisfied with  the  imperial  situation 
at that  time,   the  British public never  tired of  the heroic 
accomplishments  of British  soldiers  and  civil  servants. 
Along with  this  never-ending  fascination,   a new philosophy 
gained  the   attention  of  the British public:     Muscular 
Christianity.     A dynamic  individual was  not only physically 
active but  also spiritually  strong.     One  had  to be   able  to 
undertake  strenuous  physical  exertion  without  complaint, 
supported  only by  God's   spiritual  guidance.     In  this manner, 
Britons  would  carry  the  Christian word  and  the  Anglo-Saxon 
culture   to  the   less   civilized  countries  under  their   "guidance" 
and   "protection". 
During  the  second  half  of  the  19th  century,   Gordon was 
watched by  a British public who expected  the utmost  from its 
public  officials.     He  gained  short-lived popularity  during 
his  assignment  in China   (1863-1864)   as  the  commander of the 
"Ever-Victorious  Army".     Numerous   authors  believe  that Gordon 
eventually  faded  from public notice because  of his  aversion 
to being  lionized.     The  British  public,   however,   seemed  un- 
prepared  to appreciate   the  heroic  overseas  achievements  of 
any British officer.     Britons  expressed  little enthusiasm 
in   the   1860's   for either  an  imperial  empire  or officers  who 
promoted  and/or protected  British mercantile   interests  in 
foreign  countries. 
After  his  demanding explorations   and  attempted  sup- 
pression of  the  Sudanese  slave   trade   (1874-1879) ,   Gordon 
obtained   less  notice  from press   and public  than  he  received 
after his  earlier  mission to China.     It was  only  during  and 
after  the  ill-fated Khartoum mission   (1884-1885)   that he 
achieved  enduring   fame.      The  legend which developed  about 
Gordon  and his  exploits  was  a  combination of  astonishing 
fact  interwoven with  the  ethnocentric   fiction  of  the Briton's 
superiority  over Oriental  races.     The Victorian was  unable 
to distinguish   this   fact  from  the   fiction;   they were  one 
and  the same.     Even   though  Gordon was   the  principal  source 
of his   legend,   he was  not its   chief  author.     One  must now 
examine  the  legend's  growth  and  development.     In  doing  so 
one will be  able  to examine not only  the   thoughts  of Gordon 
but  also  those  of  the British public  and  politician  through- 
out  the different phases   of his   life.     As   the  conception of 
a strong British Empire  gained popularity  during  and after 
the  1870's,   Gordon's   reputation  as   the epitome  of   the British 
hero  also increased  in stature. 
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CHAPTER I 
EARLY   LIFE  AND  CAREER 
Charles  George   Gordon was  born  at the military  community 
of Woolwich  Common on   2 8 January  1833.     His   father,   General 
William Henry  Gordon,   was  the  Inspector  of  the  Carriage  De- 
partment  at the  Woolwich  artillery  supply depot,   and Charles 
Gordon  stemmed  from a  long  and somewhat distinguished  soldier- 
ing background.     David  Gordon,  his  great-grandfather,   was 
captured by   the  Stuart  army  during  the engagement at Prestonpans 
but  fortunately was  released.     He  eventually  died   (1752)   in 
North America.        David's  son,  William Augustus  Gordon,   fought 
with General Wolfe   at  the battle of the Plains  of Abraham. 
His  mother,   Elizabeth Enderby,   described  as  the   ideal 
devoted Victorian mother,  was  descended  from a well-known  line 
2 
of British  shipping merchants  and whalers.       Her   family   "came 
^romj   that middle-class  Puritan  stock which had been untouched 
by  the  genial  skepticism  of  the eighteenth  century."       The 
Enderbys  did not  trust  the  established  forms  of worship  and be- 
lieved  that  all earthly  problems  could be  solved   through  a 
4 
strict interpretation of  Biblical passages. 
Gordon,   one  of eleven children,   experienced a  typical 
Tom Brown upbringing.     Gordon's  father had  to keep  constant 
track of his  son's  actions   and stated  that he  felt  "like  a man 
10 
sitting on a powder barrel."  When Gordon was ten, his father 
sent his "powder barrel" to Tauton Grammar School, probably 
with grateful thanks of the neighborhood.  Five years later 
he was enrolled at the famous Woolwich Military Academy.  Like 
Tom Brown, Gordon was completely bored with his studies, but 
"was rather known for his love of sport and boisterous high 
spirits. . . . „6 He did, however, excel in sketching military 
fortifications and geographical details which served him in 
future military operations. 
At Woolwich, Gordon was always in some scrap with his 
superiors; he was well known among his classmates for an 
utter disregard for organized discipline.  When a senior 
corporal prevented some younger cadets from leaving the mess 
room, Gordon "lowered his head and charged," hitting the 
O 
astonished young man  squarely  in   the  stomach.       Bouncing 
down  a   flight of stairs,   the  corporal  demolished  a  glass  door, 
luckily  without injury  to himself.     This  incident  almost ended 
Gordon's  military  career.     About  to graduate,   he  found  him- 
self in more hot water.     An  underclassman   "asserted  that 
Charles   Gordon had  struck him  on  the head with  a clothes 
brush."9     For  this  action,   he  had  six months  deducted  from 
his  place  in  class. 
However, on 23 June 1852, he was commissioned a second 
lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. In February 1854, Gordon, 
now  a  first lieutenant,   was   stationed  at Pembroke  Dock.     In 
11 
keeping with  the   story  of  Tom Brown,   Gordon,   realizing his 
past conduct had  violated  the  principles  of a devoted  Christian, 
took  his   first  communion  and swore   to mend his  ways. His 
sudden  conversion was  primarily   the   responsibility of  a certain 
Captain  Drew who  lent him  a piece  of  religious  writing en- 
titled Priceless   Diamond. 11 It  is  interesting  to note  that 
while  most Britons had become  uninterested  or  skeptical  about 
their  religious  beliefs,   Gordon's  dependence on Scriptures  in- 
tensified.     Like  Tom Brown,   Gordon  looked  upon his  Creator as 
"the  King  and Lord  of heroes."12 
One   factor which  enhanced  Gordon's  legend was  his  re- 
markable  ability   to undermine   the defences  of Chinese   fortifi- 
cations   and his   seemingly  uncanny  defensive  operations   at 
Khartoum.     Unfortunately,   few people   attributed  these  amazing 
feats   to his  extensive military  training,  but believed  that 
Gordon's  charismatic  influence  over his  soldiers was  the 
principal  reason  for his  numerous   successes.     As  a Royal 
Engineer,   Gordon participated  in  three   training programs, 
conducted not only  at Woolwich Academy  but also  at  the  Royal 
Engineer Establishment at Chatham. All  cadets   received  the 
customary  doses  of  Greek  and  Latin while being trained  in 
mathematics,   fortifications,   artillery,   modern  languages, 
natural     sciences^and  drawing. After  rigorous  examinations, 
the successful  cadets  decided whether  to  join  the prestigious 
Royal Artillery or   the  greatly  underrated but egually important 
Royal Engineers.     At Chatham,   Gordon  spent four  and  a half 
12 
months examining the fabrications of field works.  Nine more 
months were devoted to 
modelling various works in sand; spar-bridging; 
field-works of attack and defense; mining; 
floating bridges; railways; sundry practices, 
such as escalading with ladders and grapnels; 
the construction of field kitchens; and . . . 
schemes for the attack or defence of some 
neighboring height, for the bridging of some 
river or canal,£andj for the obstruction of some 
road or railway against an imaginary foe.15 
Also required were topics dealing with surveying and military 
reconnaissance, architecture, chemistry, telegraphy, and sub- 
marine mining. °  Even though the Royal Engineers suffered 
more casualties under combat conditions than any other mili- 
tary branch, positions of responsibility were not given to 
these officers "on account of their education."17 This was 
due to the Victorians' lack of respect and trust for any- 
one who neglected classical studies to pursue an education 
in practical and scientific fields. 
While Gordon was stationed at Pembroke, the Crimean War 
broke out.  Gordon, itching for combat, arrived at Balaclava 
on 1 January 1855.  His official duties were the surveying of 
enemy lines and the construction of winter shelters for allied 
soldiers dying of intensive cold.  Even in the position of 
an R. E., he was noticed by his commanding officers.  Accord- 
ing to General Wolseley and Charles Kingsley, a true hero must 
not only accomplish his assigned tasks but perform deeds be- 
yond the required "call of duty."  Gordon, through his examples 
13 
of unusual bravery,   many  constantly  cited after his  death, 
made   the  heart-pounding  adventures  in  so-called   "sensational 
novels"   take  living  shape. 
Gordon once  came   upon  a frightened  sapper who was  being 
brow-beaten by   a corporal.     The  reluctant sapper had  been 
directed  to repair  a damaged  parapet while   the  corporal would 
supervise   the  assignment under cover.      Gordon climbed out of 
the  trench,   commanding   the  astonished  corporal  to  follow him. 
As Russian bullets whizzed past,   Gordon  yelled  at  the  cor- 
poral,   "Never order  a man  to do anything  that you  are  afraid 
18 to do yourself." In  another  example,   General  Charles 
Staveley  recounted how he had  been  unfamiliar with  some enemy 
positions  due  to  illness.     Gordon was  more  than willing  to 
show him  these   trenches.      "He  explained  every  nook  and  corner," 
Staveley pointed  out,   "and  took me  along  outside  our most ad- 
vanced  trench,   the bouquets   (volleys  of  small  shells  fired 
from mortars)   and  other missiles   flying  about us  in,   to me, 
a very unpleasant manner,   he  taking   the matter remarkably 
coolly."19 
After   the   cessation  of hostilities   in  the  Crimea,   Gordon 
was  assigned  to  the delegation  responsible  for determining 
the newly  created  boundaries  between  Russia and  the  disputed 
territories  of Wallachia  and Moldavia.     Early in  1859,   Gordon, 
by now  a captain,   was  stationed  at Chatham as  the  Field-Work 
Instructor  and Adjutant.     But in   little  over  a year's  time, 
14 
Gordon's  heroic exploits would be  examined by an  indifferent 
British public.     The  Gordon legend would obtain  its basic 
foundations  when  Charles   Gordon continued his  noteworthy 
career in China as  commander  of  the   "Ever-Victorious  Army." 
15 
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CHAPTER  II 
CHINA:      THK   TAIPING   REBELLION    (1863-1864) 
During Gordon's  early  life,   the  British  government had 
become more  involved in  China's  domestic matters.     During  the 
Opium War   (1839-1842),   Great Britain  fought  the Manchu Empire, 
and the  Chinese,   unable  to  compete with European military 
technology,   were  soundly defeated.     The British  government 
demanded  twenty-one  million dollars  in war  debts  which meant 
that  the  provincial  officials   raised more  revenue  in  taxes. 
This  crushing  burden  fell  largely  upon  the  Chinese  peasantry, 
eighty  percent of  the population.        Western  intervention up- 
set  the  social,   political and  economic balance  of China, 
especially  in  the   southern provinces  of Kwangsi  and Kwantung, 
where  the  Taiping  rebellion  originated.     The  important eco- 
nomic  region  in  and  surrounding Canton,   located  in  Kwantung 
province,   was   seriously disrupted causing an  increase  in 
piracy.     Different ethnic  groups with varied  life  styles  were 
now  forcibly   thrown  together which   touched off numerous  petty 
wars.2     Secret organizations   such as  the  Triad Society  de- 
veloped  to protect  the  commercial  and political  interests  of 
these various   groups.     When not warring  against each  other, 
these  fraternal  organizations  harassed  the  government  offi- 
cials who  attempted  to maintain  control  over  the  province's 
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Fig.   1.     Gordon's  Operations  in  China   (1863-1864). 
Source:     Hugh Evelyn  Worthem,   Chinese  Gordon. 
(Boston:     Little,   Brown  & Co.,   1933), 
opposite  p.   90. 
19 
salt  industry.3 
In  this  turbulent environment,   the   future  leader of 
the  Taiping  rebellion was reared.     Born  of peasant  stock,   the 
young  Hung  Hsiu-ch'iian displayed remarkable  intellectual 
abilities.     His  family,   realizing  the material  advantages  of 
a  son  accepted  into  the   "scholar-gentry,"   gave  up many ne- 
cessities   to prepare him  for   the examinations which  would  de- 
.    .        4 termine   their  future  economic  and social  position.        Even 
though Hung passed  the   first set of  scholastic  examinations, 
he was  unable   to obtain  the major  sheng-yuan degree.     After 
several  unsuccessful  efforts   to obtain  the  degree,   Hung, 
due   to mental pressures  and  the  shame   felt by his   family, 
suffered  a mental  collapse.     Succumbing  to  a trance-like 
state.   Hung experienced several  unexplainable dreams. 
In  1843,   Hung,   after examining  some  Christian  tracts, 
concluded  that  in his   former trance-like  state,  God had re- 
quested him to  re-establish His   control over  the  earth  and 
to drive out  all  the  devils  plaguing humanity.     He  also be- 
lieved  that he was  the younger brother of Jesus Christ.       He 
began  to preach  his  pseudo-Christian philosophy  throughout 
his  province  and had  collected  such  a  large   following by  1850 
that  the  government  suffered  several military  defeats   trying 
to dissolve  his movement.     After a major victory  over govern- 
ment  forces,   Hung  officially decreed  the beginning of  the 
T'ai-ping T'ien-kuo Dynasty   ("The Heavenly Kingdom of  Great 
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Peace.")7     From  11  January  1851  to  the early  1860's  the  Taiping 
rebels were  constantly  at war with  Imperial   troops  and eventu- 
ally with Anglo-French  forces   as  well. 
The  Imperial  government  again had difficulties  with  the 
British  government.     Since  the  Chinese  were  unable  to control 
piracy  along  their eastern coast,   they  found  the British doing 
the  job  for  them.     Matters  reached  a violent  climax in  1858 
when  the British boarded  and captured  the  Chinese  ship.   Arrow, 
which had been  flying  the British  colors.     The  Chinese,   again 
no match  for European soldiers,   soon  capitulated and agreed 
to sign  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin.     Even  though  the Chinese 
tried  to eliminate  British  influence by  attempting  to  sink 
the British  fleet  at Peking,8 Anglo-French   forces  finally 
compelled  the   Imperial  government to  accept  the   treaty in 
1860. 
Although  the  British  government wished   to maintain 
peaceful   relations  with Peking,   the  British  authorities  were 
not  anxious  to  involve   themselves   in  China's  domestic prob- 
lems  such  as  the  Taiping  rebellion.     Between   1853  and   1861, 
the British  adopted  a  "wait  and  see policy of  limited neu- 
trality"   in which military aid was  supplied  neither  to the 
Peking government nor  to  the  Taiping  rebels.9     In  the  early 
1860's,   however,   this policy  rapidly  changed.     Palmerston's 
government became  uneasy  at  a Russian  offer of naval  aid 
against  the  Taipings. 10 Furthermore,   the  anti-Western 
Emperor Hsien-Feng had died,   leaving his   five-year-old  son 
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under the influence of his mother, Tsu Hsi, who along with 
Prince Kung favored a pro-Western foreign policy. 
The most influential factor in the British decision 
to abandon neutrality was the increasing threat to the treaty 
ports by the Taiping rebels.  The Imperial forces under 
Tseng Kuo-fan had occupied the important Taiping strong- 
hold of Anking, forcing the rebels to move toward the coast. 
With the successful capture of the treaty port of Ningpo and 
the important silk industry of Soochow, the British and 
foreign merchants at Shanghai realized that the Taiping 
rebels would soon move against Shanghai itself.  (An important 
Taiping military officer felt that the occupation of Shanghai 
would stimulate immediate diplomatic correspondence with the 
Western powers.  ) 
In order to insure their investments, these Shanghai 
merchants hired an American adventurer, Fredrick Ward, who 
organized an "ad hoc" army of Americans, Chinese and Spanish, 
and called this force Ch■ang an chun or the "Ever-Victorious 
Army."15 The name supposedly acted an an incentive for re- 
cruitment.16 Ward was first regarded as a trouble-maker and 
the Western powers had him arrested and tried for military 
misconduct, but the charges were later dropped.    His un- 
popular image changed when, early in 1862, he helped Anglo- 
French forces repulse the long expected Taiping attack on 
Shanghai.  Since Ward was now "officially recognized" by the 
14 
22 
European  powers,   he  was permitted  to obtain vital war supplies 
18 and  to enlist  foreign  officers. 
Unfortunately   for this make-shift army,  Ward was 
mortally wounded in  September   1862.     The  command devolved 
on Ward's  chief officer,  Henry Burgevine,   an unscrupulous 
individual who wanted   to use  Ward' s  force  for his  own per- 
sonal gain.     Burgevine,   however,   along with his  body guard, 
attacked  a prominent Chinese  banker who refused  to pay  the 
19 back wages  of Ward's   force  and was  relieved  of his command. 
Shortly after  Burgevine's dismissal,   General Charles  Staveley, 
commander  of British   troops  in China,   proposed  to Li 
Hung-chang,   former governor of  Kiangsu province,   that his 
brother-in-law.   Captain  Gordon,   should obtain the  command. 
He  had not proposed his   relative because of  family connec- 
tions.     Not only  impressed with Gordon's  courage under  fire 
in  the Crimea,   Staveley  had again witnessed his relative's 
bravery while  Gordon  surveyed  the  rebel  fortification of 
Tsingpu.     With  no concern  for his welfare,   he  crawled under 
enemy gunfire within close  range  of  the  fortification walls, 
took  notes  on  the  defenses,   and  returned unharmed  to his 
command. Because  of  this valuable  information,   the  town 
was   taken next day.     On  24  March  1863  Gordon,   now a brevet 
major,   assumed  command  of  the  "Ever-Victorious Army."    Un- 
like  the Western  forces which were  only allowed  to engage 
the  rebels within  a  thirty-mile  radius  of Shanghai,   Gordon 
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was  permitted  to operate beyond  this  set boundary. 
Gordon's  appointment,   his  unusual  bravery and person- 
ality,   and his  continued successful  invasion of Taiping 
fortifications   lent credence   to  the widely   accepted  story 
that Gordon and his   3,000 disciplined   troops  had single- 
handedly crushed  the  Taiping  rebellion.     Many of  Gordon's 
Victorian  biographers,   especially  his  relative A.  Egmont 
Hake  and his personal   friend  Demetrius  C.  Boulger,   rein- 
forced  this myth.   ^     Such  individuals  as Andrew Wilson, 
who believed  the downfall of  the  rebellion  was  due primarily 
22 to  the   Imperial   troops,        were  only cited in  order to pro- 
vide  examples  of Gordon's personal  bravery. 
In Events  in   the  Taeping Rebellion   (1891),   Hake   stated 
in  the  chapter,   "Gordon  as Leader  of Men,"   that Gordon had 
taken  all major  Taiping   fortifications  and had broken  the 
back of  the  rebellion.      "He had  saved millions  of money"; 
concluded Hake, 
he had  saved millions  of men  and women   from 
famine,   torture,   and death;   ay,  he  had  saved 
a mighty  Empire  and  a  throne.     He  had written 
his name   across  the map  of China;   and  as  long 
as her dynasty endures,   so  long will he  be 
held  in  reverence   as  the benefactor and  savior 
of a race.23 
Recent works  by Chinese historians   almost entirely 
disagree  with  this  well-worn  assumption;   Gordon's   force  was 
a contributing,   but certainly not a principal,   factor in  the 
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rebellion's  collapse.     Dr.   S.   Y.   Teng,   a leading expert on 
Taiping  history,   states  that the  rebels were defeated  by 
"their  own  inadequacy.     There were  defeated neither by  the 
Ever-Victorious Army nor by Tseng  Kuo-fan,   but  rather by 
themselves. "24 The  rebel  leaders,   including Hung himself, 
were  incapable  of creating  and operating an  effective  mili- 
tary  force.     While  being  "stubborn  and  narrow-minded," 
these  leaders were  envious  of each  other's  power  and posi- 
tion.     The  result was  the murder  of  important Taiping 
soldiers  and civil  servants and  the mass extermination  of 
their  followers.25     Taiping officials began  to  assume  the 
airs  of Peking nobles  and abandoned  their Christian  teach- 
ings.     With   this  example  before   them,   "the morale  and disci- 
pline  of  the  army   .   .   .   degenerated  sharply,   and  looting 
and rape  became more  common. "2f> 
Dr.   Teng  stresses   that after  1857,   the Taiping army 
was  officered by  few competent  individuals.2'     when  Gordon 
assumed command of  the   "Ever-Victorious Army"  in March  1863, 
the Taiping  rebels  had been under  this   inefficient  leader- 
ship for  five  years.     The  Taipings  were   further  hampered 
by  lack  of manpower  armed  with  inferior weapons.     Provided 
only with  swords,   lances,   spears,   tridents,  matchlocks,  and 
28 Dingals   °  the   Taiping  soldier,   unable  to compete  with  Imperial 
and European   troops,   found  it impossible  to patrol  the vast 
extent of conquered  territory.     With  few soldiers  to  garrison 
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captured  fortifications,  much  of  this  hard-fought  territory 
was  eventually  reoccupied by  Imperial  troops.29     The  rebels 
also  lacked needed war material  after  1857 because  the 
Imperial  fleet prevented  any  supplies   from reaching rebel 
fortifications   located near or  on  the  Yangtze  River. With 
poor  leadership,   low morale,   antiquated weapons,   insufficient 
troops  to man captured  fortifications,   and  the  additional 
obstacle  of European war  supplies  and  officers  aiding the 
Imperial government,   the  Taiping cause had  little  chance  of 
success. 
J.   S.   Gregory,   interested  in British public opinion 
about  the  rebellion,   attributes  many of Gordon's  victories 
to additional British  troops  around Shanghai.     This  city 
became  a  storehouse   for war supplies  and a  recouping  area 
for  Gordon's  troops.31 
Several historians,   contrary  to Victorian beliefs, 
credit  the  Chinese   forces  with  a significant role  in  the 
rebellion's  downfall.     Dr.   Franz  Michael believes  that 
Gordon's  unit  "played  only  a  supporting part in  the  last 
stages  of military affairs,   and  its   theater  of operation 
was   limited  to  the  area  around  Shanghai."32     Gordon's  force 
quickened  the  rebellion's  destruction but its actual  fate 
had already been decided by  the defeat of Taiping  forces  in 
the upper Yangtze  valley.33     The  rebellion collapsed with 
the  fall  of Nanking,  but at  the  time  of  the  city's  capture. 
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Gordon had  already disbanded his   force. 
Dr.   William Hail,   probably  the  first Chinese historian 
to debunk  the  Gordon  legend  in  China,   believed  that most 
credit  should be  given to  Tseng  Kuo-fan and his   Imperial 
forces.     While  Gordon was  active  around  Shanghai,   Tseng 
bottled  up  the  rebel   forces,   preventing  them  from invading 
Shanghai  and overwhelming  Gordon's   smaller  unit.   * 
Even  though  Gordon was portrayed  as   the  ever-powerful 
savior of  the  Chinese  people during  his   later  life   (1884- 
1885),   it  seems   that his exploits  caused  little  stir during 
the  1860's.     Several historians   attribute  this  lack of 
popularity  to  Gordon's  aversion  to any  form of  notoriety. 
Britons,   however,   in  the  1860's  were  not  interested  in  an 
imperial  empire,   and were probably  less  interested  in  the 
men who performed  heroic deeds  in  order  to  advance   the 
interests  of  the  British  government and British merchant 
class.     Gordon's heroic  actions  in China had  only a  limited 
effect on  the  general British public  in the   1860's,   but 
the  foundations  of  his  legend were  established  at  this  time. 
These   legend-making  events would be  exposed  to  an  indifferent 
British public  through British reporters  in China  and Andrew 
Wilson's  classic  study,   The   "Ever-Victorious Army."     Even 
though Mr.   Wilson believed the Chinese were  greatly  re- 
sponsible  in  crushing  the  Taiping  rebellion,   he  described  in 
vivid detail many examples  of  Gordon's  unusual  bravery under 
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enemy   fire.     These  exploits,   recorded by  Mr.   Wilson,   would 
constantly  be  cited by  Gordon's  admirers  during  and after 
his mission  to Khartoum,   but without  reference   to the   ability 
of the  Chinese  to handle   their  own domestic problems  with- 
out  foreign  intervention. 
The  British press  probably became  interested in  the 
Taiping rebellion  to  the  extent  that it was   concerned  be- 
cause of  two  factors:     1)   General Ward  and his   forces  broke 
the neutrality  between Europeans  and Chinese,   and  2)   General 
Gordon obtained  command  of  the   "Ever-Victorious  Army"   and so 
received  "official British  recognition"   for his   activities 
against  the   rebels. 
The  clearest  statement of British policy,   defended 
by  The  Times   and  lambasted by The  Daily News,   was  presented 
on  4  March  1864  by  Lord Palmerston  in the House  of Commons. 
He  declared   that  since  a  stable  government under  Taiping 
control was  impossible,   the  present Manchu Dynasty  had  to 
be   supported.     Britain's  course was  clear:     "It is  very 
important,"  affirmed  the  Prime Minister,   "for  the   commercial 
interests  of  this   country  as  connected with  China,   that order 
and peace  should be  re-established  there,   that commerce may 
revive  and be   carried  on without impediment." However,   as 
events would demonstrate,   this  did not mean  the  active parti- 
cipation  of British  troops  against the  rebels. 
The  Times,   probably  the  strongest  supporter  of 
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Palmerston's  Chinese   foreign policy,   defended  the protection 
of  legitimate  British  commerce  in China.     The  Taiping move- 
ment,   according  to  the  paper,   was   "not a political  party or 
a national party  but  simply a  social  disease ^nd  a  conglomeration 
ofj  the  ideal,   the destitute,   and  the   ignorant congregated 
upon an enormous  scale   and plundering  in great multitudes   .   .    . 
(who]   occasionally  aid  the  least scrupulous  and  respectable 
of our merchants.   .   .    ."-"     Even  though  Britons  had benefited 
from commercial  contact  with China,   The  Times,   however,   did 
blame  British merchants   for  involving British  troops  in 
38 seemingly  needless  wars. 
The  Daily News,   probably  the most vocal paper  against 
British  intervention  in  Chinese  affairs,   likewise believed 
Britain's  unfruitful  involvement in  Peking's  domestic matters 
was  the  fault of  "young merchants'"   complaints   about  the 
Taipings'   attempted  invasion of Shanghai.     Although  the  re- 
bellion was  an   "extraordinary evil,"  British  intervention 
was  unnecessary because  the  rebellion was  dying   "from a 
natural process  of exhaustion  and  from  the  slow conviction 
of  the people  of  China  that  their  support ought  to be  given 
to  the Mandarins  rather  than  to  the new claimants  of ce- 
39 lestial  power  and wisdom." 
The British public was  informed  in  the middle  of April 
that Captain  Gordon was  to  replace  Captain Holland as perma- 
nent commander of  the   "Ever-Victorious  Army."40      (Captain 
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Holland had  obtained   temporary  command of Ward's   forces  be- 
tween  the  time  of Burgevine's  dismissal  and  Gordon's  appoint- 
ment  as  the  force's   commander.)     Even  though  Gordon's  mili- 
tary operations  were  highly  successful in   1863,   they  achieved 
little  notice compared  to   the  long detailed accounts  of  the 
American Civil War.      Some   comment appeared  about Gordon's 
capture  of Fushan   (4  April   1863),   Taitsan   (2  May   1863),   and 
the  important rebel  supply base  of Quinsan   (31 May   1863),   but 
nothing was  considered of  editorial  value.   1 
The  only event  that  did create   a sensation  in  the 
London press,   tarnished Gordon's  reputation  instead of en- 
hancing  it.     The  Shanghai Daily  Shipping  and  Commercial  News 
and  the  North  China Herald   (printed  in  Shanghai)   stated  that 
reliable  sources  had  informed them of  inhuman tortures  in- 
flicted by  Imperial  soldiers  upon  seven Taiping  prisoners 
after  the  capture   of Taitsan.     According  to  a  letter pub- 
lished   in  the  North  China Herald  and written by  a  certain 
"Eye-Witness,"   the  prisoners   had  "arrows   .   .   .   forcibly driven 
(into^  various  parts  of  the  body,   heads,   region of  heart, 
abdomen,   etc.;   from whence  issued  copious  streams  of blood.    .   . 
While   "strips  of  flesh"   had been  "hacked"   from  the body,   a 
"hewing,   hacking  and   .    .   .   sawing motion" was  used  to  cut part 
of  the head  from the  shoulders.42     Even   though  these  inhuman 
acts  supposedly   lasted  for several hours,   a British officer 
present examined  the  prisoners  only  ten minutes before  their 
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execution.      (The North  China Herald had been an  avid  supporter 
of  the  Taipings  in   the  early  1850'Sj   but had completely  changed 
their opinions  about the  validity  of  the  rebels'   cause  during 
the early  1860's.43) 
Gordon stated  in  a  letter  to  the Shanghai  Daily Shipping 
and Commercial News  that many Taiping rebels were  in  his  em- 
ploy  and   fought along with   Imperial  troops.     Gordon  further 
indicated  that  former  Taiping  rebels   and  Imperial  soldiers 
treated each  other  almost as  brothers   after  the  Taipings were 
captured.44     The  incident must have  placed  Gordon  in  a poor 
light,   but  the North  China  Herald  hoped  to  smooth any  ill 
feelings:      "We  desire not to  be  understood  to  cast any re- 
flections   on  Major  Gordon in   the matter;   the  executions   took 
place  at Wyconsin  a  distance   some miles   from  Taitsan  and no 
one will  for  a moment suppose  that he  could be  cognizant of 
them."45 
Even  though  General Staveley's  replacement,   General 
Brown,   assured  the British public  that  these  cruelties would 
immediately  cease  or  all  British  support would be  withdrawn, 
the British  electorate was not satisfied.     In an editorial  in 
The Daily News,   Goldwin Smith  declared  that a  "few rapacious 
and unscrupulous  adventurers"    (i.e.   some  British merchants) 
had necessitated British  officers  to be  involved  in  a  "war, 
in which Englishmen,   without  any call  of  national  duty,   and 
against all   laws  of  international   justice,   are  instigated by 
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our government to  take part."     Taiping prisoners may have been 
murdered  by  Imperial   soldiers,   but when   "put  to death by  the 
Imperial  Government with  our assistance   [they  arej,   in  fact, 
murdered  by  the  government  of  this  country."4^ 
The  controversy over  the  prisoners'   treatment eventually 
faded  into  the  background;   Gordon  retained his  command even 
though his reputation may have  suffered,   and he  continued his 
successful  advance  against  the  Taiping   fortifications.     Colonel 
W.   H.   Sykes M.P.,   a vocal  supporter of  the  Taiping  cause, 
tried to  place  Gordon's efforts  in  a dim light by publishing 
a  supposedly private   letter  stating  that all  Gordon's British 
officers  had  abandoned him because  their wages  had been halved. 
With  no other  European  officers  to  support him,   the  letter 
added  that Ward's  former  lieutenant,   Henry Burgevine,   had 
deserted with  500   "rowdies"   to  the  Taiping  army.     It was 
Burgevine's  intention to  occupy Quinsan whereby he would   "have 
more war supplies   than  the  English   in  Shanghai."     Gordon him- 
self,   supposedly  tired  of  the  whole  affair,   was  contemplating 
resignation.48 
Gordon remained  in command,   but Burgevine  could not get 
along with his new Taiping allies.     During a  secret  conference, 
Burgevine   "proposed  to Gordon  to unite  with  him,   and  together 
to seize  Soochow;   to  keep both  Rebels  and  Imperialists  out  of 
it;   and  then  to  organize  an  army  of  20,000 men,   with which  to 
march  to Peking."49     Gordon would have no part of  the  plan. 
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Burgevine returned to the rebels but was almost executed when 
his men deserted to Gordon, leaving him still in rebel hands. 
Gordon, however, persuaded the Taiping commanders to surrender 
Burgevine in exchange for weapons stolen by Burgevine's men 
during their flight from the rebel camp.50 
These events probably excited the imagination of 
British residents in China, but at home they received scant 
notice.  Government officials knew almost nothing about the 
Chinese insurrection and 
intervention against the Taipings was not 
an issue upon which the Palmerston govern- 
ment felt very seriously challenged.  Cer- 
tainly there was no sense of urgency about 
these fairly frequent debates which, with 
one or two exceptions, were held before 
thin and disinterested houses {of Parlia- 
ment and which only once resulted in a di- 
vision. 51 
The British public between 1862 and 1864 may have considered 
the Taiping rebellion as a deplorable evil but they were not 
willing to lend active troop support for its suppression.52 
In the beginning of 1864, the Lay-Osborn, Anglo-Chinese 
Fleet, and not Gordon's offensive against the rebels, was under 
discussion by individuals interested in Chinese affairs.  Mr. 
Horatio Nelson Lay, with the services of Mr. Robert Hart, had 
persuaded the Imperial government to acquire from Great Britain 
a squadron of steamers to eliminate piracy and deal with the 
Taipings.  Staffed with British officers and men under the 
command of Captain Sherard Osborn, these ships would be under 
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the direct jurisdiction of Mr. Lay and not the Chinese govern- 
ment.  Prince Rung, realizing that Mr. Lay would be able to 
wield enormous power in Chinese affairs, rejected the arrange- 
ment and the fleet returned to Great Britain.53 
The Times, irritated by what seemed to them Chinese 
double-dealing, believed that 
the hopes which we had encouraged of the 
pacification of China, and the conseguent 
return to a trade in the prosperity of 
which not merely a vast amount of material 
wealth, but the best interests of civili- 
zation are involved, are doomed to complete 
disappointment . . . (on these men and shipsj 
depended the destiny of some 400 millions 
of the human race.54 
Little credit was given to Gordon's achievements and accord- 
ing to The Times, the Chinese were not disappointed over the 
fleet's failure because Chinese officials were satisfied with 
"the small successes of Gordon," demonstrating the belittling 
opinion of his achievements.55 
The Lay-Osborn controversy soon faded from public view 
with the news of the fall of Soochow (5 December 1863) to 
Gordon's force and Imperial troops.  Soochow had once been a 
thriving center for the production of silk but was presently 
a major Taiping fortification garrisoned by 40,000 men.  If 
the need arose, the Taipings could muster 38,000 more soldiers. 
The Taipings were confronted by 10,000 Imperial troops, Gordon's 
force of 3,100 men and 400 French troops.  About 25,000 more 
Imperial soldiers could be obtained in an emergency for a pro- 
longed siege.56  The Offensive was placed under Gordon's 
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supervision  and he proceeded to disrupt all  supply  routes 
entering  the  city. Even  though  Gordon's  forces   suffered 
several  setbacks,   the Taiping commanders  or Wangs  realized 
the   town would  soon  fall  and  so began  surrender  talks with 
Gordon and  the   Imperial commander,   General Ching.     Gordon 
received  the   impression  from  the military  governor,   Li 
Hung-chang,   that  the  Wangs  would be  pardoned  if  the  city was 
surrendered,   and he  probably  conveyed  this  notion  to  the 
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Wangs. Shortly  after  their  capitulation,   the Wangs were 
executed by Li  Hung-chang's  orders   and  the  city was  ransacked 
by  Imperial  troops.     Franco-Chinese   forces,   however,   pre- 
59 vented  any attempt  to exterminate  the  local  population. 
According  to Mr.   Hake,   Gordon was  so  outraged over  the murders 
that he  searched  for Li with  gun  in hand. 
Li  believed  the  executions were  unavoidable.     The  Wangs 
would  not   "shave   their  heads"    (symbol  of  submission),   demanded 
the  permanent retention  of  Soochow and  its  troops,   and  their 
"general bearing was marked by  extreme   ferocity." The 
British,   however,   viewed  the  executions   as  brutal  and un- 
motivated.     According  to The Times  reporter,   the  episode  was 
an open-and-shut  case.     Li Hung-chang  had  sworn  to  Gordon  that 
the Wangs would be  spared and  Gordon had  given  them a  solemn 
promise   that no harm would come   to them.     Li,  without reason, 
had butchered  the   leaders,  offending  Gordon's honor  as  a 
British  officer.     The capture  of Soochow had been marred by 
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"those   foul  acts  of  treacherous  cruelty   .   .   . jwhich]   rendered 
it a subject of  regret that we  should  have  allowed British 
officers   to  associate  themselves with  a  cause,   the members  of 
which  are  so utterly deficient  in  every   feeling of honour and 
humanity."62    Because  of  his   actions,   Gordon  and his   forces 
remained  idle,   refusing  to undertake  further action  against 
the  rebels.     The  Times  added  that  "the  news  of  Gordon's   in- 
tended  inactivity will  quickly  spread  through  the  rebel 
districts  and all  thoughts  of  surrender  will  be abandoned." 
These  unfortunate  events  immediately placed  Gordon's 
name  and military  operations  before   the   attention of  inter- 
ested British  readers  in  Great Britain.      Gordon was  now con- 
sidered  the only means   to disrupt the Taipings'  eventual 
takeover of China.     British  and  Chinese  alike  soon  realized 
that Gordon was  not interested  in pecuniary  gain  at  the  ex- 
pense  of his  personal honor.     For his   activities  at  Soochow, 
the  Emperor  of China presented  Gordon with  a generous  reward 
of  three  thousand  pounds.     He  also  received an  insignia 
comparable  to Britain's  Grand  Cross  of  the Bath. Gordon 
refused all  signs  of  Imperial  favor.     This  utter disregard 
for  all  rewards over  a matter  of  personal  honor  stood out  in 
contrast  to the unsavory  exploits  of American adventurers 
and British profiteers. 
After  the  fall  of  Soochow,   Gordon and his  troops  re- 
mained  inactive  at Quinsan.     Reports  gave  the impression  that 
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without Gordon's  assistance,   the  Taipings would  shortly over- 
whelm  the  Imperial  troops.     Gordon,   however,   again decided  to 
take  the offensive  against the Taipings  for  several   reasons. 
His men,   unable  to participate  in military operation,   became 
extremely restless,   and  Gordon  feared  a possible mass  de- 
sertion  to  the Taiping  camp. Gordon,   in a  letter   (dated 
6  February  1864)   to Sir  Frederick Bruce,   British  ambassador 
to  China,   provided  further reason  for returning  to  the  field. 
He  was   afraid  that Burgevine would  again  join  the  Taipings 
along with  300  Europeans.     It is  interesting  to note,   that 
Gordon himself sincerely  believed  that without his  direct 
intervention  the  rebellion would  last  indefinitely.      "I do 
not apprehend  the  rebellion will  last six months,"  Gordon 
argued,   "if I   take   the  field.      It may  take  six years  if  I 
leave,   and  the  Government  does  not  support the   Imperialists. 
I propose   to  cut through  the heart of  the rebellion,   and 
divide  it  into  two parts by  the  capture  of Yesing and 
Liyang."66 
Shortly  after  Gordon's  return  to military operations 
(18  February  1864),   Li Hung-chang,   probably  fearing  the  loss 
of British officers  and war  supplies,   publicly  announced  that 
Gordon was  not  responsible   for  the death  of  the  Taiping 
leaders. Unfortunately,   this  statement did not placate 
British public  opinion  and many British  statesmen;   the  Orders 
in Council  allowing  Gordon  and other British officers  to  serve 
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under  the  Imperial  government were rescinded.     According  to 
Andrew Wilson,   this  decision was   taken  on 1  January  1864.68 
J.  S.   Gregory,  however,   affirms   that  the orders  were  revoked 
in March,   1864.   '      Both  authorities,   however,   failed  to ex- 
plain why  Gordon  was  permitted  to  carry out offensivep  from 
18 February  1864  until  the   fall  of Chanchu Fu   (11 May  1864). 
After  his  return  to  action,   the  papers   again  reported 
one  successful  engagement  after  another.     This,   however,   was 
not to  last  long.     The  Overland  China Mail   (printed  in Hong 
Kong)   stated  on  1  April  1864  that Liyang  and Kintang had 
surrendered without bloodshed.     Upon Gordon's  approach  the 
rebel  troops   "shaved  their  heads   in  submission."     The dis- 
patch  added  that Chung Wang,   "the  Q-aipingJ  military genius 
of the  rebellion,"  realizing   that Gordon would  soon reach  the 
Taiping  capital  of  Nanking,   was  packing his  belongings  in 
order  to evacuate  the  capital  immediately. Seven days   later, 
a  short news  clip  told  a different  story.     Gordon had been de- 
feated  and wounded  at Kintang   (21 March  1864)   and  had  lost 
many of his  officers. Soon  after,   The  Times  correspondent 
stated  that previous  reports  of Gordon's  bloodless  occupation 
of Kintang had been   "premature."     After  discussing   the  casual- 
ties  among  staff  officers  and  enlisted men,   and  stating  that 
rebel  forces  had  not decreased  in  strength,   the reporter wrote 
of  another  defeat  suffered by  Gordon's   forces at the major 
Taiping  fortification of  Chanchu Fu.      "A few such  successes 
as  these,"   the reporter  lamented,   "will  teach  the  rebels  the 
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strength which  their numbers  actually give  them;   and  that 
dread of  the  disciplined troops which  has  hitherto been the 
72 great  secret of Gordon's  success will  disappear." 
When Gordon's   situation  appeared  its  darkest  and  the 
opposition criticized his  return to  active  duty,   his  brother. 
Sir  Henry,   sent The  Times a  letter  from Sir  Frederick  Bruce   ap- 
proving Gordon's decision  to  return  to  active duty.      "It would 
be  a  serious  calamity,"  wrote  Bruce, 
and  addition  to our embarrassments  in China 
were  you compelled  to  leave  your work  in- 
complete,   and  were  a  sudden dissolution or 
dispersion of  the  Chinese  force   to lead  to 
the  recurrence  of  that  state  of  danger and 
anxiety   from which,   during  the  last two years, 
Shanghai  has  suffered.73 
Gordon,   during  the meantime,   had  recovered  from his 
wound,   by-passed  Kintang,   and  after one  unsuccessful  onslaught 
upon Waissoo   (31 March  1864),   he  eventually captured  the  city 
on 11  April  1864.     The  Waissoo  garrison  of  10,000 men  evacu- 
ated  in  the  direction  of Chanchu  Fu,   but  fortunately  for 
Gordon,   only  1,000 of  these  rebels  reached Chanchu Fu with  its 
war-hardened veterans  numbering   20,000.     The   local  inhabitants, 
realizing  the  rebels'   plight,   exterminated most of  the  panic- 
stricken  soldiers. 74 
After Waissoo,   Gordon attacked  Chanchu Fu,   the  last 
major  stronghold  before Nanking.     The  Times reporter  stated 
that even  though  Gordon had been  temporarily repulsed with 
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heavy losses at Chanchu Fu (27 April 1864), the rebellion was 
"almost at its last gasp, and the rebels (were] fighting with 
courage of despair." The correspondent further claimed that 
the fortified city had a garrison of "nearly 70,000 men at or 
near the city."75 If any avid China watcher was apprehensive 
about Gordon's position, he was relieved to learn that Gordon 
had overcome his last major obstacle; Chanchu Fu was in the 
possession of  his  forces  and  Imperial   troops   (11  May   1864). 
Shortly  after  the   fall  of  Chanchu Fu,   Gordon dissolved 
the   "Ever-Victorious  Army,"  visited  Tseng Kuo-fan who was   di- 
recting  the  attack  on Nanking,   and  organized  a  training base 
for  Imperial  troops  before  leaving  for  England.     It was   the 
opinion of The  Times   correspondent   (and  eventually of   the 
British  public  as well)   that Gordon had   "effectually crushed 
the  rebellion,"   and   further added  that   "unless  the   Imperialists 
are guilty of  some gross blunders,   the  Taiping rebellion ought 
in another  three  months  to be  a matter  of history." 
Palmerston's   foreign policy had not been well received 
by the opposition  and  probably  failed  to  obtain much  response 
from the  British  public unless  there was  a  chance  of  further 
British military  involvement  in  China's  domestic  disputes. 
It could have  only benefited  the  public   image  of his  adminis- 
tration  if  Gordon's exploits were  glorified.     Was  not  the  Prime 
Minister partly  responsible  for   the  suppression of   this  in- 
famous  rebellion by permitting Gordon  and  other British  officers 
to  serve  under  the  Chinese  government?     If  Palmerston nourished 
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such  an  idea,   he was not disappointed with The  Times'   editorial 
comments  analyzing  Gordon's  Chinese  accomplishments. 
Gordon  and  his  achievements  received nothing  but praise 
from  The Times.     A   "soldier  of   fortune"  whose  only  concern was 
honor,   duty  and   "the general  interests  of  humanity"  was  almost 
impossible  to  find,   but Gordon  proved  to be  such  an  individual. 
With  no desire   for  personal  gain,   Gordon  "after  all his victories 
[had]   just  laid down his  sword."     The  beneficial results  of 
his  campaigns  were  numerous.     Finding   the  southern Chinese  pro- 
vinces  in complete  desolation,   he  proceeded  to   "cut  the  re- 
bellion  in half,   .    .    .   recovered  the  great cities,   .    .   .   iso- 
lated  and  utterly discouraged  the   fragments  of   the brigand 
power,   and   (finally  had)   left  the marauders  nothing but a  few 
tracts  of devastated  country  and  their  stronghold at Nankin (gj." 
The  Times editorial   further  claimed   that modern  European weapons 
had achieved  the  initial  successes,   but  the   "terror of his 
name"  eventually accomplished  a great deal more.     Although 
wounded only once  at Kintang,   the  article declared  that  "the 
frequency with  which  he   {had)   been wounded,    (only proved] 
how necessary  it was  for him  to  inspire  his   followers  by his 
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example  as well  as  to   lead  them with military  skill." 
While most papers discussed Gordon's  visit  and  advice 
to Tseng  Kuo-fan  during the  attack  on  Nanking,   and his   train- 
ing camp  for  Imperial  troops.   The  Times  discussed his numerous 
decorations   from a grateful   Imperial  Emperor.     Not  only was  he 
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presented  with  the highly prized   "Yellow Jacket"  only awarded 
for exceptional  courage  under  fire,  but he  also received the 
"star  and banner,"   the most distinguished award given  by  the 
7Q Chinese  government.'* 
Little has been  said concerning Gordon's  reaction 
toward all  this  praise,   and how it  affected his  personality. 
He  sincerely believed  that he had  crushed  the rebellion and 
had resumed  operations  against the  Taipings  after  the Wangs' 
execution partly because he   felt with his  aid,   the  rebellion 
would  collapse  within  six months.   °    Gordon had even  told  close 
friends  at Gravesend  who had  inquired about  the  rebellion  that 
he had   "put  an end  to  it."81    He  did not,   however,   want  to  be 
honored  for  these achievements;   he  hoped people would eventual- 
ly  forget about his  Chinese  exploits.     Before  leaving China 
he wrote his mother,   asking her not to announce his  arrival, 
"for it would  be a signal  for  the disbanded  to  come to 
Southampton."82    Mr.   Hake  recounted how a British Minister   (prob- 
ably a  short  time after  Gordon's  return  to England  and without 
his prior  knowledge)   upon  reading Gordon's  Chinese   journals  sent 
the materials   to  be published.     Learning of  the action,   Gordon 
regained his  records  from the publisher and demanded  that  all 
copies be  immediately destroyed;   his  daily reports  were no 
longer examined by anyone.83    A  further  story described how 
Gordon,   aboard his home-bound steamer,   ordered  a "ready- 
made  suit"  thrown over   the  ship's   side  in order  to   "age  it 
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before  arriving  home.     By wearing   "worn"   clothes,   he wouldn't 
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be  recognized  as   the hero of  the  Taiping  rebellion. 
According   to most historians,   Gordon's  popularity soon 
waned because  of  this  aversion   to hero-worship;   if  Gordon had 
desired  notoriety,  he  would have been  acclaimed  a national 
hero.     There   is,   nevertheless,   a  strong  possibility  that 
Gordon's popularity had declined  considerably  before his  re- 
turn  to England   in  January  1865.     One  could easily obtain  the 
impression  from  the highly complimentary  editorials published 
in The  Times   that  Gordon during  the  1860's was  looked upon 
as  a national  hero by all Britons.     But  since  the British 
public was not  in  the  proper  state  of mind  to glorify   the 
possession of  an  imperial empire  or  the  heroic  achievements 
of British  officers  overseas,   any attempt  to exalt  Gordon's 
Chinese  exploits would have met with  little  or  no  success. 
After   1868,   however,   Benjamin  Disraeli,   supported by the 
Tory  party,   would  create  the  romantic  image  of  Great Britain's 
overseas  obligations.     At  the  same  time,   these  British 
imperialists  would  constantly emphasize  the  vital  importance 
of military  and civil  administrators  who defended and en- 
larged Britain's  colonial possessions.     In  the receptive 
environment of   the   1880's,   the British public would  readily 
accept and praise  Gordon's  past heroic  accomplishments  in 
China. 
Upon Gordon's  return home,   The Daily News,  The Morning 
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Post and  even  The  Times,   contrary  to  the  accepted version,   did 
not hail  Gordon as  China's   savior  and  protector  of  British 
imperial  prestige.     Two and  one-half months  after his  home- 
coming,   The  Times  did  recount his   successful engagements  as 
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result of  a   letter  of appreciation  from  Shanghai merchants. 
The  letter,   however,  was  dated  24  November  1864   and most  like- 
O C 
ly generated  little  public  reaction.    '     When Gordon visited 
the War  Office  a  few months  after   leaving China,    "the Minister 
seemed hardly  to  have heard of his  name,   and to  know nothing 
whatever  of  his  successes." 
Throughout  the  1860's  very  little was published about 
Gordon's  exploits;   the only major work  was Andrew Wilson's 
The   "Ever-Victorious Army":     A History  of  the  Chinese  Campaign 
under Lt.   Col.   C.   G.   Gordon,   C.B.     R.E.   and the   Suppression 
of  the Taiping  Rebellion   (1868).      (A portion of   this  work had 
8 8 
appeared  previously  in Blackwood's  Edinburgh Magazine.     ) 
Even though well  researched,   it probably  did not  stir much 
interest during  the  1860's.     But even  to a  limited reading 
public,   Mr.   Wilson's  basic  theme was  probably objectionable 
to  any ethnocentric  views  of  British  superiority.     According 
to  the  author,   Gordon would not have achieved his   successes 
if  Imperial  soldiers  had not garrisoned  captured  enemy positions 
or prevented  large  numbers   from overwhelming Gordon's   small 
force.     Imperial  commanders  supposedly   forced the  rebels 
toward  the   treaty  ports  in  order  to  involve the  Western powers 
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in  the  rebellion. The book  presented   to  this   limited  read- 
ing  public many  of  Gordon's  heroics,   often  repeated during 
and  after  his   ill-fated mission  to Khartoum. 
Gordon exemplified the  highest  ideals of British 
courage  under  fire;   he  faced death without batting an eye 
and constantly  with his men,   leading  the   assault.     Taking  a 
reluctant officer   "by  the  arm   VGordon wouldj   lead him into 
the   thick of   the  fire."     He   "seemed  to bear a charmed  life, 
and never  carried  any  arms,   even when  foremost  in  the breach. 
His   only weapon   .    .   .   was  a  small  cane with which  he  used  to 
direct his   troops,   and  in Chinese  imagination this cane  soon 
90 became magnified  into Gordon's   'magic wand  of victory'." 
It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Gordon,   always  in  the  fore- 
front of  the  attack,  was  only wounded once,   but even  under 
extreme  pain  he  represented  the  unconcerned,   courageous 
British officer.     Shot  in  the   leg,   Gordon,   after quieting 
"one  of  his  body-guard,   who cried  out that  the  commander was 
hit,   .   .   .   stood giving  orders  until he  fainted  from  loss  of 
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blood,   and was  carried back  to his  boat." 
A British  officer.had  to maintain  control  over his 
men  at  all  times;   he  always had   to be  an example  of  supreme 
and absolute  authority.     When  an  officer  in   supplies was 
promoted  to  Lieutenant Colonel,   the majors   demanded  the  same 
rank  and  rights.     Gordon  refused  to  consider  their demands 
and accepted  their  resignations,   placing himself  in  a difficult 
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situation. Only his personal body-guard would obey his orders. 
Gordon still refused to submit to such pressures and eventually 
the  rebellious  majors  and delinquent  soldiers  gave  in. 
Gordon  also experienced  serious problems  with his non- 
commissioned officers.     Unhappy  about moving  away  from the 
riotous   life  at  Sung-Kiang  to  Gordon's  new base  at Quinsan, 
"the  artillery  fN.C.O.'sj   refused to  fall  in,   and  threatened 
to blow  the  European  officers  to pieces with  the  big  guns,   and 
the Chinese  authorities  with  the  small  ones."     Lining  up his 
non-commissioned  officers,   Gordon demanded  to know  the  insti- 
gator  of  this   threat.     When he  received no reply,   Gordon  in- 
formed  them  that unless   the  guilty party  came   forward,   one 
man out  of every   five  would be  executed.     Upon hearing  this, 
loud  "groans"  came  from  the group.     "As  it was  absolutely 
necessary,"  explained Wilson,   "to  restore  discipline,   the  com- 
mander ordered  a  corporal,   one  of  the most prominent of  the 
groaners,   to be  dragged  out and  shot,   which was  immediately 
done by   two of  the  infantry who were  standing by."     Ordering 
the  rest  locked  up,   Gordon gave  them an hour to change  their 
minds,   before his  original  intentions  were  carried out.     The 
men,   relenting,   submitted  the name of  the  executed  corporal 
as  the master-mind  of  the plot.93     Even  though  this  story 
demonstrated  that  Gordon would not bend  to  a demand  contrary 
to his principles  of military discipline,   Wilson  failed  to 
mention  the desertion of  two thousand men  from Gordon's  camp 
after  this  trying  episode.     Gordon,  however,   enlisted  former 
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94 Taiping rebels   into his  army  to make  up his  loss. 
Even  though  Gordon  and his  exploits were  forgotten by 
Britons  of   the  1860's,   some  essential  characteristics of his 
legend,   traits  cited numerous   times   twenty  years   later,  were 
established  during his  campaigns  in China.     As  the  years  ad- 
vanced,   as   the  British  public became  more  concerned with the 
creation of  a strong  and  prestigious Empire,   stories  of how 
Gordon singlehandedly  crushed  the  Taiping rebellion  obtained 
new prominence.     Unlike  people  of  the  1860's,  Britons  of 
Gladstone's  second  administration believed  that single British 
officers  and  civil  administrators  created  their  Empire and 
maintained  its  strength  and  prestige.     When  these empire- 
minded individuals  examined Gordon's heroic  adventures,   they 
naturally  concluded  that he  could  again  suppress  another 
seemingly pseudo-religious  rebellion,   this   time  in  the  Sudan. 
Unfortunately,   Britons,   and even Gordon himself,   did not 
realize  until   too  late   that all  Oriental  rebellions were not 
as easily  suppressed  as   the  former  insurrection  in China. 
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CHAPTER  III 
GORDON  AND   THE SUDAN   (1874-1879) 
After  returning home,   Gordon spent  the next  six years 
in  Gravesend     on  the  outskirts of  London^where he  supervised 
the  construction  of river  fortifications  along  the  Thames. 
With  the  completion of  his  daily  routine,   Gordon  returned  to 
the  Gravesend  slums  and  participated in  varied  forms  of  chari- 
table work.     His  greatest satisfaction was  educating,   clothing, 
feeding, and obtaining occupations   for homeless boys,   his  so- 
called   "Kings."     An  observer  of  Gordon's  numerous  exertions 
wrote:      "The  workhouse  and  the  infirmary were his  constant 
haunts  and of  pensioners  he had  a  countless number  all  over 
the  neighbourhood.     Many  of  the  dying sent  for him in pre- 
ference  to  the   clergy  and ever ready was he  to  visit them 
no matter  what weather or  at what distance."       Upon examining 
numerous   accounts  of Gordon's missionary work  among  the  poor, 
one would  eventually  conclude  that the  above  statement was  no 
mere  exaggeration. 
After six years,   Gordon was   appointed(bctober  1871) 
British  representative  to   the  Danubian Commission.     While  in 
Constantinople,   Gordon met Nubar Pasha,   vizier  to  Ismail,   the 
Khedive  of  Egypt.     Nubar was   searching  for  a British  engineer 
to replace  Sir  Samuel White Baker,   the previous governor  of  the 
53 
MILES 
u* UOJM  net 59* ta 
Fig.   2.     Egypt  and  the  Sudan During  the   1870's  and  1880's 
(   denotes  boundary  of  the  Sudan) 
Source:     Hugh  Evelyn Worthem,   Chinese  Gordon. 
(Boston:     Little,   Brown  &  Co.,   1933), 
p.   229. 
54 
Equatorial  provinces  in  the  southern Sudan.     Early  in  1874, 
Gordon offered  to fill   this  position,   occupying  the  governor- 
ship  from 1874   to the end  of  1876. 
The  Times,   shortly  after  Gordon's  appointment,   inform- 
ed the British public   that  the new governor,   offered a yearly 
salary of  ten  thousand  pounds^ refused  to accept anything higher 
than two  thousand pounds.       Gordon hoped  to  show  "the  Khedive 
and his  people  that gold  and  silver idols  are not worshipped 
by all  the world.     They are  very  powerful  gods,   but not so 
powerful as  our  God.   .    .    . He  could not comprehend being 
paid such  a handsome  salary while   the Egyptian peasant  starved 
through  oppressive  taxation. 
With   the  African  explorations  of Burton,   Speke,   Stanley, 
and  Livingstone,   the British  public had become more  aware  of 
the wonders,   but  also of  the deplorable  conditions  of  the 
"Dark Continent"   such as   cannibalism and  the  slave  trade.       The 
Khedive  suddenly   found  an anxious  British public demanding an 
end  to  slavery  throughout  the Middle  East.     Realizing  the 
possible  economic  advantages  available   from Great Britain, 
the Khedive   attempted  to  placate  British public  opinion  through 
the employment of  Samuel  Baker.5    As  Equatorial governor.   Baker 
was  to explore  as   far south  as   "the  Great Lakes of  the Equator, 
with a view  to opening  them  to navigation  and  secondly  to  in- 
troduce   legitimate  commerce   into  these  regions."6     Unable   to 
compete with  foreign commerce,   there was  a strong chance   that 
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the  slave  trade would  cease. 
Unfortunately, these high expectations   failed,   because 
Baker utilized brute   force  in  dealings  with  the natives.     Fail- 
ing  to  farm the  local  staple,   dourra.   Baker and his   troops 
were   forced to harass   surrounding natives  for  needed  supplies. 
When Baker  left the  country,   the natives  developed  a  trouble- 
some  distrust of  the  Egyptian  government.        In order  to ac- 
quire  closer  relations with Great Britain while  at the  same 
time  suppressing  the  slave  trade,   Ismail  readily  accepted 
Gordon as  Baker's permanent replacement.       Gordon's  objectives 
were  essentially  the  same as   those  given  to Baker,  but he  was 
especially  "to be merciful  toward   jthe  natives},   exerting him- 
self  all  the  time  to  attract  them gradually  to  the  apprecia- 
tion of  the   sort of  life,   civilization can give  to man."       If 
Gordon needed additional  supplies,   the  Governor-General  of  the 
Sudan,   having  no  jurisdiction over his  activities,  would be 
required  to provide  them.     Even  though  all   "articles  of com- 
merce" were  to be  sent  to Khartoum,   capital of  the  Sudan,   Gordon 
was allowed  to deduct  all  troop  costs  before  sending  them to 
the capital.10    He would explore  the  Great Lakes  region in 
order  to introduce  commerce and  suppress  the  slave  trade. 
Upon his  arrival   at Khartoum,   the Governor-General of 
the Sudan,   Ismail Ayoub  Pasha,   greeted Gordon in  the warmest 
manner.     According  to The Times,     Gordon was  impressed with  the 
conditions  of  the  city's  schools,   hospitals,   troops,   etc.     The 
governor was  reported  to have prepared  Gordon's  expedition  to 
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the capital  of  the Equatorial  province,   Gondokoro.**    This 
cordial   relationship,   however,   did not last.      Ismail,   jealous 
of Gordon's  enormous  authority,  began  to  interfere  with his 
administration and prevented  the  dispatch of  necessary 
supplies.12 
Gordon and  his  expedition  faced  additional  problems. 
He was  plagued by  his  own  staff,  which  included  the   former 
slave  dealer,   Abou Saoud.     Samuel Baker had  blamed  all his 
problems  upon  this  devious  individual.13     It  seems   that Abou, 
in order  to cripple Baker's  efforts,   had persuaded  the  local 
natives  not to provide Baker's  expedition with  any vital 
supplies.14     Baker had him arrested by  the  Cairo  authorities 
and  strongly  urged  that Abou  should  be   judged  in  a  community 
court of   law  instead of closed proceedings.   5     Gordon,  however, 
realizing  that  a  former  slave  trader  could  pacify as  well  as 
agitate   the  local  natives,   had him released.16    Abou  then be- 
came Gordon's  vekil  or deputy.17    Unfortunately,   Gordon placed 
too much   trust in Abou's  ability  to mend his  old ways;   "his 
arrogance  was  aroused,   and he began to   lay claim  to  a power 
which could not be  conceded  to him."18     Gordon  recorded  in his 
Sudanese   journals  how he  eventually discovered  that Abou was 
stealing  ivory  from  the  government's  storehouses.19     Upon his 
dismissal,   Abou attempted  to convince   some  of  Gordon's Negro 
troops  to  disobey  the Colonel's orders,   but he  did not  succeed.20 
Gordon,   against his  better  judgment,  was  persuaded by  certain 
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.21 individuals   to rehire Abou, but more problems arose in which 
he was suspected of precipitating a revolt against Gordon's 
22 expedition. Abou was  dismissed  a  second and  final  time. 
While  Gordon was  governor,   the  outside  world knew  little 
of his explorations;   daily reports  of his activities were  im- 
possible  because of  difficult communications between his pro- 
vinces  and  Cairo.     Occasionally a  free-lance  correspondent such 
as Captain Fred Burnaby  sent back  a glowing description of 
Gordon's  explorations  and his   friendly relationship with  the 
natives.   J     Burnaby portrayed  Gordon as  a  financial genius 
in his  daily  administration.     Supposedly,   Baker's  expedition 
had cost  the  Egyptian government 1,170,247 pounds.     Gordon, 
however,  made   a  profit  from  the provinces'   resources,   paying 
all expenses   incurred by his  government.24    According  to 
Burnaby's  descriptions,   Gordon was  highly respected by  the 
local  natives.      He was known as  the   "Great Pasha,"  listening 
to all  complaints  no matter how  small  and handing down  a  fair 
judgment  to everyone's  satisfaction.     Not  flinching under  the 
burden of his duties,   "the Colonel went steadily ahead  giving 
{numerous  orders] ,   administering  justice,   .   .    .  ordering 
[punishments  and  rewards],   all   this   through an Egyptian  in- 
terpreter,  who  gravely rendered every word of  Gordon's  French 
into Arabic."25     Burnaby,  who greatly  admired  Gordon's efforts, 
helped  to perpetuate  Gordon's  legend  by creating  the  false  im- 
pression  that the Colonel  was  singlehandedly accomplishing his 
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daily  tasks.     Gordon was  also being pictured  as  a demigod 
among  the  native  population.     Unfortunately,   this  and simi- 
lar reports  by other admirers  strengthened these beliefs. 
Britons  in   the  1880's  would  sincerely believe  that Gordon 
could  undertake  any difficult situation concerning Oriental 
peoples  and  resolve   their problems without any British 
military  support. 
By  the  end of  1876,   Gordon  had accomplished much but 
at  a great  cost.     Four of his European staff had died  of 
either malaria or dysentery,   while  five others  were  too sick 
to work.26     Fortunately,   Romolo Gessi,  Gordon's  comrade-in- 
arms  from the  Crimea,   performed many  duties neglected by  the 
others.     After  two years  of  this  strenuous  exploration, 
Gordon,   weary of his  duties,   decided  to return home.     He  had 
received no  cooperation  from  the  Governor-General  of  the  Sudan 
who  thwarted  his  attempts  to  halt  the   slave  trade.      (The 
Governor-General permitted  the  slave dealers  to  use Khartoum 
as   their base  of  operation.    ') 
He  had  accomplished  a  great deal during  his  administra- 
tion.     Exploration  steamers  under  Gessi's direction surveyed 
Lake Albert and the Egyptian  colors  flew over  its  shores, 
while peaceful  coexistence  was  maintained with  Kabaka Mutesa, 
King of Uganda.28    According  to The  Times,   Gordon had de- 
creased  the  slave  trade,   "but  its   total extinction must be 
a work of  time."29    Through his  tireless efforts,   "a  line of 
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ports  50   to  100  miles  apart    had    been established  from Khartoum 
to Gondokoro,   and  then  to Lake Albert," with  the  result  that 
communication between  Cairo and  the Great Lakes was  now a reali- 
ty.     "Perhaps   the best practical  test  of  the  completeness  of 
this  work,"   affirmed  The  Times  correspondent,   "is   .   .   .   the 
fact  that  the  Colonel  received his English newspaper with  fair 
regularity  seven weeks  after  the  date  of issue.   ..." 
The  Times  indicated  that  Gordon's  achievements had been 
"undervalued"  because   little had been  heard  from him during 
the period  of  his exploration.31     Instead  of  the  constant use 
of  firearms   to maintain  control,   Gordon,   through his  upright 
personality,  was  able   "to win the  trust and  affection of  the 
natives."32     The  Times  considered  Gordon's methods of ad- 
ministration  as   an  amazing  feat.     Understanding  the  natives' 
primitive  customs,   Gordon was  able  to  apply   "English  ideals 
of equality  to  the disputes  of people  whose  conception of 
justice may be  as rude  as   those  of our  own  Islands  were  three 
thousand years  ago."     With  such a valuable  talent,   the paper 
believed  that  if  Gordon were made  governor of Bulgaria,   the 
tensions  initiated by  the  Turkish massacres would cease  to 
exist.33     Even  though  Gordon was  again  suggested  for  the post, 
nothing  came  of  it.     The British public,  however,   soon learn- 
ed that Gordon had been  appointed Governor-General of  the 
Sudan.34    He  desired  to  return to   the  Sudan but realized his 
efforts would be  useless without authority over  the  entire 
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Sudan.     The  Khedive   raised no  argument over  the demand  and 
Gordon obtained  the  governorship of  the  entire area. 
This  appointment was viewed  as a  favorable  sign by 
the British Liberal  press.     According  to The  Daily News,   the 
Egyptian  community did not desire  an end  to  the  traffic,   but 
Gordon had  convinced  the Khedive  to  the  contrary.      "This  re- 
markable  man whose  personal  influence,   even more  than his 
warlike  capacity,   has  been  successful in  tranquillizing   tur- 
bulent populations  and winning  the  confidence  of  savage 
tribes,"   the  editorial  affirmed,   "will now be brought  face  to 
face with   .   .   .   the most cunning  .    .   .   (andj   desparate  hordes 
of ruffians who ever  lived  by pillage and murder."    Even Gordon 
would have  to  use   force  against these  individuals  before   they 
would surrender.36     The Daily Telegraph  applauded  the  Khedive's 
decision  to eliminate   the   slave  trade.     Gordon,   the   "redoubtable" 
and   "gallant"  British  officer,   would most  likely be  successful. 
"His   singular  and well-tried gifts  are a security   that he will 
maintain  order,   encourage  peaceful  industry,  provide easy  com- 
munication   {between  the  Sudan and Egypt]   .   .   .   and  in every 
way,"  concluded  the  editorial,   "promote the welfare  of  the 
people  and  the  interests of  civilization."3 
Between December  1876  and February  1877,   an  important 
element in  the Gordon  legend gained  a prominent position  in 
the  press.     Not only was  Gordon a  competent administrator but, 
more   importantly,   he  possessed a charismatic power  over  less 
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civilized  peoples;   he  could control  their  actions without the 
needless   use  of weapons.     The belief in  this   "one man army" 
would be   a primary reason  in Gladstone's  decision  to send 
Gordon back  to  the  Sudan  in  1884. 
Gordon's  responsibilities  as  Governor-General  proved 
more demanding  than  the duties  of Equatorial governor.     The 
British  public  would be  largely  unaware  of  his hardships  until 
the  publication  in  1881  of Colonel  Gordon  in  Central Africa 
1874-1879  by Dr.   George Birkbeck  Hill.     Little  information 
reached  the British  press.     The  Times  reported  that Gordon 
had ended  construction on  the  Sudanese  railroad  largely  con- 
3 8 tributing   to  the  country's  increasing debt. News  of  crush- 
ing  financial burdens was   intermixed with  accounts  of Gordon's 
never-ending  struggle with  the  slave-traders.     An  attempted 
revolt  flared  up  in Darfur province,   but  the  British public 
39 learned  that Gordon's   zealous  efforts had ended  the   trouble. 
His   final mission  for  the Egyptian government proved 
disappointing  to both  the British  and Egyptians.     The  Khedive, 
unable  to  cooperate  with his  European  creditors,  was   forced 
to  abdicate  by  the  Sultan of  Turkey.     The  Sultan then placed 
Ismail's   son,   Tewfik,   on  the  throne.     The new  Khedive per- 
suaded a reluctant  Gordon  to  attempt a peaceful  settlement be- 
tween Egypt  and her  hostile  neighbor Abyssinia  over  increasing 
territorial  disputes.     Early comments  in  the  papers  expressed 
the hope  that Gordon had  obtained  immediate  success. Late  in 
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November,   however,   the Abyssinian king,   Johannis,   demanded out- 
rageous   territorial concessions   from the  Egyptian government 
and  the  negotiations  collapsed.      Gordon,   mentally and phy- 
sically exhausted,   returned home. 
Mr.   John Marlowe,   in his  work Mission  to  Khartoum, 
supports   the popular interpretation that during  and  after 
Gordon's   first mission  to  the  Sudan   (1874-1879),   he   "became 
increasingly  a public  figure,   .    .   .   gaining  a popular  repu- 
tation as   a quasi-miracle-working knight-errant  and an of- 
ficial  reputation  as  a mischievous  and  tiresome  eccentric." 
To Britons,   he  became   "a  reincarnation  of  St.   George;   .   .    . 
rtoJBritish  officialdom,    [however],  he  was   ...   a meddle- 
some  Don Quixote."41     In Gordon's  first encounter with Egypt's 
European  creditors,   he  remained  loyal  only  to Egyptian  in- 
terests,   irritating  the Anglo-French creditors.      In June  1878, 
Gordon,   upon the  Khedive's  request,   represented  Egypt  in  a 
European conference  analyzing  the  Egyptian budget.     Gordon 
proposed  that the  country's  upcoming deposit on her European 
loans  should be  used  to rectify  serious  domestic  problems. 
Ismail,   afraid  to  offend  his  creditors,   left Gordon to  face 
the  relentless  censure of European diplomats. 
Gordon may not have been  appreciated by  imperial  ad- 
ministrators  and Anglo-French creditors,   but,   contrary  to Mr. 
Marlowe's  statement,   Gordon was barely noticed by  the British 
public.     He would not be  considered   "a  reincarnation of  St. 
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George"  until his   second mission  to Khartoum  in  1884.     Mr. 
Demetrius  C.   Boulger,   Gordon's  friend  and biographer,   gave 
a more  accurate  picture  of Gordon's homecoming.     The 
public  opinion at home,   as reflected 
in  the  Press,   seemed  singularly blind 
to  the   fresh claim he  had established 
on  the  admiration of  the world.     His 
China campaigns  had earned him un- 
grudging praise.... (JioweverJ ,   his 
achievements  in  the  Soudan,   not less 
remarkable  in themselves,   and  obtained 
with  far  less  help  from others  than his 
triumph over  the  Taepings,   roused no 
enthusiasm,   and  received but scanty 
notice.43 
Even  though The  Daily  Telegraph believed that Gordon's 
efforts  to crush  the  slave  trade   "have been duly  appreciated," 
the paper confessed  that  the   traffic was  still  active  in  the 
Sudan.44     The  Times  expressed  a pessimistic  tone  over  the 
future   suppression  of  the  slave  trade.     Once  the   "European 
influence"  exercised by  Gordon  left the  Sudan,   the  slavers 
would  again  resume  normal operations.45     In an  interview with 
The Times  correspondent,   Gordon  summarized his  feelings  over 
his  accomplishments:     "I   am neither a  Napoleon nor  a Colbert; 
I  do not profess  to  have been  either a  great ruler or a great 
financier   .   .    .   (however]    I have  cut off  the  slave dealers  in 
their strongholds  and  I made  all my people  love me."46     He 
complained of  the  Egyptian government's  never-ending demand 
for taxation upon  the  Sudan,   blaming European creditors   for 
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the  Egyptians'   unreasonable pursuit of  additional  income. 
To  The  Times  correspondent,  however,   Gordon's  achieve- 
ments  were  remarkable:   "He has   dealt a  deadly blow to  the 
slave   trade  on  the White Nile  and the Gazelle  river.   ..." 
When  the  slave dealers  revolted, 
he   .   .   .   almost annihilated them and 
their  leaders.     Notwithstanding  this 
long  strife,  which he  conducted with- 
out  a  single  soldier  from Egypt,   in 
spite  of  incessant revolt in Darfur, 
the   frequent disputes  on  the Abyssinian 
frontier.   Colonel  Gordon  has  succeeded 
in establishing peace  and order  along 
the  banks  of  the  Nile   pander his 
jurisdiction •     Tribes   rormerly hos- 
tile  are now engaged  in  peaceful bar- 
ter,   and by means  of a  series  of 
military  stations  regular  communica- 
tions  have been established through- 
out his  dominions.47 
It is  interesting  to  note  that according  to Mr.   P.  M. 
Holt and contrary to the  statements of Gordon and The  Times, 
Gordon was  not viewed by  the  Sudanese  as   their  savior.     As 
Governor-General,   Gordon had suppressed Egyptian corruption, 
but was  considered by  the Sudanese as   the  lesser of  two  evils. 
He did not endear  himself  to  the  Sudanese by disrupting  their 
principal   industry,   the  slave  trade.48    With a wrecked  economy 
which weakened  the whole  structure of  Sudanese  society,   the 
Sudanese  became easy prey  for renewed  Egyptian corruption  that 
again plagued  the  country after Gordon's  departure.     In  this 
hostile  environment,   it was  comparatively easy to  stir  the 
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Sudanese   to rebel  against  the Egyptian government in  the  early 
1880's. 
There were  several  reasons why Gordon did not achieve 
any considerable  amount of public notice  upon his  return home 
in 1879.     Again,   historians place  too much  importance  on 
Gordon's  aversion to notoriety in explaining why  the British 
public  soon  forgot his  accomplishments.     Boulger,   however,   be- 
lieved  Gordon  alienated  the British Anti-Slavery  Society 
through his  purchase  of captive  slaves.      (These   slaves,  many 
incapable  of returning  to  their villages,   were  easy prey  for 
slave-traders  and Egyptian  soldiers.     Gordon used  these  slaves 
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in his  army  as   troops  against  the  slave dealers.     )      "Exeter 
Hall,"   commented  Boulger,   "could not resound with  cheers   for 
a man who  declared that he had bought  slaves himself." 
Why didn't  Gordon use Egyptian  troops  extensively 
instead  of black  garrisons?    The Arabs,   according  to Gordon, 
were  "cowardly,   cruel,   and effeminate,"  only  able  to follow 
orders  repeated  several  times,   while  the   "blacks"  were   "patient, 
enduring,and  friendly."51     Gordon also provided additional 
reasons  why Egyptian  troops were useless  in  the  Sudan.     "The 
Arabs hate  these  parts,"  he explained,   "and  all  the   (Arab) 
troops  are  sent    (to  the Sudan)   for punishment;   their consti- 
tutions,   unlike  ours,   cannot stand  the wet and damp,   or  the 
dullness  of   their   life."52     In  addition  to  these  reasons,   the 
Egyptian  soldier was  seemingly participating in  the  Sudanese 
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slave trade in order to compensate for his meager salary. 
Helping Gordon suppress the slave trade would only mean a 
serious  loss  of  extra  income  for  these Egyptian troops. 
Gordon did not  cherish the  same biased ethnocentric 
attitudes  of  average Britons  and  imperial  administrators, 
making  it  almost  impossible  to glorify his  Sudanese achieve- 
ments.     British  authors  described  the African  Negro  as  a 
blood-thirsty,   uncivilized  cannibal who could  only be  con- 
trolled  through  the  use of  firearms.     Samuel  Baker  held  this 
attitude  as  Equatorial  governor and  the results were dis- 
astrous.     Well-known  explorers  such as  Dr.   Schweinfurth 
seriously believed  a  Caucasian could  trek unmolested  from  the 
East Coast  to  the West Coast of Africa  if he  was   "not  too 
fat;   .    .   .   for  fatness,  whether  in black or white makes  all  canni- 
bal tribes   lick  their  lips  and rub  their  abdomens.   .   .    ."53 
In another  Edinburgh Magazine  article,   "Stanley's Discoveries 
and  the  Future of Africa,"   the Negro was described as   "idle 
and clumsy   .    .   .   Hind]   his  average  pleasures   in work and his 
average  manual dexterity are  low when measured by a  European 
standard.   ..."     If one  looked hard enough,   some Negroes of 
above-average  intelligence  could  be  found  to be   "labourers  and 
artisans. „54 
Dedicated  imperial officials operating  under  the  above 
illusions probably  adhered  to what Dr.   Faber  called  the 
"Exclusive" method  of  colonial  interrelationships.    According 
to Dr.   Faber,   these  public officials were responsible  for  the 
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continual welfare  of  the  subject peoples who were  supposed  to 
gaze  upon  these Britons  as  father-figures.     The glaring dif- 
ferences between ruler  and ruled were emphasized,   which re- 
sulted  in an exaggerated  sense of British racial  superiority.55 
Gordon exemplified  this  sterotype image  of a  father- 
figure  but did not believe  that one  should  alienate  oneself 
from  the Negroes.     Whereas,   close  interpersonal relationships 
were discouraged  among   "typical"  British imperial  administra- 
tors  in Africa,   Gordon  found no  fault in  them;   he  even en- 
couraged close  communications  through  his  intimate  relation- 
ships with  these  supposed   "savages."     Even  though close  to 
his Negro subjects,   Gordon maintained his distance  with his 
own Egyptian  soldiers  and  civil  administrators.     He  believed 
the Egyptians were   "incapable of civilising  these natives"  and 
could   "generally be  described as   ...   a  feeble  race."56 
In  his  daily  interactions with  the natives,   Gordon  dis- 
played  a  sincere  concern  for  their welfare,   and he  only  used 
force  in  self-defense.     His   journals  demonstrated  several 
examples  of helping  suffering Negroes who were even  rejected 
by their  own people.     Finding a half-dead  16-year-old girl, 
abandoned  in  a mud hole,   Gordon placed her  in  front  of a  fire 
and  "poured  some  brandy down her  throat.   ..."    On  the next 
day the  girl died  and  Gordon wrote  in a  letter,   probably  to his 
sister?     "Your black  sister departed  this  life,   .   .   .   deeply 
lamented  by me:     not  so by  her black brothers,   who  thought 
her a nuisance."57     These  expressions  of  sincere emotion 
did not belong  to  a man who  believed  that one must maintain a 
"proper  distance"   from his  uncivilized  subjects.     Calling   "savages" 
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your   "brothers"   and   "sisters"  caused many people  to  ignore,   not 
glorify,   Gordon's  past accomplishments. 
Gordon probably  also alienated many  imperial adminis- 
trators  through   anti-imperialistic  philosophy.     The Creator, 
in Gordon's opinion,   loved   "all nations  equally   ...   He  is 
perfectly impartial  and has  no  favourites.   ..."    Britain 
had achieved much  because  she   thought God had meant it that 
way.58    While   serving Oriental nations,   the  British officer 
was responsible   for  only   that nation's welfare;   he was not 
to  seek  any political  and/or economic  advantages  for his own 
country.59    Not  only must  the  officer respect the  country's 
"peculiar habits   and  customs,"60 but all beneficial reforms 
[supported by himj   .   .   .   must be  the  spontaneous  desire of 
the mass  of  the  people,  and  not  forced like  exotics,   to 
perish in a day.    .   .   ."°       Gordon adhered  to these  beliefs, 
when he  attempted   to advance  Egyptian  interests during  the 
European  conference   (June  187 8)   examining  the Egyptian budget. 
With  these  unconventional  viewpoints,   it would have  been 
difficult  for  the   Tory government to portray  Gordon as  a British 
hero;   it meant upholding  his  anti-imperialistic  ideals.     Gordon 
supposedly had   "gone  native"  which  had been  frowned upon after 
the  Indian Mutiny  of   1857.     But even  though his remarkable  ad- 
ventures were hardly noticed during  the  1870's,   these unusual 
traits would be  openly romanticized  and glorified during  the 
1880's.     Gordon's   opinions   and personal character achieved 
limited public notice  through  the publication of Dr.   Hill's 
afore-mentioned  collection of  journals   and letters.   Colonel 
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Gordon  in  Central Africa  1874-1879.     The  book,   failing  to 
gain popularity  in  1881,   was  not widely  read until Gordon's 
Khartoum mission  in  1884-1885.     "I had  looked  for a gale;" 
confessed  Dr.   Hill  in February  1884,   "there was  not more  than 
breeze  enough  to  ruffle   the  waters." During  the  1880's 
when  Gordon was  hailed as   the ideal British officer and  ad- 
ministrator,   Tory  and Liberal alike would derive many examples 
of  "heroic"  British  character  from Hill's  study.     Tory poli- 
ticians would especially  cite   these  examples while  ignoring 
any comments expressing his   anti-imperialistic  concepts. 
Even  though  Dr.  Hill  never met Gordon,   he  was earnestly 
advised by  Gordon's  brother  Henry against lauding  his  Sudanese 
achievements or  slandering  anyone's  reputation.     Dr.   Hill  com- 
plied with  this  desire,  but  partially  ignored Gordon's wish 
concerning  glorification.     The  author had no qualms  in  re- 
counting Gordon's  China adventures.     In his introduction,   Dr. 
Hill quoted extensively Mr.   Wilson's passages  concerning 
Gordon's   "wand  of  victory,"  his heroic example  after being 
wounded  at Kintang,   and  the  numerous  tokens  of gratitude  from 
the Chinese  government.     He  also included The Times'   editorial 
of 5 August  1864  emphasizing  the major part Gordon played  in 
the  suppression  of  the Taiping rebellion. 
The  British public,   for  the  first  time,  was  exposed to 
Gordon's  strong  religious beliefs.     According  to Gordon,   he 
looked upon  himself  as  an  "instrument"  of  God,   only doing what 
was desired  of him: 
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I  have  an  enormous  province   (i.e.   Sudan)   to 
look  after;   but  it is  a great blessing  to me 
to know that God has undertaken  the adminis- 
tration of  it,   and  it  is  His work  and not mine. 
If   I   fail,   it  is  His will;   if  I  succeed,   it is 
His  work.     Certainly He has given me  the   joy 
of not regarding  the honours  of  this world,   and 
to  value my union with Him above  all  things. 
May  I  be  humbled  to  the dust and  fail,   so  that 
He may glorify Himself.64 
Gordon was  more  concerned with advancing the work of God 
rather  than  imperialist desires  of any  country,   especially  the 
overseas  ambitions  of  Great Britain.     These  religious beliefs 
came  into  conflict with  the  popular conceptions  of  heroism, 
derived by  Thomas  Carlyle.     According   to Mr.   Carlyle,   God 
had  chosen  certain  individuals   to accomplish  important missions 
upon earth  without His  direct  intervention;   the  Creator was 
only an  interested  observer,   not an active  participant  in  the 
hero's  affairs.     Gordon,   however,   believed  that God controlled 
the  actions   and  fate  of man;   without His  direct  intervention 
the hero was  not  able  to perform any deeds  of valor. 
While   viewing himself  as  an insignificant  servant of God, 
Gordon expressed no  apparent  fear  of death.     Most British  of- 
ficers  approached even  a heroic death with bitter  contempt while 
displaying no  outward  signs  of emotion.     Gordon,   on  the other 
hand,   looked  upon death as  a   "cheerful  friend,  who  takes us 
from a world  of  trial  to our  true  home.     All our sorrows  come 
from a  forgetfulness  of  this  great truth."65    Many Britons, 
during the   latter part  of  the  nineteenth century,   were able   to 
understand  Gordon's   seemingly Methodist doctrines   (i.e.   one must 
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suffer  in  this  world while  accomplishing God's work  in order 
to be rewarded in the afterlife), but found it difficult to 
appreciate  his  devout religious  beliefs.     The Evangelical 
Movement,   which had  adopted many Methodist concepts  indige- 
nous   to  the  eighteenth  century,   had come  in  conflict with 
the new scientific  and  technological discoveries  of  the 
Victorian era.      While  the  faith  of many Britons had been 
shaken,   Gordon's  religious  beliefs  strengthened  as  he be- 
came  older.     One  writer,   after  Gordon's  death,   felt  the 
British public   should  give  Gordon's  religious  concepts  their 
"tender attention"   and  further  added: 
Whatever  he  says  is  full  of  divine  love  and con- 
sciousness,   the very breath of holiness  and 
truth.     If we  cannot  follow him,   what does  it 
matter.    .    .   .     The  treasury  from which he  brought 
that noble   faith,   that charity  of  his,  must have 
been no  less  than  the  stores  of Heaven.66 
Mr.   Francis  G.   Hutchins,   in his  study The  Illusion  of 
Permanence:     British  Imperialism  in India,   believes   that after 
the  1830's,   the   "traditional  tenets of Christianity"  were 
losing  their  spiritual  significance  for  the  British public. 
This  "produced   ...   a vast proliferation  of  surrogate  faiths 
which  it was hoped would  fill  the  role  conventionally played 
by Christianity  as   the  support of  personal morality and  social 
obligation."67     One of  these   "surrogate  faiths,"   according  to 
Mr.  Hutchins,   was   the   "cult of good conduct"  in which   "Duty 
became  in  itself  a  religion."68     Games became an  important 
factor  in  this  way of  life  and a healthy  constitution  helped 
to reinforce  a  strict moral code  among Britons  throughout  the 
Empire. 69 
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Dr.   Olive Anderson,   however,   would take exception  to 
Hutchins'   argument.     She believes   the   "practices"  and  teachings 
of Christianity were  a   significant  factor in reinforcing  the 
heroic  image  not  only of  the British hero but the British  army 
as well.     Religious  teachings became an  important  tool  in 
strengthening  the   overall  performance of the British military 
system.      "After  the Crimean upheaval,"  explains  the  author, 
concern  for military efficiency and an acute  shorage 
of  good  recruits   led  to  a real attempt to make  army 
conditions  generally  comparable with those of  the re- 
spectable working  classes.     In view of the widespread 
mid-nineteenth-century assumption  that physical, 
mental  and spiritual   'improvement'   could not be 
separated,    'raising  the  tone  of the  troops'   inevitably 
entailed  the  provision of chapels,   Bibles  and chaplains 
as much  as   the provision of schools,  gymnasia and 
model barracks.'0 
According  to this  reasoning,   Gordon  and his exploits would have 
only enhanced  this  supposed Christian  "image"  perpetuated by 
the British military system. 
Hutchins'   "cult"   coexisted with Charles  Kingsley's 
concept of   "Muscular Christianity,"  in which  a  strong moral 
character was  also  supported by  a sound and active body but 
included was  a  vigorous   spiritual  faith.     An adherent of 
"Muscular Christianity"  most likely  felt a greater comrade- 
ship with  Gordon;   he  experienced a more  sincere  appreciation 
of Gordon's  physical  exertions  for God's  glorious mission 
(i.e.  elimination  of  the   slave  trade)   than  followers  of a 
"cult of  conduct." 
Supporters  of  these  two somewhat related moral  systems 
must have  read Gordon's  Sudanese exploits  with profound 
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interest.     Gordon constantly kept  active and experienced no 
fear  about becoming  ill which he believed  largely contributed 
to  sound health.71      (Unfortunately,   his European and  Egyptian 
staff did  not hold  the same  attitudes.)     Gordon must have 
fascinated  the British  public,   no matter what their moral 
systems,   through his  seemingly super-human excursions  on  camel 
and mule.     Dr.   Hill   informed his  readers  that between  1877  and 
1879,   Gordon  travelled  about  8,490  miles on  camel  and mule, 
averaging  32-1/2  miles daily on  the   former  and  10 miles  on  the 
latter.72    Dr.  Allen  stated  a camel  paced  3-1/2 miles  an hour 
signifying  that Gordon  spent  about  9-1/2 hours  daily  on his 
"ship of  the  desert."73    According  to  Gordon,   these  extraordinary 
journeys  even produced  a startling effect on  the Sudanese 
themselves.      "I  gain,"  he  explained,    "a great deal of  prestige 
by these  unheard-of marches.     It makes  the  people  fear me 
much more  than if  I were  slow."7 
A relaxing physical environment did not  cultivate  and/or 
reinforce  a  strict moral code.     Mr.   Hutchins believes   that 
Britons   "valued"   such  British possessions as  India  "not for 
its pleasures,   or promise,   but precisely because  it was pos- 
sible  to be desperately unhappy  there."    This  deplorable  life- 
style was  supposedly essential for one's   "character building."75 
Gordon's  own   lamentable  living conditions kept him in  excel- 
lent standing with  this  rigorous  cult of conduct,  while  to the 
followers  of  Muscular Christianity,   he  was  able  to tolerate 
his numerous  tribulations  through his  devotion  to God's  plan 
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for the suppression  of  slavery.     Along with the unbearable 
climate,  Gordon  co-existed with numerous rats,   which   "run over 
the mosquito  nets,   and  scream and  fight  all night,   .   .   .   carry- 
ing off my  shaving brush,   soap,   fcearj   leaves  out of books,   and 
Teatj   the  tops of boots.   .   .    . "76     He was  further plagued with 
swarms  of mosquitoes  against which  insect powders  did  little 
77 7R good,        and  harassed by scorpions hiding  inside  his boots   ° 
79 and creeping  inside his pants   leg. 
Gordon's examples  of personal  bravery  fascinated all 
Britons  no matter what philosophy of  life  each  followed  and 
would be acclaimed as  the  truest illustrations of British 
heroism during the  1880's.     The  possibility of a violent death 
never  concerned Gordon.     In  the  center of a native attack,   he 
astonished  an Arab chief by calmly lighting a cigarette while 
ft fi spears   fell  around him. Gordon's  greatest  feat of personal 
bravery,   cited  numerous  times  after his death,  was  his  seem- 
ingly  single-handed  suppression of  the  slave-traders'   revolt 
in Darfur province   (1877).     His exceptional  courage  reinforced 
the romantic  conception  that one  lone British officer,   through 
sheer determination,   could control untold hordes  of natives. 
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In  the  province of  Darfur,   the  son of Zobeir Pasha, 
Suleiman,   had become chief  Sudanese  slave  dealer.     His father, 
lured to Cairo,  was placed under house arrest.     Suleiman  and 
his numerous  forces migrated  from their base of  operations  at 
Shakka  to  Dara.82     Gordon believed that only  immediate action 
on his part could prevent an open revolt.     Upon his  camel,he 
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travelled   from Fufar  to Dara  in a  day and  a half,   a  total of 
eighty-five  miles.     Leaving his escort far behind,   Gordon 
suddenly  appeared  at Dara.      "Imagine  to yourself,"  Gordon ex- 
plained,   "a  single,   dirty,   red-faced man on a  camel,   orna- 
mented with   flies—arriving  in  the  divan all of a  sudden.     The 
people  were  paralyzed,   and  could not believe  their eyes."83 
Egyptian  outposts  in  the Sudan were  rarely visited by  any high- 
ranking  government official,   let alone  the  Governor-General. 
The  Egyptian  troops would probably be  shocked not only by  the 
sudden  appearance  of  Gordon,   but on  the  immediate  realization 
that one  lone  man had  travelled unprotected  into an area on 
the  verge of  revolt. 
Early  the  next day   (2   September  1877) ,   according to his 
Sudanese  journals,   Gordon dressed  in his  gold-laced  uniform, 
84 a gift of  the  Khedive,   and with  four Bashi-Bazouks,       entered 
Suleiman's  camp containing  three  thousand men.     He drank  some 
water and  then  ordered  Suleiman  and  his  relatives  to collect 
at the  Egyptian  outpost.     He   then informed then  in  "choice 
Arabic"   that any ideas of rebellion must be  abandoned and they 
must disassemble.     Fortunately,   they  agreed  to his  terms,  while 
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he believed  that God had  intervened once  again. (Gordon be- 
lieved  that Suleiman,   even  though  a   "nice-looking boy of  twenty 
or twenty-two,"  needed  a  "good  flogging.") 
It is difficult to comprehend how Gordon singlehandedly 
prevented 3,000 Sudanese troops from rampaging Dara province, 
and returned  alive  to  tell about it.     Romolo  Gessi,   Gordon's 
. 
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comrade-in-arms,   provided  readers  in  1892 with  a plausible  ex- 
planation  for   the  successful  disbanding of  the  slavers.     Even 
though  the Arabs  envisioned Gordon  as  a  "supernatural being," 
the camp's  leaders  wished  to execute  him upon his  arrival  into 
their encampment.     Nuer Anger,   on the  other hand,   believed 
Gordon's  death would mean  future  involvement of Anglo-Egyptian 
forces.     If British  forces had  invaded Abyssinia   (1867)   to 
rescue  their envoys,   the British government would not hesitate 
to deploy  troops  for Gordon's   safety. Unwilling  to encounter 
this threat,   about half of  Suleiman's  allies   (3,000)   terminated 
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their  allegiance,   leaving  Suleiman  in  a difficult position. 
If true,   the Arabs  were more  afraid of what Gordon  represented 
(i.e.   British military power)   than  the  dynamic personality  of 
one  lone  British  soldier.     Early  in  1884,   the  British public, 
press  and government depicted  Gordon as  the epitome  of Carlyle's 
"Great Man,"  with charismatic powers  to pacify  the  savage 
emotions  of  all  rebellious  Sudanese.     Gladstone  and  his 
Ministers  believed  in Gordon's   ability  to  control  these  tribes. 
The Arabs,   however,   were more  apprehensive of  the  unlimited 
destructive  power supposedly  at his  command   (i.e.   British 
troops),   than of his  acclaimed   "supernatural"  qualities. 
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CHAPTER   IV 
GORDON AND  THE  SUDANESE  REBELLION 
(1884-1885) 
Upon his  return  from  the  Sudan,  Gordon  spent  the  early 
months of  1880   regaining his health  in London  and Lausanne, 
Switzerland.     In the  latter part of April,   he  became  private 
secretary  to Lord Ripon,   Viceroy of  India.     Gordon  immediate- 
ly regretted his decision,   however,   and resigned his  post on  2 
June  1884.     Shortly afterwards,   he  received a  "totally unex- 
pected  telegram  from  Robert Hart,   Inspector General  of Chinese 
Maritime Customs,"  who  hoped he would help alleviate  growing 
tensions between  Russia  and China over Russian-controlled 
territory  in northern Sinkiang.1 
Some news  sources  feared  British  involvement if Gordon 
2 entered  into  the   territorial dispute.       He provided  the Chinese 
with  sound military advice  on defensive warfare and was willing 
to give up  his  British  citizenship    to defend China's  claims,   if 
the capital was   transferred  to a  strategically  less  dangerous 
position.4    Gordon,   however,   stressed  a peace  platform which 
irritated  the  court's  active war party.    The  court,  partly due 
to Gordon's  interference,   decided  against a  direct confrontation 
with Russia.5    He  received no credit  from the major British 
newspapers,   while  The Daily News only  stated  that  "European 
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governments,   England especially,  brought influence  to bear on 
China,"   in order  to bring peace between the  two nations.6 
For the next  three years   (1881-1883),   Gordon received 
little  notice  from press  sources.     Between 1881-1882,   he  com- 
manded British  troops  in Mauritius  and afterwards helped re- 
organize  the military establishment  of  the Cape  Colony govern- 
ment.     In December  1883  he  took  leave and  spent  one year  in 
the Holy  Land engrossed  in religious  study.     During his  absence 
from public view,   developments   in Egypt had a devastating effect 
upon William Gladstone's   "unspirited  foreign policy." 
Gladstone  viewed  Britain's energetic  involvement in 
foreign  affairs  as  a needless waste  of  time,  men    and money. 
"Our currency,   our  local  government,   our liquor  laws,  portions 
even of our taxation,"  affirmed  Gladstone,   "remain  in a  state 
either positively discreditable,   or  at the  least  inviting  and 
demanding  great   improvement;   but  for want of time and  strength, 
we cannot handle   them.     For  the  romance of political  travel we 
are ready  to scour  the  world,   and yet of capital  defect in 
duties  lying at our door we  are not ashamed."7     Even though 
honor-bound  to protect present possessions,   Britain's military 
forces  of   "thirty millions  of men [had]  to bear   ...   the burden 
of defending the  countries  inhabited  by near  three hundred 
millions."8    Even though Egypt was not a British colony,  it had 
become  an unnecessary  financial burden and  furthermore was  not 
vital  to  the protection of the Suez Canal.     Further  involvement 
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in Egyptian  affairs  would eventually mean  the  deeper penetra- 
tion into Africa,   bringing Great Britain  into a   "cold war" 
situation with other  European powers   (e.g.   France).9 
Gladstone  hoped  to evacuate Egypt in  1882,  but  the 
Egyptian domestic  situation made him change his mind.     Un- 
able  to cooperate  with his Anglo-French creditors,   Ismail  was 
forced  to  abdicate  the Egyptian  throne by  a   "European-influenced" 
Ottoman  Sultan.     Ismail's  son,   Tewfik,  was placed under  the 
Dual  Control  system with Evelyn Baring and M.   de Blignieres 
as  the  system's  administrators.     To  the Egyptians,  Tewfik was 
a "Franco-British  puppet,   and  a revolt against him was  in- 
evitable." Colonel Arabi  Pasha with other Egyptian army 
officers  instigated a  national movement to oust all European 
and Turkish   intervention.     When  fifty Europeans were murdered 
in Alexandria,   Gladstone was   forced to  summon  the British   fleet 
to crush  further Egyptian resistence.     Due  to  Gambetta's  re- 
moval  from the  French  government,   the   French   fleet declined  to 
undertake  offensive  operations   against Egyptian  fortifications 
in the Alexandria harbour.     British guns demolished  the Egyptian 
defenses  and  British  troops  occupied  the city.     When British 
troops  under  General  Garnet Wolseley captured  the  Suez Canal 
and crushed  the Egyptian army  at Tel-el-Kebir,   the Dual Control 
system collapsed.     Lord  Dufferin,   commissioned to analyze  the 
Egyptian domestic  situation,   reported  that Great Britain would 
have  to  control  the  country's  administration  "for an indefinite 
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period  of  time"  before British evacuation was possible.11 
Gladstone's  problems  had  just begun.     In Egypt's  only 
colonial  possession,   the  Sudan,   an  obscure holy man,  Muhammad 
Ahmad,  proclaimed himself  the Mahdi  or   "guided one."12     He 
declared Holy War  against Egyptian  financial oppression  and 
corruption.     Mr.   P.  M.  Holt believes   that the   "immediate 
cause"  of  the  rebellion was  the disruption of the  slave  trade, 
"which  struck  at  an  important source  of wealth  and  the  basis 
of the domestic  and  agrarian economy  of  the  country   .   .   .  pindj 
affected  all  classes  of  society ^throughout  the  Sudan]."13 
When Gordon  left  the  Sudan  in  1879,   the  slave  trade  again  re- 
vived but  to  a  lesser degree   "since  the great merchants  of  the 
previous decade were now either dead  or powerless." 
Winning  several  small  engagements,   the Mahdi besieged 
the provincial  capital  of  Kordofan,   El-Obeid.     After  a dis- 
astrous  frontal attack  in which about  10,000 men were  lost  the 
dervish   forces  surrounded  the  city  and  starved it into  sub- 
mission.15     The Khedive  and his Ministers decided  to  take  posi- 
tive action,   but  the British government refused to offer  any 
advice,   fearing additional  involvement  in Egyptian affairs. 
British officers  who were not on the  active  list,   however,   were 
permitted  to  serve   the Egyptian government.«    Colonel William 
Hicks,   a  former  Indian Army officer,   along with  7,000  foot 
soldiers,   500  cavalry,   400 mounted irregulars,   and  2,000  camp 
followers,   marched into  the  woods of  Kordofan where all but 
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17 250 were massacred. The rebellion had also engulfed  the 
Eastern  Sudan,   where  Osman Digma,   a devoted  follower of  the 
Mahdi,   attacked  the  important outposts  of Suakim,   Tokar     and 
Sinkat.     An expedition  sent to  support  the  struggling  troops 
at Tokar  failed,   resulting  in  the death  of Captain Moncrieff, 
a British  consul. 
With  the  entire  Sudan in revolt and two British officers 
killed,   the British  government realized  that political  un- 
involvement was   impossible.     The  British  ambassador in Cairo, 
Evelyn Baring,   was  requested by his government  to urge  the 
abandonment of  the  Sudan.18    Even  though  the masses  cared  little, 
the Egyptian  "influential  and political classes"  opposed  the 
idea.19     The  present Egyptian Ministry would not accept  the 
British  suggestions  and resigned.     It was replaced with  a 
pro-British  cabinet under  the direction  of Nubar Pasha.     Agree- 
ing to abandon most of  the Sudan,   the  Egyptian ministers  none- 
theless wished  to maintain  jurisdiction over Suakim. Both 
governments  now had  to decide   "how"   the  Sudan would be  abandon- 
ed. 
Gordon's  employment  in  the  Sudan was discussed among 
British  officials   several  times between  1882 and  1884.     Sir 
Harry Verney believed  Gordon was  the most appropriate  choice 
because he  displayed   "a very remarkable  influence  over wild, 
uncontrollable,   uncivilized peoples."21    These  thoughts were 
sent to Granville  who,   on  17 November  1882,   interviewed Gordon 
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concerning his  feelings.     While  suggesting an army of  8,000 
Egyptians under Sir  Charles Wilson  and other British com- 
manders,   Gordon believed  the Mahdi's  revolt  "had been  immense- 
ly exaggerated. "22    Queen Victoria,   in December  1882,   sug- 
gested  that either  Sir Samuel Baker or Gordon could pacify 
2"} 
the Arabs within two months. Nothing came of  these  sug- 
gestions  until  27 November  1883  after Colonel  Hicks was killed. 
Lord Granville  proposed  the  idea  to  Gladstone:      "Do you  see 
any objections   to using Gordon  in  some way?    He  has  an  immense 
name  in Egypt--He  is  popular at home—He is a strong but very 
sensible  opponent of  slavery."24    Baring,  however,   thought the 
recommendation  unsound because   "the     appointment of a Christian 
25 would probably  alienate   the  tribes who remain  faithful." The 
matter again  was dropped. 
While the British public created an uproar over the 
Hicks massacre. Baring, realizing that conditions were worsen- 
ing, requested immediate evacuation of all Egyptian troops and 
emphasized that "it (would] be necessary to send an officer of 
high authority to Khartoum with full authority to withdraw the 
garrisons and to make the best arrangements he can for the 
future of  the   country." 
Gordon,   however,   had concluded  a contract with King 
Leopold of Belgium to  suppress  slavery  in  the Congo.     Granville 
was opposed  to  Gordon's   intentions  and  the  latter,  having made 
up his mind,   resigned  from  the British army. (King Leopold 
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decided  to compensate  Gordon   for  the  loss  of retirement pay.) 
The Times  aroused public  opinion by explaining that Gordon 
would  lose  rank  and pension because  he desired  to  crush  slavery 
28 in the  Congo. 
On  8  January  1884,   twenty-four hours  after his  resig- 
nation,   Gordon was  visited by W.   T.   Stead,   editor of  the 
Pall Mall  Gazette.     After much persuasion,   Gordon consented   to 
air his  opinions  about  the crisis  in  the Sudan.     He believed  the 
Eastern  Sudan must be  kept,  while   "Darfur and Kordofan must be 
abandoned."29     He  also  believed troops  from Khartoum,   Darfur, 
Bahr-el-Ghazal,and  Gondokoro would be wiped  out if an evacua- 
tion was  attempted.     Commenting on  the  Sudanese  capital,   Gordon 
proposed  two  solutions:     "You must either  surrender  absolutely 
to the Mahdi,"  he  affirmed,   "or defend Khartoum at all hazards. 
Unfortunately,   Gordon's  mistaken conviction  about the  religious 
character of  the  rebellion would have  a direct bearing upon  the 
Gordon  legend.     The Mahdi was   "a mere puppet put  forward by 
Ilyas,   Zebehr's  father-in-law,   and  the  largest slave-owner  in 
[El-Qobeid,   and  .   .   .   he has   assumed  a religious  title  to give 
colour  to his  defense  of  the popular rights."31    Gordon  firmly 
believed  that  the Mahdi  was not a spiritual  leader but one who 
n32 "personifies  popular discontent.   .   .   • 
The  next day,   under  the heading  "Chinese Gordon  for  the 
Sudan,"   the  Gazette  published Gordon's  plan  of  action.     If 
Khartoum were  surrounded,   evacuation  impossible  and British 
.,30 
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troops  unavailable,   the  paper urged  that Gordon must go  to 
Khartoum with  "absolute  control of  the  territory,   to  treat with 
the Mahdi,   to relieve  the garrisons,   and do what can be  done 
to save  what can be  saved  from  the wreck  in  the  Soudan."33 
Even though  there  was  no  total  guarantee  of complete  success, 
"the  attempt  is worth making"  but immediate action had  to be 
taken.34 
With   increasing public  and press  demand  for Gordon, 
Granville,   apprehensive  about   the  former's employment   (probab- 
ly because  of his   Gazette  interview), again wrote  to Gladstone 
about his  employment.     If Gordon  "could by his personal  in- 
fluence  excite  the  tribes  to  escort  the  Khartoum  garrison  and 
inhabitants   to Suakim, a   little  pressure on Baring might be 
advisable."35     Granville may have disagreed with  Gordon's 
published opinions,  but was still willing  to  send him if Gordon 
could  accomplish the work which normally would  require  numer- 
ous British  troops.     Baring  insisted  that a British officer 
must carry out  the  evacuation  and finally relented under  the 
Cabinet's   "pressure,"  but demanded  in  return  full  control over 
Gordon's  actions.36     General Garnet Wolseley met Gordon  at  the 
War Office  and  asked him  "to go  to Suakim  to  inquire  into  the 
conditions  of  affairs  in  the  Sudan."37    Gordon afterwards met 
with the  Ministers   (Gladstone  not present),  who  asked him if 
he would  undertake   the evacuation and  also  report on the  re- 
bellion's progress.     Gordon was   told not  to concern himself 
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with the  formulation of  a  stable Sudanese government.38    Even 
though he had previously  stated  that evacuation was  impossible, 
Gordon  consented  to  the mission.     Granvilla,   in written orders 
to Gordon,   confirmed  his  executive powers but  transferred  the 
responsibility of  these  instructions  upon Baring and  the 
Egyptian government.      "You will consider yourself authorized," 
Granville  explained,   "and   instructed  to  perform such  other 
duties  as   the  Egyptian  Government may desire  to  entrust to you 
by Sir E.  Baring."39 
Gladstone,   however,   was  informed by Lord Hartington, 
Minister of War,   only  of Gordon's meeting with  General  Wolseley 
in which the matter of  reporting upon the present  "conditions 
of affairs   in  the  Sudan*'was  discussed.     Seemingly nothing was 
brought up  about  the Cabinet's  meeting with Gordon concerning 
his  evacuation of  Egyptian  garrisons. Gladstone,   under  this 
misconception,   gave his  consent  to Gordon's  supposed   "advisory" 
mission.     When  Gordon desparately needed  troop  support  for  1) 
evacuation of   troops or   2)   to   "smash  the Mahdi, "  Gladstone 
would inform Baring,  Queen Victoria and  the British public  that 
Gordon's  original  purpose was  only to  observe  and  that he had 
exceeded his  orders.     Matters became  further complicated when 
Gordon,   sailing  to  Egypt,   suggested the  creation of  a  stable 
Sudanese  government under  the  country's  former Sultans.     The 
leaders  supposedly  loyal  to  the  rebellion would desert,   causing 
the rebellion  to collapse.41    Both Baring  and the British 
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Ministers,   believing Gordon's  advice  fairly sound,   raised no 
42 objections   to  thxs  suggestion. 
Gladstone had  temporarily interrupted  the  searing 
criticism of  his  foreign policy by focusing  the  attention 
of  the British  public upon Gordon and his mission.     The papers, 
both Conservative  and  Liberal,   believed Gordon  was  the most 
competent  individual,   but his  eventual  success  was  a  de- 
batable  issue.     According  to The Times,   Gordon's  "name"  and 
"prestige"  were  well-known throughout the  Sudan.     Even  though 
Gordon was  the Mahdi's  superior,   the British public  was not to 
"feel  too  great confidence at  the outset as  to  the  final  issue 
of his enterprise."     If  any   "serious mishap" befell  Gordon, 
43 the Liberal Ministry might not withstand public  reaction. 
The  Daily Telegraph,  once  a staunch  supporter of 
Gladstone's  policies   (since  1878), expressed a critical  opin- 
ion of Gladstone's  anti-imperial policies.     Besides  lambasting 
Gladstone's  Egyptian program,   the paper entirely  disagreed with 
Gladstone's  platform  concerning  Home  Rule  for  Ireland.     The gap 
between  the paper  and Liberal party became  so great that "from 
1886 onwards   it  supported,   without swerving,   the  unionist and 
44 
imperialist  causes  and  a   'strong navy'   policy." 
According  to The  Daily Telegraph,   the dispatch  of Gordon 
was   "better  late  than never."     But,   continued the  editorial, 
"we  still  fear  that the British public must prepare  itself  to 
hear from the  Sudan of  a series  of military  catastrophes." 
92 
At times highly emotional  in  its editorial comment,   the  paper 
described the  possible  destruction of Khartoum with  its 
"thousands  of  shrieking women  and children."    While many would 
either  be  "butchered"  or   "outraged,"  it was assumed  that  "the 
majority   [woulcQ  be  torn  away  from their hiding  places  for the 
slave yoke  and even  a worse  fate."45 
Other  Liberal newspapers and  journals,  more  strongly 
pro-Gladstone,   were highly  optimistic  about Gordon's  future 
success.     The   largest Liberal paper,   The  Daily News,   blamed 
the Egyptian  government  for  the  Sudanese  turmoil.     Gordon, 
however,   with his   "large  and  intimate knowledge  of  the country 
and its  people,"   and  his  name which  to  "every  tribe  M-sl   a 
source  of  fear  or  trust and  confidence,"  was  sent out to  recti- 
fy the  blunders  of the  Egyptian  government.     Even  though  the 
situation was   "critical,"   "there was much  reason  to hope  the 
very best results   from  the  appointment of General  Gordon." 
After 26  January,   the British public realized  that 
Gordon's  mission was  to include  the evacuation of  Egyptian 
troops.     Any  lingering  doubts  were dispelled on  12  February 
1884,  when Gladstone,   facing  an  attempt by  the Conservatives 
to censure his  Egyptian  policy,   described Gordon's primary ob- 
jectives.     His  purpose was  not to  "{reconquer}  the  Soudan,   or 
.   .   .   (persuade]   the Chiefs  of  the  Soudan  again  to  submit 
themselves  to the Egyptian government."     Gordon was   to evacuate 
the Egyptian garrisons  and  return   "to  those  chiefs   their 
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ancestral power   .   .   .  withdrawn or  suspended during  the period 
of the Egyptian  government."^7 
During  the mission's   earliest  stages,   one of Gordon's 
most avid  supporters was  the  Liberal  political  journal.   The 
Spectator.     Described almost  as  a supernatural being,   Gordon 
exercised a   "personal  ascendancy over Asiatics  and Africans 
which  seems  to be  irresistible  and self-derived,   and which 
makes of  the most  treacherous  and cowardly of mankind brave 
48 and  loyal  followers.   ..." The  slave-dealers,   fearing a 
revolt  from their own  slaves  due  to Gordon's presence,  would 
not approach Khartoum,   but would permit him to carry out the 
evacuation without interference.     If  Gordon were unable   to 
understand Arabic,   his   "magnetic power over dark men"  would 
rectify  this  deficiency.49    A Spectator  article entitled 
"The  Power of  the   Individual"  reaffirmed  this popular  theme. 
Hailed   "by  all  grades of society,"  Gordon, 
without  soldiers  or  followers,   or  forces  of 
any kind,   Cwas   to enterj  a mutinous  city in 
the  centre  of Eastern Africa and  there,  by 
his  personal  influence,   release  garrisons 
numbering   thirty  thousand men,   imprisoned  in 
cantonments  scattered  over a  territory  two 
thousand miles  square,   by hordes  of savages 
wild with hatred,   new-born hope  of deliver- 
ance,   and  religious  excitement.=" 
Would Gordon be  able  to accomplish  such  a  task?    With  little 
hesitation The  Spectator  indicated that Gordon  "will,   if  it is 
ever wise   to predict upon evidence,   in  all human probability 
succeed. ..51 
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Gordon,   upon Baring's  request,   arrived at Cairo in- 
stead of  Suakim,   his original  destination.     The Khedive 
gave him  the post of Governor-General of  the  Sudan,   and pre- 
sented Gordon with  a proclamation  outlining his  orders  con- 
cerning the evacuation and  the  creation of a stable  Sudanese 
administration.52     Baring  also  assured Gordon  "that no effort 
will be wanting on  the part of  the Cairo  authorities,  whether 
English or  Egyptians,   to  afford you all  the  cooperation and 
support in   their power." 
From Cairo,   he  arrived at Berber,   the  last major Egyptian 
outpost before  reaching Khartoum.     While  in Berber,   Gordon  an- 
nounced  the  proposed evacuation and  the  suspension of all  anti- 
slavery  laws.     Even  though it was   an unpopular  stand,   The 
Times  believed an  active  campaign  against slavery     "at the 
very moment when  General  Gordon has  undertaken to restore  the 
country  to  independent native rulers and  to withdraw the 
Egyptian garrisons would plainly be  suicidal." In a rare 
instance,   The  Times  reprimanded Conservative members  of Parlia- 
ment and abolitionists who  lambasted Gordon's declaration  to 
abandon  the   country's  anti-slavery   laws.     It was difficult  to 
convince  these people  that once  the  Egyptian garrisons  left 
the Sudan,   slavery would again  flourish. 
This  controversy was  temporarily overshadowed with  the 
announcement  of Gordon's  heroic entrance  into Khartoum   (arrived 
on 18 February  1884).     The British public,   if harboring any 
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doubts  about Gordon's  abilities  now most  likely  agreed  that 
their apprehensions were  groundless.     The  Sudanese  surrounded 
him,  hailing  the  Governor-General  as   "Sultan,"   "Father"   and 
"Savior of  Kordofan."     Upon his  arrival,   Gordon confessed  that 
he came without  troop  support,  but  "with God on my  side,   to 
redress  the  evils  of  the  Sudan.     I will not  fight with my 
weapons  but (witty  justice.   ..."     Gordon  then proceeded  to 
burn old  tax  records,   kourbashes   (whips of animal hide)   used 
to force  payments,   and  released 200 men,  women  and children 
from deplorable  prison  conditions.   5 
The  entire  Sudan appeared  to be  in Gordon's hands,   the 
rebellion  seemed  about to dissolve,   and the  Gladstone  govern- 
ment strengthened by efforts  of one British officer.     Unfor- 
tunately,   neither Gladstone  nor Gordon  comprehended  the  exist- 
ing social  and political climate  of  the Sudan.     Gordon  sin- 
cerely believed  the  Mahdi was  only  a symbol  of political 
dissatisfaction but not a religious  leader.     His  mistaken 
conceptions  were  supported by  so-called  "experts"   on  the  Islamic 
faith.     Mr.   C.   R.   Conder,  who  supposedly spent six years   among 
the Arabs,   believed  that "Turkish"  oppression was  responsible 
for the  uprising.56      (The Turks  at  this  time had little  if 
anything  to  do with  the Sudan.     Egyptian corruption,   not Turkish 
interference,   was  a principal  factor which  generated ill-feelings 
between  the  Sudanese  and  the  Egyptian  government.)     The Mahdi 
and his   followers,   according   to the author,   were  incapable  of 
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formulating  religious  doctrines  comparable to Western creeds 
and these people  were   "utterly deficient in education  and  in 
power of  thought."57    The  author,   nonetheless,   considered 
these  "savages"   a  threat,  making it essential  to support Gordon 
fully.     "Gordon's   success will be Bngland's  success";   but, 
warns Mr.   Conder,   "Gordon's   failure   (but General Gordon does 
not fail)   would be  a most  serious  blow  to the  prestige of 
England."58 
Gordon was now portrayed  to  the British public as   the 
finest example  of British officer  and worshipped  as  a demi- 
god among  the Arab nations.     If Gordon were captured or killed, 
British prestige would suffer not  only in Europe but through- 
out her colonial  possessions.     If   the British public had been 
better  informed about  the  radical  changes  in  the  Sudanese 
political  and  social  climate,   they would have been  less  opti- 
mistic  about his  chances of  success.     Mr.   P.  M.   Holt believes 
the rebellion was   "a movement of religious  origin which was 
assisted  in  its development by political,   social,   and economic 
stresses  in  Sudanese  society.   ..."    The  eventual  result of 
these  interacting elements was  the  creation  "of an indigenous 
Islamic state."59     Gordon  and  the British public had both over- 
estimated  his  charismatic  influence.     As Governor-General, 
Gordon had  suppressed  Egyptian corruption,  but  seemingly he 
had been  the  lesser  of  two evils.     Not only was   the Mahdi  of 
Sudanese origins,  but he was  also respected  as a  sincere  re- 
ligious  leader who promised  the  complete and permanent 
97 
expulsion of Egyptian  rule.     Gordon had unintentionally alien- 
ated the  Sudanese by destroying  their major industry,   the  slave 
trade,   and was  blamed  for  the death of Zobeir's   son,   Suleiman.60 
His major influence  over  the Sudanese  came not  from the  justice 
of his  government nor his  British-manufactured demigod person- 
ality,   but from  "the  prospect of British  troops  coming to 
support him." 
Gordon  eventually realized that he had  overestimated 
his personal  popularity among  the Sudanese.    His   first request 
was  for moral   support  through  the employment of   Zobeir Pasha, 
former  slave-chief of  the  Sudan.   While discussing future ob- 
jectives  with  Baring during  his  brief  stay,   Gordon had  a meet- 
ing with   Zobeir.     The   former  slave-dealer had been lured  to 
Cairo to  argue his  claims  against Egyptian administrators  and 
was placed under  house-arrest.     Gordon,  experiencing a   "mystic 
feeling,"   implored Baring  to permit Zobeir  to help him estab- 
lish a  settled  Sudanese  government.62     "Zobeir has a capacity 
of government  far  beyond any other man  in the Soudan.     All  the 
followers  of  the  Mahdi,"   Gordon wrote  to Baring,   "would,   I  be- 
lieve,   leave  the Mahdi on  Zobeir's approach,   for   the Mahdi's 
chiefs  are ex-chiefs of  Zobeir."63    Gordon,   however,   faced two 
formidable  problems  with  this  idea:     1)   Zobeir believed Gordon 
was responsible   for  his  son's  death   (Suleiman revolted after 
Gordon's  visit  to his  slaver's  camp,  but was  captured and shot 
by Gordon's  lieutenant,   Romolo Gessi);   and  2)   the  British 
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public could not  comprehend  the  thought of sending the  ex- 
chief  slave  dealer back  into the Sudan.     At the meeting,   Baring 
and Colonel  Stewart,   Gordon's A.D.C.   at Khartoum,   observing 
Zobeir's hostility  toward Gordon,  refused to sanction  the pro- 
posal.     Baring,   nonetheless,   indicated that he would recon- 
sider  the  suggestion  if  Gordon  felt  the  same about  Zobeir after 
his arrival  in  Khartoum.^4 
With  the hope  of obtaining  Zobeir,   Gordon  left Cairo on 
26 January  1884  and  arrived at Khartoum on 18 February  1884  to 
be greeted with  a hero's welcome.     Meanwhile,  events  near  the 
Red Sea coast  created more problems  for both Gladstone  and 
Gordon.     Valentine  Baker,   a  former British army officer 
(commanding  a  force  of Egyptian gendarmerie), was  defeated by 
a small Arab  garrison with  a  loss  of  2p00 men while  attempt- 
ing  to  relieve  Egyptian  soldiers  at Tokar.     On  12  February 
1884,   the Egyptian garrison  at Sinkat near Suakim was massacred. 
Suakim,   the British  and  Egyptian outpost on the  Red  Sea  littoral, 
faced  the  same   fate  and   the  British public demanded  immediate 
action.     In order  to placate  the  Opposition and  the  public, 
Gladstone dispatched General Gerald Graham with  four  thousand 
British  soldiers   to relieve  Tokar and provide  further safe- 
guards   for  Suakim.     Even  though General  Graham defeated  the 
Arabs  in  two major  engagements,   Gordon was   feeling  the pressure 
from the Suakim  area.     He  repeatedly requested  Zobeir,  but  the 
Liberal Ministry   (excluding Mr.   Gladstone)   did not want to 
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aggravate  a British public  strongly opposed to Zobeir's  employ- 
ment. 
On 23  February  1884,   Gordon  received a reply  from Baring 
concerning his  repeated requests  for  Zobeir.    He  informed 
Gordon  that  the  British government had  the   "gravest objections" 
to sending  the  ex-slave  trader.     According  to Baring,   it was 
Lord Granvilie's  conviction  that  "public opinion  of  this country 
would not tolerate  the  appointment of  Zobeir Pasha."   ~     Gordon 
immediately  replied  to Baring.     Still holding the misconception 
that the Mahdi was  "most unpopular"   Gordon believed  that,   for 
the well-being of  Egypt,   the   "Mahdi must be  smashed up."    To 
do the   job,   he  needed  one hundred  thousand pounds  and  two 
hundred  Indian  troops. 
While   the Ministers  were  fuming over his   "smash  the Mahdi" 
telegram,   Gordon  still  hoped  to obtain  Zobeir.     He openly ad- 
mitted  that his   influence had waned and  informed Baring  that his 
major disadvantages were   "being  foreign and Christian  and peace- 
ful."67    Finally on  8  March   1884,  Gordon  affirmed  that without 
Zobeir  the evacuation  of  the  garrisons was   "impossible." Even 
though  several  Cabinet Ministers  feared  for  their political hides, 
Gladstone was willing  to dispatch  Zobeir,  but due  to sickness 
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was unable  to  use  his   influence  in its  fullest capacity.   '    Mr. 
Hamilton,   Gladstone's  private   secretary,  believed,   however,   that 
"the anti-slavery feeling in  this country would be too strong 
even for Mr.   G. fladstone] . 
„70 
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On  10  March  1884,   The Times published Gordon's proposed 
solution  to  the  Sudanese  question.     If  immediate  action were 
not taken   (i.e.   British  troops  and/or  Zobeir),   the Mahdi would 
become a  serious  threat  to  the entire country.     By  this  time, 
General Graham   (on  29  February  1884)   had defeated  the Arabs 
at El-Teb,   the   location  of Baker's defeat of  5 February  1884. 
Gordon believed  two  squadrons  from Graham's  army would pacify 
the Khartoum-Berber  area,   while other troops  dispatched  to 
Dongola,  Wady  Haifa  and  Sennar would crush  the  last resistance. 
Gordon again  called  for  Zobeir as  the  future governor, believ- 
ing that his past involvement in  the  slave-trade was  compar- 
able  to that of many Egyptians;     "for  the  thief is  no worse 
than the  receiver."     Above  all,   Gordon did not want   "a British 
expedition  to  reconquer  the  Sudan." 
If  the Ministers  experienced any  further doubts  about 
Zobeir,   these  thoughts were  quickly eliminated  through press 
opinion.     Both  Liberal  and  Conservative papers voiced the 
Briton's  intense distrust  of  the  former  slaver.     The  Times 
published  a  letter  from  the  Anti-Slavery Society expressing 
violent disapproval of  Zobeir's nomination.     Any  support given 
to an individual whose   "career is specially marked by perfidy 
and crime would  be  a degradation  for England and  a scandal  to 
Europe."     The  Society  cited examples  from Gordon's  Sudanese 
journals  to  portray  Zobeir's   role  in  the  slave-trade  during 
the 1870's.     In   "the  light of his writing,   surely it seems 
impossible  that  the  idea of placing  Zebehr  again  in a  sphere 
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72 of active mischief  can be  countenanced." The  Times  saw only 
one solution  to  the   intricate  problems  surrounding Egypt and 
the  Sudan:     declaration of a British protectorate. The 
Daily Telegraph,   siding with  the Conservative  viewpoint,   sug- 
gested a British  protectorate   for  seven years  in order  to pre- 
74 
vent Khartoum  from  again becoming  an important slave market. 
Even though  Gordon  should be  supported with  "every assistance— 
moral  and material--which he may require,"   the best means  of 
controlling  the  country   "would be    ja]   railroad between Berber 
and Suakim." To  Gladstone,   trying to disentangle himself 
from Egyptian  affairs,   these proposals only meant further and 
more costly  involvement. 
Gordon's  popularity at home was entering  a period of 
transition.     The  Liberals,   who once  felt  Gordon was  the  answer 
to all  their  difficulties,   were  now angry  that he  required 
troops   for what  appeared   to them a  war of  reconquest.     The 
Tories,   however,   realized  that  in his present situation,   Gordon 
would need  some  reinforcements  to accomplish his mission.     This 
would enable   them  to demand a protectorate,  partially  to assist 
Gordon  in his worsening condition. 
The Liberal  press  expressed varied opinions  concerning 
Gordon's  requests   for  Zobeir.     The  Daily. News  at  first denounced 
Zobeir's  employment but  suggested  to  "await"  for  Gordon's   "rea- 
sons"   for wanting  the  ex-slave  chief.76    The paper partly alter- 
ed its  opinion after  its  Cairo  correspondent had  interviewed 
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Zobeir.     The  reporter  learned that he desired to assume the 
position offered by  Gordon,   considered the  General his  brother, 
and believed  slavery  "can be  got rid of gradually when  the 
Sudanese begin  to  appreciate  civilization."'7    Commenting on 
Zobeir's  nomination.   The Daily News  editorial stated:"lit  isj 
not necessary  in fa7  moral  sense  to believe  in Zebehr  in order 
to recognize   that  a  pliant  and able man may be made useful  in 
78 the hands  of  others   for purposes nobler than his  own."'       How- 
ever,     the  paper was  not willing   "to  underrate or  to rebuke" 
the  surprise  over  or  the heated opposition  against Zobeir. 
It would be  difficult,   according to the paper,   to take  any 
positive  action on  Gordon's  request,   until he provided his 
"reasons"   for  Zobeir's  employment. The pro-Gladstone 
Spectator adopted  a  firmer position.     Zobeir  could handle  the 
"half-caste  tribes"  of  the  Sudan,  but he would also be  a di- 
rect  threat  to Egypt.     Gordon should govern Khartoum as  an 
"independent potentate."     Several other Europeans  controlled 
Sudanese  provinces   (e.g.   Slatin Bey in Darfur and Lupton Bey 
in Bahr-el-Ghazal),   and Gordon would  require   "no  further British 
help  than  a  liberal  supply of needed weapons  at cost price,   and 
liberty  to  officers  on half-pay  to  join [him]  in  the  interior. 
These European governors,  probably acting as  a league,   would 
create   "new and  trustworthy dynasties  of European blood £with 
the result  that/ European culture would be dotted over  Eastern 
Africa,   holding  the  Nile   from Egypt Proper  to  the Equatorial 
Lakes."81 
..80 
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Without  Zobeir,   Gordon pleaded  for,   and desperately 
needed,   troop  support,   but according  to him,   not in  large 
numbers  if  they were British soldiers.     Even though Gordon 
was unable  to  quell  the   rebellion,   the appearance or rumor 
of the  presence  of British redcoats would hopefully be  suf- 
ficient.     When  Gladstone,   after Baker's defeat at El-Teb, 
wanted  to know  from  Gordon  if British  troops  to Suakim would 
endanger his mission,   Gordon replied:     "I  would care more  for 
rumours of  such  an  intervention than  for  forces.    What would 
have  the  greatest effect would be rumours of British  inter- 
vention."82     On  26  February  1884,   Gordon,   realizing that Gen- 
eral Graham's  army was heading  toward  Suakim and hoping  to 
pacify rebellious  natives  around Khartoum,   stated to  the  local 
population  that British  troops  would  soon arrive at the  city 
Gordon may have been  under  the  impression  that British  troops 
would re-open  the Arab-held road between  Suakim and Berber. 
There  is  also   the  possibility  that Gordon believed  the   supposed 
"fear"  of British  troops  would  calm  the  surrounding disturb- 
ances.   ("The  Liberal Ministers,   especially Gladstone,   felt their 
representative's   "licence  of  language"  was beyond all  reason- 
able comprehension.84)   His misconception about native  respect 
for British  soldiers  became  only  too  clear,  when he implored 
Baring   (about  2 March  1884)   to dispatch  Zobeir  and a detach- 
ment of only  two hundred    British  troops  to reopen  the  Suakim- 
Berber  route.      "It  is  not the number,"  Gordon explained,   "but 
83 
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the prestige  which  I  need;   I  am sure  the  revolt will  collapse 
if I can  say  that  I have  British  troops  at my back. «85 If 
British troops were unavailable,   Gordon hoped  that three 
hundred  thousand  pounds  could be  collected from  "British and 
American millionaires"   in order  that 3,000  Turkish  soldiers 
would be hired  to end  the  rebellion.86 
Gordon himself was  able  to  leave his  increasingly 
difficult position by  travelling down  the Nile  on one of his 
penny  steamers,  but remained  in  the city.     Why  did he  stay? 
The Ministers,   supposedly not satisfied with Gordon's reasons 
for Zobeir,   asked  for  additional explanations and hoped he 
fi7 
would  "remain   for  some   time  longer  at Khartoum." On 17 
March  1884,   Baring  attempted  to inform Gordon that Zobeir 
would probably not be   sent  as his  replacement.     If unable 
to establish  a  "settled government,"  Gordon was  requested by 
the British  Cabinet  to  proceed  to Berber with the Egyptian 
garrison.88     Unfortunately  for  all  concerned,  Gordon never 
received  these  orders;   telegraph  communication about  five 
days before  between Khartoum and Berber had been permanently 
disrupted by  Arab  troops.     The  Gordon  legend would now grow 
rapidly due   to  newspapers playing on the  emotions  of  the British 
public and  the procrastination of Ministers who were more  con- 
cerned with  the  domestic matters  of Great Britain. 
With the impression that Gordon's position was becoming 
more critical, the British public had their fears confirmed by 
a telegram   (dated  23  March  1884)   from Mr.   Powers,   The  Times 
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correspondent in  Khartoum.     He  stated that Gordon had received 
an invitation  to  adopt  the  Islamic  faith.     Gordon's penny  steam- 
ers kept  the Arab  troops   from becoming a major problem,  but 
Powers  included   a  desperate note which became  the Tory battle 
cry against the  Gladstone  government:     "We are daily expect- 
ing British  troops."     Powers  explained,   "We cannot bring our- 
selves to believe   that we  are  to be  abandoned by  the English 
Government.     Our  existence  depends  on England."89 
The  Times  editorial   (1 April)   was no April Fool's   joke 
to either  Conservative or Liberal.     Unless  something were done 
to rescue  Gordon  it   "would be  universally and  justly regarded 
as the betrayal  of  a high-minded and devoted public  servant." 
Supposedly  there was only one  solution which met the  approval 
of all Britons:     a  protectorate  over Egypt to be extended  to 
include  the  Red  Sea  littoral  and Khartoum.     This  action would 
be  "at once  understood among  the Arabs,   and would draw off 
any dangerous pressure upon General Gordon."    The  reconstruct- 
ed Sudanese government would  also need a  railroad between  Suakim 
and Berber  and possibly  a garrison  of British  troops.     Ignoring 
this plan,   The  Times  concluded,  meant a military  force  to  save 
Gordon from his   "fate. „91 
Gladstone,   realizing his back  was  against the wall,  was 
only able to defend his policy with temporary success.    On 3 
April  1884,   Gladstone before  Commons  stated that at the  "present 
time,"  Gordon was  in no peril.     Furthermore,  Gordon  •   (H   under 
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no constraint and under no orders to remain in the Soudan."92 
Lord Hartington, Minister of War, further added that "General 
Gordon niad] never suggested, to my knowledge, the employment 
of troops for the relief of Khartoum." Even if an expedition 
from Suakim to Berber was contemplated, the lack of water, 
"intense heat" and the dire effects on British troops "would 
be enormous."93     Lord Northcote,   leader of  the  Conservative 
party,   was  not  satisfied with  the Ministers'   explanations  and 
94 continued  to  inquire  about Gordon's  uncertain  situation. 
Gladstone,   complaining about  the  seventeenth debate on Egypt 
in the  past  two months,   lambasted Lord Northcote.     "He,   the 
Leader of  the  Opposition,"  argued Gladstone,   "has  announced  to 
the world  the   failure  of   the plan of General  Gordon;   is  that 
beneficial?"95     After blunting  the  Opposition's attack, 
Gladstone belittled  the  accusations  of Mr.   Powers and believed 
it a  "farce"   to  consider Mr.   Powers'   viewpoint  "as  virtually 
equivalent  to  an  official  declaration probably conveying  the 
mature  conviction of  General  Gordon." 
The  Prime Minister,   nonetheless,   again  found his poli- 
cies  an object  of  attack  on  17 April  1884.     Another  telegram 
from Mr.  Powers,  more desperate  than  the one  of  23 March  1884, 
declared that Khartoum was   "at present  the centre of an enorm- 
ous rebel  camp."     With  limited ammunition,   Khartoum's position 
was considered  "very critical."    The  roads  and  river passages 
to Berber were blocked,   and  a  telegram sent by  the British 
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government  to  Berber  stating  that no  "troops would be  sent  " 
would  spread  like wild-fire  throughout  the  Sudan.     Upon hear- 
ing this  information,   "the Arabs will learn that the members 
of the English  government have  turned down  their  thumbs while 
97 General  Gordon  is  struggling here." 
While  The  Times  attempted  to inflame public  opinion 
through  the publication  of emotional dispatches  from Mr.   Powers, 
some Liberal news   sources only  created more problems  for 
Gladstone's  administration by  expressing caustic remarks  about 
Gordon himself.     The  Spectator  stated that  the British Minis- 
ters,   unable  to send  Zobeir,   were waiting  for Gordon's   "al- 
ternative  plan"   for  a more practical Sudanese  settlement. 
The journal, however,   suggested "that the public  [had begun] 
to mistrust his   judgment.     The  abject worship paid  to  [cordon] 
by the  Pall Mall  Gazette  and  some  other papers,  which write 
as  if he  were  a  supernatural being,  or  the  Destiny  of Britain 
incarnate   in  the   flesh,   is enough   ...   to make ordinary men 
pronounce  him  an  over-estimated  fanatic."98    The  Spectator 
editors,   however,   possessed  short memories.     Two months  be- 
fore  they had  believed  that Gordon was  the  only hope of Great 
Britain.     His power  over   "savage"  natives was unexplainable: 
"The  strength,   wherever  it comes  from,   is  in him,   in  a per- 
sonality  so potent  that it lifts him of himself up  to  the 
level  of  Kings."99     But now  the government,   faced by public 
demand  to  send  Gordon,  may have   "commit [ted]   an imprudence 
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in so closely  identifying itself with him."    The public was 
also told how  Gordon's   once highly praised  influence over the 
Arabs was no  longer effective.100     Indirectly the  journal 
blamed the British  public  for  forcing Gordon upon an unwill- 
ing Liberal Ministry.     Britons,   however,  were unable  to change 
opinions  as  radically as   some newspapers  or politicians.     The 
government and   its  press   support were alienating public opin- 
ion by attacking  a  popular hero whose  legend had been  signi- 
ficantly developed  and reinforced  through Conservative  as 
well as  Liberal  news  sources.     The Tories used  this increas- 
ing public  agitation against Gladstone's  administration  to 
further  their  pro-imperialist designs  in Egypt.     Gordon must 
be saved and his  desperate effort  to establish  a permanent 
government must be  supported  through a British protectorate 
over Egypt and   the  Sudan. 
The  Daily News   followed  the   same  line  of  thought  as 
the Liberal Ministers:     Gordon was   in no   "personal danger." 
British and Egyptian troops had not assisted Gordon because 
he proposed a   "smash  the  Mahdi"  policy.     If Gordon could not 
safely evacuate   the  garrisons  through peaceful means,   "they 
must shift  for  themselves,"  and make   "terms" with  the Mahdi. 
The Governor-General  had blundered when he   "over-estimate(d].   . 
the extent  to which personal  ambition enter  (ed]   into  the move- 
ment,  and underestimate fd]  ...   the  force  and  character of 
in? 
the religious enthusiasm which  is  its main  support." 
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The  Daily  Telegraph  and  The Times did not appeal  to the 
Britons'   powers  of  logic,  but  played upon their emotions.     Ac- 
cording  to The  Daily  Telegraph,   Britain's  gallant hero, surround- 
ed by barbaric Arabs  and  supported by rebellious  and disloyal 
troops, had become   "the   scape-goat of  the Ministry  sent forth 
into the  desert to perish."     In  an attempt to express  public 
opinion,   the paper warned the  government of  likely consequences: 
Public  attention  has become  so  concentrated on 
the  solitary  and  chivalrous  figure  of Gordon; 
the credit and power of  England have  grown to 
be  so  bound up with  the   success of his mission, 
or  failing  that,   with his personal  safety as 
an   'Englishman of Englishmen,'   that no appeal 
to   'original  arrangements,'   no plea of material 
or military difficulties,  no plausible official 
excuses  or  regrets,  would save  from an outburst 
of public  condemnation  the Government which 
should  have  to  confess  that it had suffered 
such an emissary  to perish,  without moving a man 
or  issuing  an order  directed  to his  support or 
rescue.     Heroes  are never cheap.103 
In  both   fiction and  reality,   a  true-blooded British 
officer  defended his post and  fought with his men,   never  think- 
ing of  the  approach  of  death.     Rumors  reached London concerning 
the desperate  condition of Berber,   the  last major outpost be- 
fore Khartoum.      If Berber was  captured,   the  Egyptian garrison 
would have no means of  escape  to  the north.     Evacuation south 
through  the  Equatorial  provinces with Egyptian troops  and their 
women and children would  be  extremely difficult if not  impos- 
sible.     The Spectator  found no need of  a relief expedition if 
Gordon  left Khartoum with  one of  his penny steamers. i_ 
Daily Telegraph  did not  foresee  the poss ibility of  this  British 
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officer  even contemplating  this  alternative.     "How could  a man 
like Gordon,"   inquired   the  editorial,   "submit to  the desert 
all these  souls,   or  fail   to declare  that they must be either 
saved by  force  or   left   in  safety by establishing a strong 
government?"105     Throughout his  Khartoum journals,  Gordon, 
plagued with  the decision of whether or  not to save himself, 
decided not to   leave  until another person was  appointed 
Governor-General.     After much  thought,   he came  to  the  conclusion 
that he would not  leave,   "until everyone  who wants  to  go down 
[to Egypt]   is  given  the  chance  to do  so,   unless  a government 
is established,   which  relieves  me of  the  charge;   therefore  if 
any emissary or  letter  comes  up here ordering me  to come down, 
I WILL NOT  OBEY   IT,   BUT  WILL STAY  HERE,   AND FALL  WITH  THE   TOWN, 
AND RUN ALL  RISKS."106 
Public  abuse  turned increasingly  against Mr.   Gladstone. 
On the   first day of  the  London  Health Exhibition,   the Prime 
Minister  experienced.,according  to The Times,   "a demonstration 
which  is probably without precedent in recent  times."     In- 
stead  of  a  tumultuous  welcome,   Gladstone  received   "hisses   .   .   . 
and other  unmistakable   signs of  disapproval."10       The  Daily. 
News  complained of   "an extreme  and outrageous  form of  the  tone 
which men  of more  pretensions  of  good sense and  good manners 
have lately  thought  fit  to assume."    Commenting on the  dif- 
ficulty of military  relief because of  climatic    conditions, 
the paper     accused  the  Opposition of using Khartoum to discredit 
Ill 
108 the government. *WQ     Sir Hamilton believed  the outbursts were 
played up by  The  Times.     Even  though Gladstone  supposedly paid 
little attention   to  these gestures,  he  kept  "on the  look-out 
for hostile demonstrations."   09     Apparently Hamilton blamed 
"Society and  the  upper  classes"  for perpetuating  the heated 
uproar over Gordon.   10     The Times,   on the other hand,   stated 
that a  great deal  of  "anxiety"   for Gordon's welfare was  ex- 
pressed  in  the  newspapers of   "all  classes,   those  of  the working 
4.  ^ .. Hi- men not excepted.    .   .    . 
On  2  May  1884,   Sir Michael  Hicks-Beach  announced his  in- 
tention  to censure  the  Liberal  administration because   "the 
Government has  not  tended  to promote  the  success  of the mission 
of General Gordon,   and  that even  such  steps  as may be necessary 
for his personal  safety  are  still  delayed."112     (Berber was  in 
immediate  danger  of  capture.     Mr.   Baring,   General Wood,   Com- 
manding General  of British forces   in Egypt,   and General 
Frederick  Stephenson  had  suggested  to Lord Granville  that British 
troops  should be   sent to  relieve Berber.113)     A vote of  censure 
at this  time  could  not only wreck  Gladstone's proposed domestic 
reforms   (e.g.   Reform Bill),  but  also the  upcoming  European con- 
ference  in London which  was  to examine  the  Egyptian debt. 
Mr.   John Marlowe  refers  to  a memorandum received on  9 
May 1884 by Lord  Hartington  from General Wolseley.     According 
to Mr.  Marlowe,   Wolseley  rejected  the  idea of  a small expedi- 
tionary  force   sent  from  Suakim to Berber,   if  this  support was 
not part of  a major  British  task  force dispatched  to relieve 
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Khartoum.     The  General  strongly urged  immediate   "preparations" 
114 for Gordon's  rescue.    J       Sir Hamilton,  however,   presented the 
memorandum  in  a different light.     General Wolseley was  sup- 
posedly more   interested  in  the  "announcement"  of a major res- 
1 15 f cue mission. This   "immediate   show of preparation [would 
be]   the most  likely means  of  avoiding having to  undertake so 
formidable an expedition."116    There  is  a  strong possibility 
that someone  in  the  government adopted this  suggestion to 
weaken  the Opposition's  attack on the  Egyptian policy of  the 
Liberal Ministry. 
The  Daily Telegraph believed the  rumor,   started  in 
Egypt, was  a  political  maneuver  "to  seek  to  justify  reluctant 
votes by hints  of  forthcoming energy and courage,  which can- 
not be  earnest  since  they  are  accompanied by no overt sign 
of sincerity."     In order  to stir public  feelings,   the paper 
further described  Gordon's   lamentable  conditions:     a disloyal 
garrison except  for  his  black  troops,  pro-Mahdi  sympathizers 
among Khartoum's population,   and  the collapse of  the  city's 
defenses  if  besieged  in  a major offensive.     Gordon could  easi- 
ly leave  the  city unharmed,   but he would not desert his com- 
rades.     The  British government must  save both  Gordon  and  the 
Egyptian troops. 
The  Daily. News,   however,   taunted  the  Tory opposition 
with an   "I  told you  so"   attitude.     Gladstone's  government had 
been planning  this  expedition  for some  time,   but  "premature 
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disclosures"   could  have  had catastrophic  effects  upon Gordon's 
position.     The  paper continued to  take  the Tory Opposition 
over the  coals.     Gordon,   praised  as  a hero upon his departure, 
received nothing  but condemnation  from  the Conservatives over 
his slavery  proclamation  and  request  for  Zobeir.     His dis- 
agreement with  the  government over  troop  support,   however, 
signalled  a  significant  turning point.     He  then became  an 
almost sacred personage    [to  the  Conservatives]  whom it   jwasj 
profane  to criticise  in  any way,   and  infamous not  to support 
at all  cost."118 
During another  defense of  his ministerial policy, 
Gladstone discouraged  all  prospects of an  immediate expedi- 
tion to Khartoum.     Furthermore,   the use of British  troops  for 
Gordon's  aid   "would be  a war of  conquest against a  people 
struggling  to  be   free."119     The  Prime Minister also  indicated 
that Gordon  was  probably disregarding  the government's  original 
orders  for  a peaceful  evacuation.120    An  expedition would only 
be sent after every  conceivable  factor   (e.g.   climate,   troop 
strength and   supplies,   etc.)   had been  taken  into consideration.' 
On 13 May  1884,   Lord  Randolph Churchill  demanded one  solution: 
Gordon and  all Egyptian  troops must be evacuated122  and Great 
Britain must proclaim a protectorate over  Egypt. After 
several attacks against Gladstone's policy from both the Liberal 
and Conservative benches, Lord Hartington tried to ease tensions 
between  the  two parties.     He believed Gordon had exaggerated 
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the moral  effect  of  two hundred men asked  to be  sent  from 
Suakim to Berber.     The possible  beneficial  result  "is en- 
tirely a matter  of supposition  and  is  utterly incapable  of 
proof."124     Hartington  led  the Opposition  to believe  that 
plans were     under way  to rescue  Gordon.     If  his   situation de- 
manded  immediate   action then  "I  believe  that  this  country 
will be prepared   to  grudge  no sacrifice  to  save  the  life  and 
honour of  General  Gordon." Even  though  the Ministers 
"admitted]   and  accept led]   no responsibility"  for  the Egyptian 
garrisons,   Hartington  indicated an effort would also be  at- 
tempted  to   save   them.126    The vote  of censure met defeat by 
only  twenty-eight  votes   (275   for,   303  against). 
Gladstone  paid  a heavy price  for his  hard-fought 
battle.     If  someone  in his Ministry had been  responsible   for 
planting rumors  concerning  possible  arrangements  for Gordon's 
rescue,   this  political  tactic ultimately back-fired.     Victorians 
were very  stubborn people;   if an  idea was placed into  their 
heads  it was  almost impossible  to  shake  it loose.     Through news- 
paper reports  and ministerial  assurances  of eventual  support, 
the British  public expected  Gordon  and seemingly  the Egyptian 
garrisons  to be rescued by British  redcoats. 
Even  though  tensions  had slackened with  the  outcome  of 
the debates,127  the  Tory press  refused  to permit the public 
to forget their  "moral"   obligation  toward Gordon.     The Blackwood's. 
Edinburgh Magazine  article   "Fallen Britain and Her Politics" 
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spared no abuse  in discussing Gladstone's  foreign policies. 
He and his Ministers were  guilty  of   "evasive and misleading 
answers,"  and  pleading  a   lack of knowledge  to avoid positive 
action.     The Ministers  were also responsible  for Gordon's 
suicide mission and   "the   strain of  having  left him to his 
fate must remain  first upon the Ministers who planned the 
base desertion.   ..."     But  the  responsibility  for Gordon's 
plight also  lay with  the  British public,  who  "on being  in- 
formed of  it,   did not express  its  discontent in such a way as 
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to  force  the  Government  into a more  creditable  course." 
The pro-Conservative   "Patriotic Association"  also 
lambasted  the  noncommittal  policy  toward  Gordon.     In a pamph- 
let entitled   "General  Gordon and  the British Ministry," Parlia- 
mentary debates  and Blue  Books,   along with appropriate  editorial 
comment,   pictured  Gordon  as   the ever-faithful British officer 
"hard-pressed by  savage  enemies,   yelling  for his  life." 
Mr.  Gladstone  had  not only   "thwarted,   abandoned,   and betrayed" 
Gordon but he,   along with his Ministers,  had slandered  the power- 
ful  influence  and  prestige  of  the  British  soldier.     Quoting an 
excerpt  from Mr.   George  Goschen's  speech  in Commons   (13 May 
1884),   the Association  signified  that the   "prestige" of  two 
hundred British  redcoats  could accomplish  the  seemingly  im- 
possible.     Prestige   "has  been  the  talisman,"  stated Goschen, 
"by which we  have  been  able  to hold  India,   and by which  single 
officers have been   able   to go  under  great difficulties  to distant 
116 
places  and achieve marvelous  results."130 
According  to   several  sources,   the Opposition's  attempts 
to arouse public  opinion by dramatizing Gordon's difficult 
situation achieved  little  success.     At  the end of April,  Albert 
Morley,   Under-Secretary  for War,   felt Gordon's  death  in Feb- 
ruary  "would  have  turned out the Ministry,   now people  are 
tired of him.   .    .   ."131     From  the  end  of May until August 
the Sudanese   situation averaged  "five minutes* hasty discussion 
at the  fag-end  of a  Cabinet meeting."132     (Gladstone's  do- 
mestic policies  overshadowed most questions  of  foreign  affairs.) 
It is  difficult to believe  that the British public re- 
mained completely  apathetic  about Gordon's  desperate position. 
After the  fall  of Berber was  announced in  London   (13  June 
1884),   the  public was exposed  to many  conflicting  rumors per- 
taining  to  Khartoum's  position.     On  4  June  1884,   a Reuter 
telegram reported that Khartoum would  shortly surrender  to 
the Mahdi,133  while  on  the  previous  day Gordon had  supposedly 
saved Berber   from destruction.134    Again on  4  July 1884,  The 
Daily Telegraph  reported  that Khartoum had  fallen,  no massa- 
cre had occurred  and  all Europeans except Gordon had adopted 
the  Islamic  faith.     Gordon,   refusing  to desert his men,  was 
captured and   "allowed  to move  freely  in  the Mahdi's camp."- " 
Five days  later,   the  Khedive  reported Khartoum was  still under 
siege. 136 
While numerous rumors briefly described the defense or 
fall of Khartoum, the recapture of Berber,  and the capture or 
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escape of Gordon,   The  Daily  News  considered  the demands  for a 
relief expedition  as  a   "tiresome  controversy."    With  the  in- 
crease of  the Nile,   Gordon  could  leave  the  city at any moment 
by steamer.      If  he refused  to  leave  the  garrisons,  a relief 
force of  limited  size  could handle  the  situation.   "    The 
Times,   however,   warned  the  Liberal Ministry  that Gordon was 
not forgotten by  the  public:      "...   the Government would be 
fatally mistaken   if   they  imagined  that  the  slumbering interest 
in his  fate  would not be quickly blown into  a  flame were  it 
suspected  that he had  been  finally  abandoned. "    The paper also 
reminded  the  government of  Lord Hartington's pledge  to rescue 
138 
both Gordon  and  the  garrisons  if  the need arose. 
Even  though  Gladstone   seemed  unaffected by The Times' 
demands  that   former pledges be honored,   Lord Hartington could 
not forget his  13  May   1884   speech  which emphasized  "the  life 
and honour of  General  Gordon."     Tired of  the  continual  flow 
of excuses  concerning   "climatic conditions"  and  "lack of in- 
formation;  Hartington  felt his   "personal honor" was at stake. 
If Gladstone  did   "nothing  even by way of preparation"   for  a 
relief  force,   Hartington would resign.139    Gladstone  realized 
that Hartington was  the  leader of  the Whigs  in Commons.     If 
Hartington resigned Gladstone  would probably  lose his Whig 
support and  his  government would end. 
On 5  August 1884,  Gladstone  asked Commons  for not more 
than three hundred  thousand pounds  to cover expenses of  an 
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expedition.     The motion was  approved by a large majority.140 
Lord Wolseley became  the  expedition's  commander,  but dispatch 
of troops was  delayed   for  one month while Wolseley and other 
military authorities  argued whether a  land or river route 
should be used  to reach  the  city.    With  the adoption of the 
river plan,   Wolseley   finally reached Cairo on 9  September  1884 
to undertake  command  of  desert  forces. 
The  British public  had now regained an  interest in 
Sudanese affairs with  the   failure of  the Egyptian debt con- 
ference  in London  and  the beginning of  the  expedition's  strug- 
gle up the Nile.     Late  in  September,  word arrived that Gordon, 
through an almost superhuman effort,  had raised the  siege and 
was planning  to  recapture  Berber.     In actuality,  Gordon was 
still besieged  in Khartoum and  the Arab attacks were  increas- 
ing daily.      (On  9   September  1884,  Gordon sent Mr.  Powers and 
Colonel Stewart down the Nile  to  inform the  authorities of 
his worsening  situation.     Unfortunately,   they were murdered 
while attempting   to obtain  supplies  from a local chief.) 
The  Liberal  press  reaffirmed its confidence  in Gladstone's 
foreign policy.     The  Daily News   stated  that Gladstone and his 
Ministers  had  known all   along about the actual  situation in 
Khartoum;   time had  proven  them right.     The paper censured the 
Opposition which   "[was]  drawing   ...   the  fate  awaiting General 
Gordon;   and  the  predictions of  an  invasion of Egypt by naked 
savages drunk  with victory and religious  fanaticism,  were all 
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attributable either  to  ignorance  of the  true nature of  the 
Sudanese  insurrection,   or  to an unpatriotic  passion  for  dis- 
crediting a Liberal Ministry."141    The  Spectator,  however, 
lowered  its  guns  on  Khartoum's  British  commander.     An  organized 
administration  should be  established  in Khartoum but  in its 
creation  "General  Gordon's   finger  Tmust be kept]  out of  the 
pie.     He  is  certain  to want something entirely opposed  to the 
policy of Her Majesty's  Government,   and only  obtainable by 
himself or  a campaign.     Could he not be  exported to China?" 
The Times  also  advocated  the  establishment of  a stable  Sudanese 
government under   "an  indefinite  period of British rule." 
143 
Khartoum could not be  abandoned  to either  the   slave trade, 
or another European nation   (e.g.   Germany).144     Even  though the 
news appeared  optimistic,  Wolseley,  nevertheless,  quickened 
the pace  toward  Khartoum and  the  expedition's  march  seemed to 
be a race  against  time.     The  siege may  have  been raised,  but 
no one  could  be   sure  of  the  actual condition  of Gordon and his 
troops. 
Public  anxiety must have  increased upon  receiving several 
further  telegrams  from Mr.   Powers.     Dated 30  July  1884,   one 
telegram stated  that  the  city could  survive   for only  two more 
months.     Khartoum was  under daily attack while  Gordon's  armed 
steamers  continued  to  keep  the Arabs at bay. 
1884,   Powers  again  asserted  that Khartoum would fall  in  two 
months because  of  low  food  supplies,  and  the   local population 
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had abandoned  all   "hope"   of evacuation by British  troops.146 
The Times   took  advantage  of worsening conditions  to  stir up 
public emotion.     While  Gladstone  had minimized Gordon's pre- 
dicament,   the  gallant defenders  "were daily engaged  in a 
desperate   fight  for  life."    The paper  further dramatized the 
devoted British  servants  ready  to  die  for  their country's 
honor.     "We   see   the   three  Englishmen  £..e.  Gordon,   Stewart 
and Powers] ,   knowing  that  their days  are numbered unless the 
unforeseen  and  the  improbable  comes  to pass,   setting  their 
backs   to the  wall  and  facing  their  hard fate  without  thought 
of flinching and even without  abatement of  their cheerfulness." 
The Governor-General  and his  companions even became moral 
examples to  the  British  troops.     If  the desert seemed unbear- 
able,   think  of   the  three  British defenders who had repelled 
repeated Arab  attacks  during  the summer's hottest months. 
Again,   Gordon's   sacrifices must not be wasted.     The  complete 
abandonment  of  Khartoum,   reasoned The  Times,   would be   "the 
sure way  to  lose  every  advantage won by  General Gordon's 
splendid courage,   and by  the exertions of  the  army we  are now 
pushing up  the Nile."149 
With  the  news  of  the  death of  Stewart and Powers,   ten- 
sions  intensified  by  pessimistic  rumors  of Khartoum's  fall. 
French  news   sources  provided detailed accounts  of Gordon's 
forlorn  attempt  to  reach Berber by steamer only to  lose part 
of his   fleet by  artillery  fire,   while  the remaining ships 
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along with  Gordon himself were eventually  captured.150    This 
account was  also  confirmed by  the Khedive who dispatched  this 
dismal  information  to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.   5 
The  information was  contradicted early in  December by a re- 
port received by  the  Khedive.     Five hundred Arabs had deserted 
the Mahdi and   joined  Gordon's  forces.152     Another message  from 
an escaped Arab  prisoner  related Gordon's  attempt to  strengthen 
Khartoum's  defenses  and  produce "his  own {gunpowder. 
The public's belief  that Gordon's  rescue was  only a 
matter of  time   seemed  assured,   when General Wolseley  received 
a message  the   "size  of  a  postage  stamp"  in which Gordon on 
14 December  1884   stated  that Khartoum was   in sound shape. 
Gordon's position,  however,  was rapidly deteriorating.    The 
messenger bringing Gordon's note   informed   "Lord Wolseley pri- 
vately  that  food   [was"]  running short,   that there   (would]  be 
some stiffish  fighting,   and  that as  large  a  force as  possible 
should be   sent and  sent  quickly."155     (On  14 December  1884, 
Gordon placed  the   final  entry  into his  Khartoum  journals.     He 
believed  that  if  two hundred British soldiers did not relieve 
Khartoum within  ten days,   the Arabs  would capture  the  city 
itself.156) 
Confident   that  success  had been achieved.   The  Dailv. News 
stated that  "General  Gordon  and Sir Charles  Wilson may have 
[already]   shaken  hands, and  the banks of  the  Blue Nile,   and  the 
streets of  the  city,   resounded,   for  the   first time  in  their 
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strange history with  the cheers  of English  soldiers."157    Un- 
fortunately,   British  soldiers  commanded by Sir Charles Wilson 
never entered  Khartoum.     Boarding  two penny  steamers  on 24 
January  1885,   British  troops  arrived near  the outskirts of 
Khartoum four  days   later.     Gordon's dwelling was   in ruins  and 
within a  short distance  of  the city,   the  steamers,   under  in- 
tensive Arab  gunfire,   were  forced  to make a  hasty  retreat. 
One of the Mahdi's   followers   told  the rescue  party that Gordon 
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had been captured and had adopted  the  Islamic  faith. The 
news reached  Lord Wolseley on  4 February  1885  and  in  the early 
morning of  5   February,   Britons  learned  that their  overconfident 
expectations  were   "premature." 
The  immediate  reaction  in  London  and  throughout Great 
Britain was  one  of  despair,   utter  amazement,   and uncontrollable 
anger against  the  Liberal  government,   especially  the Prime 
Minister.     Upon  learning of  the  bulletins,   the Queen departed 
from accepted  diplomatic  procedure  and sent an uncoded  tele- 
gram to Hartington,   Granville  and  Gladstone:     "The  news   from 
Khartoum are   frightful,   and  to  think  that all  this  might have 
been prevented  and many  lives  saved by earlier  action  is  too 
frightful."159     Gladstone  informed  the Queen  that  three major 
factors  contributed  to  the disaster:     The attempted rescue by 
river  instead  of  advancing  troops   from  Suakim to Berber and 
then on  to Khartoum,   climatic  conditions  and  "the  delivery 
of the  town by  treachery."160     Sir Hamilton believed the 
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Government made   two  fatal  errors:     "their weakness  (was]  in 
not turning  a deaf  ear  to  the  sentimental cry  for  inter- 
ference  in  the  Soudan,    .   .   .   and  in not resisting  the clamour 
for employing  a  lunatic  on  the most delicate of missions. "161 
Many  Liberal  politicians   shared Hamilton's critical 
comments,   but  few were  bold enough  to put their heads on  the 
chopping block by  expressing  them in public.     Gordon was now 
a beloved hero,   cut down by  the  barbaric Arabs  and an uncon- 
cerned Liberal government.     He  had also been the principal 
symbol of British  prestige  in  the Middle  East.     To attack 
Gordon was   to  further  diminish  this damaged prestige in  the 
eyes of millions  of Moslem  subjects.     Immediate action was 
demanded  to determine both  Gordon's  fate,   as yet unknown,   and 
to reinforce  Great Britain's  position as  a military power. 
On 6 February  1885,   the Cabinet empowered Wolseley  to rescue 
Gordon if he  was  not  dead and  "to check  the  advance of the 
Mahdi in districts   as  yet undisturbed."162     (Lacking nothing, 
Wolseley would be   supplied with men,   guns  and war  supplies 
upon request.)     The  Cabinet Ministers  further concluded that 
Wolseley's   field  of  operation  should also be  extended to in- 
clude the  recapture  of  Khartoum. 
According  to  the  papers,   Gordon's  fate was  uncertain  and 
several  rumors  circulated that he was dead,   captured by the 
Mahdi,  or  still  defending himself  in  a church within  the  city. 
The Daily  Telegraph,   severely  critical  of  Gladstone's handling 
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of Gordon's mission,   insisted  that Gordon,   if alive,  must be 
saved no matter what  the cost.     Probably in  a sincere desire 
of strengthening  the  weakened  ties between Gladstone's ad- 
ministration and  the  once pro-Gladstone  paper.  The  Daily 
Telegraph  did not advocate  the downfall  of the Liberal Minis- 
try.     The  Prime Minister,   realizing his  past errors  and trying 
to amend  them,   must be  supported  by all  Britons,  not drummed 
out of office.     Gordon's whereabouts were of great concern, 
but Britain's   "imperial  credit,"   symbolized by Gordon him- 
self,   almost seemed  of  greater  concern  to the news  sheet. 
Khartoum must be  retaken and 
if  Egypt  is   to  be  saved and  if England  is 
to  remain  the  Ruler of  her  countless Mussulman 
subjects  the  Mahdi must be  eventually  smash- 
ed.    ..    .     The  honour  of Great Britain  stands 
as much  committed  to  the  recapture of  Khartoum 
by  the presence  of Gordon  in that city  as  it  a 
garrison of  the  Queen's  guards  and Highlanders 
had   fallen  into  captivity or death along witn 
him. 164 
The  Times  was  almost  in  total agreement,  but did not  feel 
that the Government  should escape  condemnation for  the mission's 
failure.     All  could  have been  prevented  if  the Liberal Ministry 
had displayed more  concern.     Not only the  Government,   but all 
Britons would experience   "shame  and  sorrow at  the result of  the 
long and deliberate  abandonment of  General Gordon."     Heavy 
emphasis was  again  placed on Britain's  fallen prestige.     Gordon, 
"that solitary  figure  holding  aloft the  flag of England in  face 
of the hordes  of  Islam p 3 counted  for more in maintaining  the 
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prestige of JGreat Britain} than experienced Parliamentary 
tacticians can easily conceive. . . . General Gordon must 
be saved or avenged and the honour of (Great Britain] must 
be vindicated  no matter what  the difficulties." 
In defense  of  the Government,   The Daily News reaf- 
firmed  the  theory  of  Khartoum's  destruction through   "treachery." 
Even though plagued by   "some  acrid partisan crying out that 
now is  the  time  to   turn national disaster   to partisan account," 
both political  parties  would   (hopefully)   unite  to meet the 
present crisis.166     The  paper  attempted to make  two points 
clear  to the British public:      1)     Total evacuation of  Egypt 
and the  Sudan was  still   the  primary goal of  Gladstone's  govern- 
ment,  but popular  sentiment  and  Gordon's unknown  fate  would 
delay this objective,   and  2)   "that the dispatch of  ^Gordon] 
to Khartoum was  as  distinctly  a national  act as anything 
that has  ever yet been  inspired by the wish and sanctioned 
by the will of   the  English people."167     The  Liberal press  in- 
directly  tried  to blame   the  British public not only for  forcing 
Gladstone  to send Gordon  to Khartoum,   but also  for his  sup- 
posed blunders.     In  agreement with other papers,   The Daily, 
News envisioned  the  collapse  of British prestige  among  the 
Oriental nations.     Throughout  the  East,  non-Europeans were "sit- 
ting on the  fence" wondering  if British  troops would retreat 
from the  advance  of   the Mahdi  and his  followers.     Sudden 
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abandonment would  increase   the number of his adherents  to un- 
controllable proportions.168 
The British  public,   apprehensive  about Gordon's safety, 
could only concur  that Britain's  symbol of Anglo-Saxon supe- 
riority over   less  civilized  nations must either be  saved or 
avenged.     Constantly  reminded of how Gordon had been dis- 
patched with   their   fullest  support,   they were plagued with 
the Conservatives '   pointed  suggestion  that they were primarily 
responsible   for not demanding  that troop  support be  sent 
earlier  to  the  besiteged capital.     Unwilling to bear  the entire 
blame for  Gordon's  fate,   the  British public would eventually 
seek a scapegoat  to  relieve  any nagging  sense  of guilt. 
Britons  also   faced  the humiliating  taunts of  the  for- 
eign press  and  especially of  French news  sources extensively 
reported  in The Times.     Ever  since  the   failure of  the Dual Con- 
trol system,   Anglo-French  relations  in matters  concerning 
Egyptian domestic  and   foreign affairs  had been  less  friendly. 
With  the collapse  of   the  Egyptian debt conference in London, 
relations  again  took  a  turn  for  the worse.     France,   during  the 
latter part of  the  nineteenth  century,   was  attempting to become 
which would decrease Britain's 
ial status 
at the expense  of  Britain's  privileged position must have great- 
ly irritated a  British  public who were  extremely  jealous of 
this cherished   status.     After   the  fall  of Khartoum,  France again 
a powerful   imperial  nation,   one 
power and prestige  overseas.     Any gain  in her imper 
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was able  to  ridicule Britain's overseas prestige,  while  point- 
ing out to  the  British public and continental  Europe  the 
supposed culprit of  Egypt's  domestic  and  foreign distress 
and Gordon's  death,   Mr.   Gladstone. 
The  Daily News   seemingly provided  little French  comment 
concerning  Britain's  present difficulty.     Excerpts  from Le 
Soir expressed   sincere  regrets  that General Wolseley had not 
been in  time:      "England has  been  imprudent more  from ambition 
and egotism  than humanity,   but it must be  admitted  that the 
chastisement  is   immeasurably  severe." 
The  Times,   nonetheless,  did not spare  the British pub- 
lic the  full  impact  of adverse French  opinion.     A correspondent 
in Paris claimed  that the  fall of Khartoum and  Gordon's  fate 
was  the  only  topic  of political discussion.      "The name of  this 
hero is on everyone's   lips   ...   all  nations  regard him as  a 
fellow citizen."     The  reporter  further affirmed  that  "to  the 
universal anguish   ...   in believing  that he  is  lost,   is 
added a feeling  that  a  terrible  responsibility will  rest on 
those who have exposed  to  this  fate one of  the most remark- 
able men  in  the   19th   century.     People  are already recalling 
all the delays,   hesitations,   and precautions  which were  thought 
yesterday  to  be  useless,   but which are now regarded as  culp- 
able."1™    The  Royalist Soleil believed  that Gordon had become 
a legend  among  the Mussulman people  and worshipped as  a god. 
"M   their  idol has  been cast down  from its pedestal and has 
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crumbled to  dust,   and  with  it  the  prestige of England.   .   .   . 
She lives  on her  prestige  and  if she  loses  this what will  re- 
main?"171     Le  Francais   supported Tory  sentiments,  blaming 
one individual  for Britain's  deplorable  situation in Egypt, 
the Prime Minister.172 
While  Tory  and French editorials  assailed the Gladstone 
government,   the  British  public eagerly  awaited any informa- 
tion concerning  Gordon's   fate.     On  11 February 1885,   the 
newspapers  published  a more extensive  account of Sir Charles 
Wilson's   frustrated  attempts   to rescue  Gordon.     Several rumors 
were prevelant  about his   situation:     he was  captured and had 
adopted  the   Islamic   faith;   he was  defending himself in a  for- 
tified Roman Catholic mission;   and he was  killed while  leaving 
his place  of  residence.173     Practically all hope of his sur- 
vival disappeared  two days   later.     A document written by an 
Arab chief  and  recovered  from  the  saddle-bags of a dead donkey 
claimed  that  the   "traitor  Gordon" was  killed during  the assault 
upon Khartoum.174 
With  this  direct  indication of  Gordon's death,   British 
prestige  throughout  its  colonial possessions  reached  its  lowest 
ebb;  Britain's  hero,   supposedly  loved by the primitive  Sudanese 
people,   had been killed by  the  tribes  which,   so everyone had 
believed,   would  never harm him.     The  British  public was driven 
to two courses  of  action.     First,   their   "ideal"  British officer 
had to be  defended  against  future  attempts  to discredit his 
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actions   in Khartoum and  to have his  name,   reputation and past 
achievements  raised  to new heights  of glorification and  re- 
spect.     The  second  step would have been   to search out the 
individual  or  persons   responsible   for Britain's  loss of  pres- 
tige and  the  untimely  death  of  their Christian hero   (i.e.   the 
Liberal Ministry,   and more  specifically  Mr.  Gladstone) .     Ex- 
cept for  the efforts  of  some Liberal  journals   (e.g.   The 
Spectator)   to  vindicate  Gladstone's  reputation,   these two 
courses  of action were   followed  for  the  remainder of  the 
Victorian Era  until  Lytton Strachey,   in   1918,  would attempt 
to reverse  this   trend,   placing  the blame   for Khartoum's  de- 
struction  upon Gordon himself.   75 
In order  to   lessen  increasing guilt  feelings,   the British 
public vented  its   anger  upon Mr.   Gladstone.     Formerly  the 
"Grand Old Man,"   he was  now known as   "Gordon's  Old Murderer"17 
and another  "Nero  f idelling. "177    Gladstone only  created  ad- 
ditional  public  resentment by  attending  the  theater on 10 
February  1885  before Wilson's  description of Gordon's probable 
death was  published  in  the  papers  on  11  February  1885.     "The 
'World,'"   commented Hamilton,   "seems  to imagine  that (the 
Prime Minister!   should  clothe  himself  in  sackcloth and heap 
ashes on his  head.     The  London Society mind is poisoned with 
hatred towards Mr.   G. fladstone] ." 
J „„  in  February  1885,   Gladstone When Parliament reconvened on 19  Feoruary 
presented his   four-point Sudanese  plan  to Commons:     The 
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inhabitants  of  Khartoum must be  sent  relief,   slavery elim- 
inated in  the  fallen capital,   a  stable government created in 
Khartoum,   and  aid given  to  the remaining besieged Egyptian 
garrisons. This   did not alter  the  Tory opposition plan to 
again  institute   "vote  of  censure"  proceedings.     The Liberal 
Ministers  throughout  these  debates  endorsed these  four major 
objectives,   but would not agree  to  a permanent British oc- 
cupation of  Khartoum  after  the  suppression  of  the  insurrection. 
This provoked  severe  criticism from Liberals,180  Home Rulers 
and Conservatives  alike.     The  vote of censure was defeated 
by only  14   votes   (302  against,   288  for).     Forty Home  Rulers 
and 12  Liberal members  sided  with  the  Tory  opposition. 
During  the heated debates,   Gladstone,   like many of his 
Liberal colleagues,   paid homage  to Gordon whom he personally 
believed was   the  direct  cause  of his  present difficulties. 
.   .   .   devoted   to his  Sovereign,   to his  country, 
and  likewise   to  the world.   .   .   .   (.Hje  seems  to 
have  deemed  it  his  special  honour to devote his 
energies  and  to risk his  existence  on behalf 
of  those with  whom he  had no other  tie  than 
that of  human  sympathy.     General Gordon was  a 
hero  and permit me  to  say he  was  still more--he 
was  a  hero  among heroes.   .   .   .   JUe Proposed 
to himself  not  any  ideal of weafth and power, 
or even  fame,   but  to do  good was    jhijfl   <*]ect.   •   ■   • 
I  trust  there  will  grow  from  the  contemplation 
of that  character and  those  deeds  other men who 
in  future  time  may emulate his noble  and most 
Christian example.**2 
Fed by  numerous   journals,   newspapers  and books,   the  Gordon 
legend  rapidly  took hold  of  the  British public.     The  Conserva- 
tive press,   after Gladstone's  escape  from censure,  constantly 
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praised  Gordon's  numerous  heroic exploits  in order  to dis- 
credit  the Liberals.     Two articles  in  Blackwood's  Edinburgh 
Magazine,   "Our Egyptian  Atrocities"   and  "General Gordon^" 
served  this  purpose.     The  former portrayed Gordon as  the  in- 
nocent  scapegoat  of an  ill-planned Egyptian policy.     It ex- 
plained  to a  pound-and-sixpence-minded British public how the 
Egyptian debt had   skyrocketed  under Gladstone's  administration. 
In more  than one  melodramatic passage,   the  story attempted to 
explain  in what way  Gordon,   "the oriflame of our Christian 
chivalry   .   .   .   Uiad beenj sacrificed on  the  foul alter of 
stock-jobbery  and  cold-blooded statescraftl"183     "General 
Gordon"  described   the General's  past achievements in China 
and the  Sudan   (1874-1879) .     It provided  several accounts  of 
personal  bravery  in  China,   the  generous rewards  received  from 
a grateful Chinese  Emperor and his miraculous   journey  into a 
camp of  3,000   fanatical  slave-dealers  armed only with his 
184 charismatic personality. 
Mr.   Stanley  Leigh ton hoped to drive a  lasting wedge 
between Britons  and   the  Liberal party  through his  article, 
"Gordon or  Gladstone."     He  placed  the Prime Minister on  trial 
before  the British   people   for his part  in  the desertion of 
Gordon,     using  assorted  passages  from Gordon's   journals  in 
Khartoum,   the   author  tried through Gordon's own words  to 
condemn Gladstone's   lack   of direct action.     Before coming 
to his conclusion,   Mr. Leighton exaggerated the possible scenes 
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of Gordon's   last moments,   in order  to inflame public emotion. 
Some say he was shot as he sat at his table 
reading the Bible. Some say he barricaded 
the palace and held out until all his am- 
munition was spent; then, throwing open the 
door, walked unarmed out, quietly smoking a 
cigarette. Some say he fell in a desperate 
hand-to-hand combat.185 
After reaching  this  high-pitched climax,  Mr.   Leighton con- 
cluded  that Britons would eventually have 
to choose between vindicating Gordon  and 
absolving   the man who  lured him  to his 
death.     To vote  for Gladstone  £in  1886J   will 
be  to  sanction  the  desertion of Gordon. 
Will   the English  people  pronounce  so in- 
famous  a  verdict,   and   thus accept  the  re- 
sponsibility  for  the  basest deed of modern 
times?186 
The  Spectator,   after  the publication of  Leighton's 
article,   described  it  as  "one  of the most discreditable elec- 
tioneering appeals we  have ever read   ...   (and believed  the 
article   only  indicated)   one  of  the  signs  of  the degeneration 
of  (the  Tory]   party."187    The  author was  accused of making 
it appear  that Gordon was   "personally"  blaming Mr.   Gladstone 
for his  plight,  when  actually  he was  criticizing  the British 
"government"   in general.     Gordon himself was not  spared per- 
sonal attack.     Called   "impulsive," he  supposedly disobeyed 
his orders.     The  story   also  indicated that Gordon was responsi- 
ble  for  his  own death,   because he had waged an offensive war 
on the  Sudanese people.     In doing  so,   the  Sudanese  seemingly 
accepted  the  Mahdi  as   their protector  against Gordon's  ag- 
gression.188 
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To a people  devoted  to preserving Gordon's memory and 
supporting his  damaged  prestige,   such  searing criticism by a 
Liberal   journal could  have  only generated additional ani- 
mosity between  the  public  and the  Government.    As  already 
demonstrated,   Gordon's  Khartoum  journals were used either  to 
smear  the  Liberals  or  condemn Gordon's  actions.     The complete 
set of  journals were  compiled for  publication by Gordon's 
relative,   A.   Egmont Hake,   author of  the highly popular work. 
The Story of  Chinese  Gordon   (1884) .   In his  introduction 
attached  to  this  edited work,  Mr.   Hake defended Gordon's con- 
duct,  while explaining  that  the General had been  "constantly 
18 9 
thwarted  and never  supported" by the British government. 
The anger  felt by  the  British public  due  to  the  Government's 
negative  attitude  toward Gordon's  plight could have only in- 
creased,  when  they  examined  his  parting words.    He believed 
that Khartoum  faced  capture   after  ten days  had elapsed,   un- 
less  two hundred men  came  to  the  city's rescue.     "I have done 
my best,"   he  affirmed,   "for   the honour of our country."190 
in order  to  keep  Gordon's memory  and heroic example 
alive  in  the minds  of  Britain's younger generation,   such 
writers  as  Rev.   S.   A.   Swaine  published works  directed toward 
J   -,,.  "a nrpat and brave 
children  in which  Gordon was  portrayed  as    a great 
soldier and  God-fearing man."191    While Gordon's  only con- 
cern was   "to  God and  duty.'"* Mr.   Gladstone  and Lord GranvUle 
are described  as   "un-English Englishmen" because of  thexr 
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neglect of  General Gordon and  remaining Egyptian garrisons.193 
For  the  next  few  months,   the Tory opposition attempted 
to place  the  Liberals  in  a dim  light because  of their  con- 
fusing Egyptian policy,   while   the  Liberals,  mindful of the 
upcoming  1886  elections,   tried  to quell  the  fervor over Gordon's 
death.     Fortunately  for  Gladstone,   Egyptian affairs  soon faded 
into the  background  because of  increased  turmoil between Britons 
and Russians  in Afghanistan.     Wolseley  soon evacuated his 
garrisons   from  the  Sudan.     British  soldiers would not re-enter 
the Sudan  until   1896.     On  2  September  1898,   the Arab Empire 
crumbled at the  battle  of Omdurman.     With  the destruction of 
countless  Arab  garrisons  under murderous  British rifle and 
machine-gun  fire,   the  British  public and politician  finally 
regained their  sacred prestige,   needlessly sacrificed  at 
Khartoum  in  1885. 
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CONCLUSION 
The  Gordon  legend,   firmly established by the  time of the 
General's  death,   had not grown at a  uniform pace  since the days 
of his  first  publicly noticed exploits  in China.    Before his 
last adventure  at Khartoum,   Gordon's popularity among  the 
British public  suffered  several ups  and downs.     His  adventures 
in China received  some public notice  in Great Britain,  but his 
recognition as  a  British hero was  extremely  short-lived at 
best. 
Several historians  such as  Hake  and Elton attributed 
this fading popular  appeal  to Gordon's  aversion to any kind 
of notoriety.     Britons  in  the  1860's,  however,  were not in 
the proper   "state  of mind"  either  to  appreciate an overseas 
empire  or  to glorify  the men who performed heroic actions  in 
order  to strengthen  these  colonial   territories.    At  this  time 
only a small  class  of merchants displayed  serious  interest in 
Britain's  colonial  holdings,   caring  less  for disseminating 
British culture  and prestige  than  for obtaining  substantial 
economic advantages.     Gordon did,  nonetheless,  help  to further 
perpetuate  the   "Anglo-Saxon Myth"  of British  superiority over 
less advanced  peoples,   while  at the  same  time  saving face  for 
a weak British  foreign policy  in  the  1860's.     Unfortunately, 
both the British public  and even Gordon himself would fail to 
recognize  that the   Imperial  government had been on the verge 
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of crushing the  Taiping rebellion    when Gordon obtained the 
command of  the   "Ever-Victorious Army."    Even  though Britons 
in the  1860's  displayed little  interest  in Gordon's  supposed 
suppression of  the Chinese  insurrection,   Britons twenty years 
later would readily  acknowledge his  single-handed effort in 
China. 
Gordon  again  came to public notice during his  activities 
as Eguatorial  Governor  and  Governor-General of  the  Sudan 
(1874-1879) .     Such historians  as  John Marlowe   seemed to be- 
lieve  that during  and  after  these early  Sudanese exploits, 
Gordon's  popularity  among  the British public began to  steadily 
increase   in  stature.     The British public learned through  the 
efforts  of  free-lance  reporters how Gordon was   seemingly able 
to maintain control  over  large groups  of  savage cannibalistic 
natives through his charismatic personality.     Unfortunately, 
the British public  failed to  realize   that Gordon's  awed  sub- 
jects were  much more  apprehensive of possible  intervention by 
British  troops   than  of   the  dynamic personality  of one man. 
Yet another element was   added  to the Gordon legend while  again 
reinforcing  the   "Anglo-Saxon Myth." 
Contrary  to popular belief,   Gordon's  fame after his 
first Sudanese  exploits was  again temporary.     While,   according 
to Mr.   Faber,   the  ideal British  imper 
maintain  his   "distance"   from his  subjects,   Gordon believed in 
and practiced close  interpersonal  relations 
"savages,"   his   "brothers"  and   "sisters. 
ial administrator had to 
lordon believed in 
with these  so-called 
He in a sense had 
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"gone native"  but  in  the  1870's,   this  practice was  not looked 
upon as  the   "proper"  British attitude.     He  further  irritated 
British officials  and  statesmen by his  sincere attempts  to 
advance  the  economic  and  political  interests of Oriental 
governments   (i.e.   Egypt  and  the  Sudan).    Acclaiming Gordon's 
Sudanese  achievements would have meant acknowledging his 
methods  of  imperial administration which were  contrary to  the 
accepted  and cherished beliefs  of Britons  overseas. 
Gordon's  anti-imperialist beliefs  did not noticeably 
conflict with  a  Liberal  administration which was more concern- 
ed with domestic  reforms   than with advancing British prestige 
in its colonial  possessions   (i.e.   the   "Little England" 
tradition) .     When  the Mahdi  threatened to engulf not only 
the Sudan but Egypt as  well,   Gladstone  and his Ministers 
adopted the  easy   (but what probably  appeared to  them as the 
"practical")   way  out of  a difficult situation.     Gladstone 
hoped that Gordon's  legendary  charismatic personality would save 
him an extensive  amount of  time,  money and men.     Unfortunately 
for Gladstone's   administration,   Gordon was  unable  to  fulfill 
any of  these  wishful expectations.     Even  though both men de- 
sired  stable Arab   governments without British  interference, 
Gladstone was more  concerned with creating an effective and 
lasting  administration  in Egypt,  not  the Sudan.     Gordon,  how- 
ever,   believed  that Egypt could  not maintain an organized 
iQ  ,isn enioyed an ordered government until   the  Sudanese people also enj  s 
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system of  rule.     According to Gordon,   Zobeir Pasha was the 
key to  this  established  Sudanese  administration,  but the 
British government and  public  failed to comprehend Gordon's 
logic  and  so  his  attempts  to maintain  order came  to nothing. 
But   if Gordon  supposedly had crushed the Taiping re- 
bellion,   couldn't he  pacify a group of  less civilized and 
educated Arabs?     Besides,  weren't all  Oriental rebellions of 
the same  character?     The  British  government,   public    and even 
Gordon himself  failed  to  notice  the glaring differences be- 
tween the Taiping and Arab  insurrections.     When Gordon ob- 
tained  command of  the   "Ever-Victorious Army,"  the Taiping 
rebellion had  long been  on the decline.     Supported by fresh 
Imperial  armies   and backed by modern weapons of European 
warfare,   Gordon  and his   forces  only hastened  the  rebellion's 
final destruction.     The  Sudanese  uprising,   on the other hand, 
was approaching the climax of strength and influence during 
Gordon's  attempt  to evacuate  troops.     While  at Khartoum,  Gordon 
was engaged  in  a  defensive  rather  than an offensive war and 
was not  supplied with British war  goods or   (with  the exception 
of Colonel  Stewart)   European officers.     While  the Chinese were 
energetic,   resourceful  and  accustomed to fighting on river 
Plains,   the  Egyptians  in   the  Sudan  could barely  shoot a rifle 
and were  unable   to  function in  the unbearable Sudanese  climate. 
Even though  Gordon did have  access  to modern European weapons 
throughout  the  siege  of  Khartoum,   the Arab troops,  unlike the 
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Taiping  garrisons,   were  also well  supplied with European 
weapons  taken   from captured Egyptian outposts  and unsuccess- 
ful offensive  expeditions   (i.e.   the  Hicks massacre). 
The  Liberal Ministry  realized  that the success  or 
failure  of Gordon's mission would produce a definite  im- 
pact on  future  Anglo-Egyptian  policy.     They   failed to  recog- 
nize,   however,   that Gordon had been portrayed by press  and 
public  as  the  incarnation of  British   "prestige"  in  the Middle 
East and  throughout  the  rest  of Europe.     Other  imperial powers 
were challenging  Britain's  treasured position of world  leader- 
ship and,   given  the  opportunity,  would attempt to dispel  the 
established  "Anglo-Saxon Myth"  which depicted Britons  as 
worshipped and  obeyed without question.     Gordon's  unexpected 
death would decrease  British   "prestige"  while  exposing  this 
supposed Anglo-Saxon superiority in  the eyes  of Arab  and 
European alike  as   little more  than  romantic wishful  thinking. 
While  the  Liberals  contributed  to Gordon's  legend by 
depending  too  much upon his charismatic personality,   the pro- 
imperialist news  sources  perpetuated the need and desire  to 
glorify  Gordon's  past  and present achievements.     Even  though 
these papers  were  able  to  predict the  trend of public opinion 
to some  extent,   they  also  functioned  as  the principal  insti- 
gators  of  public  sentiment.     While  the  Liberal  news  sheets 
attempted  to  vindicate  Gladstone's  foreign policy  through 
logical  arguments,   the Opposition papers  depended on emotional 
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editorials  to agitate  public  feeling  against Gladstone's 
government.     The  Liberal  editorials  alienated public opinion 
by blaming  the  public  for  compelling Gladstone  and his 
Cabinet to  send Gordon,   while  the Opposition's  commentary 
stirred up  guilt  feelings  by accusing Britons of abandoning 
a God-fearing Christian  to hordes of blood-thirsty barbarians. 
Taking advantage of  these  increasing  guilt feelings among the 
British electorate,   such  papers   as The Times attempted  to 
alleviate  this  public  shame by directing Britons  to the 
principal   individual  supposedly  responsible  for everyone's 
present difficulties:      the  Prime Minister. 
Shortly after his   arrival  at the doomed capital, 
Gordon concluded  that his  personal influence was  not enough 
to carry  through  a  successful  evacuation;   he desired either 
British or Turkish  troops  and/or   the notorious ex-slave dealer 
Zobeir Pasha. 
Unwilling  to  sanction  Zobeir,   the  pro-expansionist 
British press  advocated  a British protectorate over Egypt 
and the Sudan.     If  Gordon were  supported by British  troops, 
Gladstone's  dream of eventual evacuation of Egypt would  suffer 
a serious  setback.     The  Opposition papers  realized that Gordon's 
name,  reputation    and present plight could be used to attack 
the Liberals'   non-imperialist policy and  to drive a permanent 
wedge between  the  existing government and  a highly emo 
British public.     Reinforcing  and  perpetuating Gordon's  heroic 
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:ime image  in  the hearts  and minds  of Britons was,   for  the  t: 
being,   the best method of  reinforcing and  perpetuating British 
involvement not only  in Egypt and  the Sudan,   but eventually 
throughout Africa. 
Knowledge of Gordon's death made  it a patriotic ne- 
cessity  to  glorify  Gordon's present  and past accomplishments 
in order  to  re-establish Britain's  fallen prestige among her 
colonies.     It also became necessary  to display powerful mili- 
tary support against the Mahdi's  forces  to regain  this  tar- 
nished prestige.     This would not only entail  the   further  use 
of British   troops,  but would also necessitate  the  additional 
involvement of  British civil  administrators  in Egypt's  do- 
mestic  and   foreign matters   as well.     One might venture to 
state  that  some  Tory politicians  relished the notion of 
Gordon's  meeting  a heroic death,   defending  the honor and 
glory of  the  British Empire.     His  name  could  then be used  to 
motivate  others   to  shoulder  the burden that he  left behind, 
the task of  bringing British  civilization and culture  to 
"less  fortunate"   lands. 
The  British public of  the  1880' Sj unlike Britons  twenty 
years  before,   looked upon  the Empire as  a genuine  and serious 
responsibility.     Anyone  or  anything  that weakened  its power or 
prestige was  a grave  threat  to the Empire's very existence. 
The public  considered  Zobeir  a menace  to Britain's  position  in 
Egypt and  the  Sudan,   and  so  contributed to Gordon's  legend by 
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refusing even  to  consider  Zobeir's possible employment.     It 
is only  conjecture  to  state what might have been  the   "good" 
or  "evil"  results  of  a  power struggle between  this ex-slave 
chief and  the   "guided  one"   of Allah.     The  fact  remains  that 
Zobeir  probably could  have   substantially weakened the Mahdi's 
influence  among  the  Emirs who were once his  old  comrades-in- 
arms.     Unfortunately  for all  concerned,   the British public 
could not  "stomach"  the  idea that a non-Christian slave- 
holder could  succeed where  their prime example  of Christian 
manhood had  failed.     Not only would British prestige  suffer 
in Egypt and  the  Sudan  through  the  dispatch of  Zobeir,  but 
also throughout  the  entire Oriental world  and Europe.     The 
"Anglo-Saxon Myth"  could only maintain  its  facade  of reality 
through  the  solitary  efforts of  this Christian  soldier,   not 
by begging  the help  of  an unscrupulous  infidel. 
Finally,   Gordon himself was  to a  large extent re- 
sponsible   for  strengthening  his  legend,  one  that  throughout 
his active  life he  tried  to  prevent at every opportunity. 
Even though he  was   able   to overcome many biased ethnocentric 
beliefs  of  his  age,   he  nevertheless was  still affected by others 
which probably  stemmed  from a military upbringing.    He stoutly 
affirmed  that the  Sudanese  revolt was not of a religious 
nature,   but was  a political  revolt against Egyptian oppression. 
Gordon could have held  the mistaken notion that  the Sudanese 
insurrection could be dissolved as easily  as  the  Taiping 
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rebellion.     Comparing  the Mahdi with Hung,  Gordon could have 
concluded  that both Oriental  leaders  came  from the  same mold 
and were motivated  by  the  same political goals.     Even  though 
the Mahdi preached  to  the  Sudanese  about  the  renewal of  the 
Islamic  faith,   Hung also had supposedly desired a Christian 
kingdom in China.     According to British  logic,   if one pseudo- 
religious  insurrection had  failed,   there  should be no reason 
why another  one,   this  time  in the Sudan,   should not also 
meet the   same  fate.     With  this belief  in mind  and realizing 
that Anglo-Egyptian policy would no  longer affect the actions 
of the  Sudanese,   it  is understandable why Gordon would have 
preferred  to  employ  Zobeir  as  the country's permanent ruler. 
At least  there was   a positive chance  that Zobeir would main- 
tain and  strengthen  a  stable  Sudanese  administration even at 
the cost of  a revived  slave   trade.     Britons,   however,  expressed 
a distinct distrust of  any government brought  about by radical 
and/or violent means.     The Mahdi  symbolized   (to Gordon  and the 
British public)   the most dangerous  threat to an established 
governmental order   in the  Sudan;   he had  to be prevented from 
obtaining  control  over  its people or he would eventually be- 
come a direct menace to Egypt itself.    Modern scholarship, 
through  the  efforts  of  such  Sudanese historians  as Mr.  P.  M. 
Holt,  has  conflicted with  the  standard European interpreta- 
tion of  how  the Mahdi  lacked  the  true motives  of a natxonal 
leader.     To  the  Sudanese,   it was  the Mahdi,  not Charles Gordon, 
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who would provide   them with  a  stable government. 
Since  British military manpower and  technology had 
supposedly ended  one rebellion,   there was no reason   (from 
a Briton's point of view)   why another Oriental  insurrection 
could not be  dissolved  in  a  similar manner.     While under- 
estimating  the  Mahdi's  religious  influence,  Gordon over- 
estimated  the  assumed moral  effect of a  small detachment of 
British  troops.     Again,   it is  only conjecture whether a small 
detail of British   soldiers could have dispelled the numerous 
Arab garrisons   surrounding Khartoum,   if  these  soldiers had 
approached Berber or even the  capital  itself. 
It  is  ironic  to note   that Gordon,  praised as  the 
"ideal" British officer and administrator,  would have readi- 
ly given up his  citizenship in order  to resolve the  inter- 
national problems  of  China   (1880) .     Not concerned with per- 
petuating British  imperial prestige,   Gordon wanted only to 
relieve human  suffering while  upholding  the word of God. 
Even his  personal  friends  could not appreciate his deep spiritu- 
al convictions.     Mr.   Boulger  could not comprehend the  image  of 
Gordon trying  to  understand his  every-day existence by con- 
tinually depending  upon  the  Scriptures  as his principle guide. 
" This    was  not  the  true  Gordon,"  argued Boulger,   "but rather 
the grafting of  a  new character on  the original  stem of Spartan 
simplicity  and heroism. ,.l 
To Mr.   Boulger  and his  fellow Britons,  Gordon had been 
able  to  accomplish his  remarkable heroic  feats because  of the 
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noble virtues  expounded by Carlyle,   Kingsley and Wolseley. 
The General,   however,   would not have  agreed with  this   "legend- 
ary"  interpretation of his  numerous  successes.    Without God's 
direct  and  continual   intervention,  he would have been help- 
less  in  the   face  of  his many adversities.     Unfortunately, 
he  could not entirely  escape  the  ethnocentric belief  that a 
small detachment  of British  soldiers could dissolve a re- 
bellion  composed  of  thousands of devoted  followers  of  the 
Mahdi. 
To  the  present  scholar these  two interpretations  of 
Gordon's  triumphs  are  at best weak and partial explanations. 
The  General's victories  in China were possible because of 
military  support  provided by Imperial  and European garrisons 
and supply bases.     In  the  Sudan   (1874-1879)   the  fear of in- 
tervention  by British  troops probably caused a possible re- 
volt in  Darfur  to  collapse.     But  in Khartoum   (1884-1885) 
this needed  troop  strength was  lacking and Gordon's attempts 
to  crush  another  insurrection ended in complete  failure. 
With  the  death  of  Gordon,   the romantic and  impractical  theory 
of  great events  performed  singlehandedly by   "Great Men"  suf- 
fered a  serious  and permanent setback.     The British public 
would eventually realize that their ideal officer or civil 
administrator was  only as  influential as  the number of well- 
armed  "followers"  who backed up his commands. 
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FOOTNOTE 
CONCLUSION 
1Demetrius C. Boulger The Life of Gordon, (New York: 
Peter Fenelon Collier & Co., 1898), pp. 31-32. 
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